[Blindé] Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, l'après M-113

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Si l'AMPV est aussi vital pour l'US-Army que le VBMR l'est pour l'armée de Terre, ce programme risque d'être à rebondissement. Voici pourquoi :

U.S. Army delays decision on General Dynamics vehicle protest

By Andrea Shalal

WASHINGTON, March 24 (Reuters) - The U.S. Army said on Monday that it would delay until April 4 making a ruling on a protest filed by General Dynamics Corp about a new competition for armored vehicles.

General Dynamics filed a protest with the Army on Feb. 14, arguing that the Army's rules for a competition to replace nearly 2,900 Vietnam-era M113 infantry carriers were skewed to favor BAE Systems Plc's Bradley Fighting Vehicle.

The company is also pressing U.S. lawmakers to intervene in the Army's Armed Multi-purpose Vehicle (AMPV) competition and to mandate that a mixed fleet includes a version of both BAE's Bradleys and General Dynamics' wheeled Stryker vehicles.

General Dynamics spokesman Pete Keating said the Army told his company it needed more time given "the complexity of the issues involved in the protest."

Army spokeswoman Ashley Givens gave no details, but confirmed the ruling was now expected April 4.

Keating said General Dynamics was evaluating its options in case the Army rejected the protest. If that happens, the company would have 10 days to lodge a protest with the congressional Government Accountability Office, which rules on contract disputes. The company could also take its case to federal court.

BAE Systems argues that the Army cannot afford further delays since the existing M113 infantry vehicles are not suited to protect U.S. soldiers against direct fire attacks by today's more powerful rocket-propelled grenades and other threats.

Mark Signorelli, vice president and general manager of combat vehicles for BAE, said the Army had been very open and transparent about its requirements for the new vehicles, and had already extended the development program to five years.

"They've been very conscious of and attentive to industry needs," he said, noting that the Army issued its final request for proposal after roughly two years of dialogue with industry representatives.

General Dynamics contends it would not have enough time or data to develop a Bradley-like vehicle on the Army's schedule, and has even suggested a teaming arrangement with BAE - although BAE declined.

The company said that similar arrangements exist on other weapons programs, including the Navy's Virginia-class attack submarines to ensure continued work for both General Dynamics and Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc.

Keating said the Army would save money if it opted for a mixed fleet of Stykers and Bradleys, since some of the required vehicles such as ambulances and command-and-control centers did not need to be tracked or a heavily armored. General Dynamics' mixed fleet proposal would give 56 percent of the vehicles to BAE.

BAE's Signorelli said he was convinced that BAE had a "very compelling and competitive offering for the Army that met all the requirements and would protect U.S. troops, but said the Stryker based vehicle was not sufficiently armored.

"Replacing a vehicle that doesn't meet the requirements with a vehicle that doesn't meet the requirements is a little counterintuitive," he said. "If the vehicle doesn't meet the requirements, then the cost savings are irrelevant."

Signorelli said BAE was preparing a competitive bid and expected other firms to bid for the contract, one of few being awarded in the current, more constrained budget environment.

He said BAE believed it could accelerate the design work on the new vehicle and complete it in four years instead of the five years designated in the Army's procurement plan.

Given the high level of commonality with the current Bradley vehicles, he said the Army could also shorten the testing process for the new vehicles and field them more quickly.

The Army's current plan for the procurement calls for proposals to be submitted by May 28, with a contract to be awarded in late November.

(Reporting by Andrea Shalal; Editing by Ken Wills)

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More Disputes Likely in US Army's AMPV Contest

Mar. 29, 2014 - 02:21PM | By PAUL McLEARY

WASHINGTON — The first week of April will be a critical one for what has been a relatively drama-free armored vehicle program for the US Army.

The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV), which formally kicked off as a program in 2012, is slated to replace the Army’s M113 infantry carrier, which service leaders have said can no longer meet the protection or power-generation needs of the modern armored brigade combat team on the battlefield.

For much of the past two years, BAE Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems have worked with the Army to refine requirements for the non-developmental program, which would produce about 3,000 vehicles over a 13-year period at about $1.8 million apiece.

But on Feb. 14, General Dynamics filed a protest with Army Materiel Command to complain that the program’s requirements had been written in a way that favors BAE Systems’ Bradley tracked fighting vehicle, and makes it harder for GD’s wheeled Stryker — or other foreign designs — to compete for the program.

While the Army issued its formal request for proposals in November, GD charges that the Army’s plan to use excess Bradleys as “optional exchange vehicles” on which to fit new communications and protection packages makes it hard for anyone not offering a Bradley to compete.

The Army also is making it difficult for competitors to obtain all of the testing data on Bradley components that would allow non-BAE bidders to determine if they can make use of the vehicles or not, the company charges.

“We’ve got no performance data” on the Bradley tracks and other key components, GD spokesman Peter Keating said. “It’s kind of hard to compete” without that full range of data available, he said.

General Dynamics also has charged that the mobility requirement in the request for proposals all but excludes wheeled vehicles, since “no wheeled vehicle can get 100 percent” of the off-road mobility that the tracked M113 possesses.

“We put in our legal filing that we want to have a dialogue with the Army, and they would not do that, so we expect to get a detailed explanation of their decision” by the April 4 deadline, Keating added. “If we get that, we can go back and consider our options if we want to go to the” Government Accountability Office (GAO) to file a formal protest that would stop all work on the program.

Army Materiel Command has until April 4 to rule on the protest, and GD then has 10 calendar days in which to go to the GAO.

As of March 28, Army officials had not responded to requests for comment about the Bradley and M113 data transfers to industry.

Questioning GD's Move

Unsurprisingly, BAE Systems sees the AMPV program in a different light.

The Army has “been very transparent about the requirements” from the start of the program in 2012, said Mark Signorelli, general manager of Combat Vehicles at BAE Systems Land and Armaments. “The acquisition strategy hasn’t changed over the past two years.

“What has changed is the Army opening up the requirement set and making accommodations to make allowance for more offerers and offerings for the programs,” he said.

Signorelli cited the added performance requirements, such as the changes the Army made in the new vehicle’s turning radius requirement.

“Originally, the service was calling for a zero turning radius, but they added a larger turning radius” that would accommodate a wheeled vehicle, “while retaining the real key characteristics as to why there’s an AMPV program — which is the ability to operate and survive in the Army’s armored brigade combat team.

“Not only do [the requirements] not specify a Bradley-based solution, a pure Bradley-based solution would not meet the requirements. ... This was not a slam dunk” for a Bradley-based solution, he added.

GD files its protest and says that BAE has an unfair advantage — how do they define unfair advantage?” asked Dean Lockwood, an analyst with Forecast International. “I couldn’t find anywhere in the [Army request for proposal where they actually specified tracked or wheeled.”

That said, Lockwood envisions a future — if the program survives the return of full federal budget sequestration in 2016 — in which the Army buys a mix of modified Strykers and Bradleys to fulfill the AMPV requirement, since “they’re both adaptable vehicles,” he said.

But that’s a kind of best-case scenario. Just as likely is that the Army “reaches the point where they have to delay and outright cut almost everything that’s not already in the system,” due to budget cuts, Lockwood said. “What money they have will have to go into maintenance of existing vehicles. Modernizing it is a lot cheaper than buying a whole new vehicle.”

Throwing another wrinkle into the program, vehicle-maker Navistar has been talking to the Army in an effort to get the service to consider its MaxxPro mine-resistant vehicle to fill at least part of the AMPV requirement immediately, to get the M113s out of the fleet until the AMPV can be fielded.

Meg Kulungowski, Navistar’s director of government relations, said MaxxPro could be used “as a bridging option to get the M113s out the door,” in anticipation of the AMPV’s fielding in 2020 and beyond.

The shift to the MaxxPro also would allow the Army to save on sustainment costs, she claimed, since many of the mine-resistant vehicles are already reset from their service in Iraq and Afghanistan and are awaiting a mission.

The Army has said it plans to retain 8,585 mine-resistant vehicles out of the 25,000 the Pentagon has purchased since 2007. Of that number, 5,000 will be stored in prepositioned stocks all over the world, with the remainder being spread among the active force.

According to internal service documents, the Army will keep 5,651 Oshkosh-produced mine-resistant all-terrain vehicles out of the 8,700 DoD has bought since 2009, along with 2,633 Navistar-built MaxxPro Dash vehicles and 301 MaxxPro ambulances.

Plans for the AMPV call for the award of a five-year engineering, manufacturing and development (EMD) contract in May to one contractor who will build 29 prototypes for government testing, followed by a three-year low-rate initial production contract beginning in 2020. The EMD phase will run from fiscal 2015 to fiscal 2019 and cost $436 million.

The Army has requested $92 million in research and development funds for the program in its fiscal 2015 request to fund the EMD stage of the program.


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General Dynamics dénonce la formulation de l'appel d'offre pour l'AMPV :

General Dynamics: We Can’t Compete For AMPV Unless Army Changes Course

By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. on April 01, 2014 at 8:00 AM


The requirements for the Army Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) disqualify General Dynamics’ Stryker, shown above.

General Dynamics Land Systems cannot and will not compete for the Army’s largest surviving weapons program, the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, unless the service changes how it is handling the program, GDLS’s senior spokesman told me yesterday afternoon. A GDLS withdrawal would be yet another embarrassment for the Army’s chronically troubled acquisition system, since it would effectively leave AMPV with a single bidder to replace its aging and vulnerable M113 transports, BAE Systems, which is offering a modified version of its current M2 Bradley.

General Dynamics spokesman Peter Keating told me the Army must either (1) relax its mobility requirements so GDLS’s eight-wheel-drive Stryker could qualify or (2) provide enough technical data on the tracked Bradley that GDLS can come up with its own tracked offering. But while the company filed a protest last month with the Army Materiel Command (which is expected to reply Friday) he said, “we are not optimistic that we’re going to get a successful outcome at this level.” (Emphasis mine). That wording implies that GDLS plans to ask the Government Accountability Office to overrule the Army, though Keating would not confirm it: “We’ll take it one step at a time,” he said.

“We know how to build vehicles, we want to compete on this, we simply don’t have all the information… so we cannot compete,” Keating said. “We have asked them [the Army] for the data; they have not provided it.” Why not? “You’d have to ask them.”

Army Materiel Command has promised Breaking Defense a response to Keating’s charges, but given the complexity of the issue and the lateness of the hour, they weren’t able to provide it yesterday: We’ll post their answer when we get it.

My congressional sources so far seem more than a little skeptical of Keating’s case. “Nonsense,” one Hill staffer snorted. “Before GCV [the Ground Combat Vehicle program] died” — a far more lucrative competition — “nobody from GD ever said a single word about the AMPV program, yet all of a sudden it is a travesty?”

“This is 100 percent GD trying to undermine a competitor, under the guise of complaints about competition,” the staffer continued. “GD can compete, but they know they need more time to develop an alternative vehicle to offer, which is why they are lodging all these protests.”

Keating quite openly stated that GD did indeed need more time. Given that the current requirements disqualified the wheeled Stryker and General Dynamics must come up with a tracked vehicle — either reviving its stillborn tracked Stryker or modifying a foreign vehicle — “you need the time and the technical data to propose a solution,” he said. “If they can give us the test data, and give us time to evaluate it, we’ll be happy to consider coming back to them.”

What’s specifically at stake is the “reliability, availability, and maintainability” data for the M2 Bradley that’s currently in the Army inventory. General Dynamics has been asking for that data for 18 months, Keating told me, but the Army has provided too little, too slowly to let GD build a proper proposal for an alternative.

“How could you ever prove to the Army, within six months, that the changes you’ve made on [some] other tracked vehicle meet or exceed the performance data in their tests on the Bradley,” Keating asked, “[if] you don’t have the performance data on the Bradley?”

The Army has actually offered all competitors Bradleys to work with as “Optional Exchange Vehicles,” but Keating argues that providing the vehicle without the data only tips the balance even more in BAE’s favor. If the Army went with a modified Bradley, then you could build more than half the required 2,900 AMPVs out of excess Bradleys the service already has on hand, dramatically lowering the price, a major advantage over alternative vehicles. (The Army also has GDLS Strykers in its inventory, but none to spare, and they aren’t on offer as OEVs). Unless and until the Army provides the detailed technical data, Keating said, only BAE has the expertise to rebuild a Bradley.

“That’s the way it is,” said BAE’s manager for armored vehicles, Mark Signorelli. “If I was looking to compete a Stryker-based offering, I would be very severely handicapped,” just as General Dynamics is when it comes to Bradleys. In fact, he said, because the Bradley has been in service in larger numbers for a longer term, the Army has far more Bradley technical data to share with General Dynamics than it would have Stryker data to share with BAE.

And why should the Army restrict itself from using the excess Bradleys it has already bought? “The Army has all of those vehicles [already],” Signorelli said. “If they can find somebody that can use them to lower the cost, then I think that is clearly in the Army’s interests rather than maintaining them in a boneyard somewhere.”

That’s not to say that BAE can simply pop the gun turret off an existing Bradley, patch the hole, and roll it back out the door as an AMPV. Yes, the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle is meant as a support vehicle — as a transport, mobile command post, armored ambulance, or mortar carrier — not a frontline assault vehicle like the Bradley, so it doesn’t need nearly as much firepower. But AMPV’s requirement to survive attack, particularly from roadside bombs, is actually higher than the most heavily upgraded Bradley model in service, the 2008 “BUSK III” model. (That’s short for “Bradley Urban Survivability Kit,” a package of added armor and other enhancements to handle the dangers of Baghdad during the Iraq war “surge”).

Then there’s the critical mobility requirement. The Army wants AMPV to be able to keep up with the Bradley and the M1 Abrams tank as its armored brigades move rapidly cross-country. That’s something tracked vehicles historically excel at, while wheeled vehicles like the Stryker built to move much faster on roads.

But the Army’s own “NATO mobility model” shows that Stryker can traverse 96 percent of the terrain that the current M113 can, Keating said. The missing 4 percent is mostly very soft terrain — rice paddies in Korea, for example — where wheels would sink in but tracks would not. A 2008 Army study said 96 percent was good enough because a commander could usually find ways to go around. The current requirements, however, insist that the AMPV be able to do at least 100 percent of what the M113 can.

“If the mobility criteria is not a go/no-go, we could then consider the Stryker,” Keating told me. In fact, GD has asked Congress to make the Army buy a mixed fleet of Strykers and Bradleys to handle different parts of the AMPV mission. But as the rules of the competition currently stand, that’s not an option — which is why General Dynamics is threatening to withdraw.

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La réponse de l'US Army à GD :

US Army rejects GD's vehicle protest; company mulls further action

Apr. 7, 2014 - 01:49PM | By PAUL MCLEARY


General Dynamics will have to decide whether to pursue a more formal protest regarding the fairness of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle program. (US Army)

WASHINGTON — The April 4 rejection by US Army Materiel Command of a General Dynamics Land Systems protest disputing the fairness of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) competition puts the ball squarely back into GD’s court, which has the option of lodging a more formal protest with the Government Accountability Office — a move that would halt all work on the program for weeks or even months.

On Feb. 14, GD filed a protest contending “the AMPV solicitation provides a competitive advantage” to competitor BAE Systems, since BAE “has years of Army test and performance data” on the M113 personnel carrier, which the competition has been launched to replace.

“In our view, the AMPV procurement process is not consistent with the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, requiring a “full and open competition,” the company said in a statement.

These statements could indicate the company will file a protest with the GAO during the 10-day window that began when the initial protest was denied on April 4.

At issue is the fact that the Army wants competitors to incorporate parts from the Bradley fighting vehicle and the M113 in their AMPV designs, both of which are made by BAE. General Dynamics contends that it doesn’t have all of the relevant historical information on those parts to fully compete. The company has long said that it would submit a version of its eight-wheeled Stryker vehicle, of which the Army currently fields nine full brigades and a smaller Special Operations contingent.

BAE launched its own salvo on Friday afternoon, saying that it “is pleased” at the decision and that “cost savings, political expediency and business reasons do not justify putting soldiers’ lives at risk. The Army has had this solicitation in the works for two years and has adjusted requirements based on industry feedback to accommodate the broadest number of competitive offerings possible.”

On April 3, 10 members of Congress wrote a letter to the Pentagon’s top weapons tester, Frank Kendall, urging the Army to rewrite the five-month-old request for proposals. The lawmakers wrote that the Army should rework the program with a view toward “allowing for a mixed fleet of both track and wheeled vehicles” to meet the requirements for the competition.

In other words, the Army should split up the buy for 3,000 AMPVs between Stryker and Bradley variants.

The lawmakers also outlined the core reason for GD’s protests: the dearth of new ground vehicle programs in the Army’s near-term future.

“Given the intensely restrictive budget requirement the Army faces, the AMPV might be the only new vehicle entering the fleet for decades,” they wrote.

Rep. Ralph Hall, R-Texas, who represents the district that houses the Red River Army Depot — and its 4,500 jobs — which performs a great deal of work on Bradleys, issued a statement on Friday applauding the decision.

“No current vehicles meet the survivability, mobility, and reliability upgrades outlined in the Army’s competitive bid,” he wrote. The program “cannot be delayed a year or more by rehashing the multi-year bidding process.”

On March 4, Hall sent a letter to Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel pitching BAE’s AMPV bid as good for the local economy, saying that “if BAE Systems is awarded the contract, jobs will be protected at Red River Army Depot and additional jobs could be added.” ■


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Cette competition a l'air d'un non-sens complet, puisque l'Army avec l'AMPV veut un remplacant a chenilles pour ses M-113, compatibles avec son stock de pieces detachees pour M-113, on se demande pourquoi GD prend part a cette competition avec un vehicule a roues, au lieu d'essayer de proposer un vehicule conforme aux termes de l'appel d'offre? la on a deja 2 non-sens en un, puisque ce n'est pas une competition pour un nouveau type de vehicule.


A moins que la seule possibilite pour GD de pouvoir participer a cette appel d'offre en proposant une evolution du M-113 soit de travailler en JV avec BAE? Ce que BAE n'acceptera jamais (sauf sous la contrainte), donc du grand n'importe quoi donc, puisque maintenant, soit on laisse l'Army decider de ses besoins en choisissant d'emblee BAE, soit on laisse GD decider a sa place...


Ce qu'essaye d'obtenir GD, avec un contrat pour une part des vehicules a roues et une part a chenilles, ressemble furieusement a ce qu'ont obtenu Austal et LM pour le programme LCS, sauf que dans ce cas on avait une vraie competition pour un nouveau type de navire, pas une evolution de design existant, avec le fiasco operationnel et budgetaire qui s'en est suivi certes, mais c'est une autre histoire.

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La priorité me semble être de sortir les M113. Aussi, je ne crois pas dans les chances du réemploi de ses pièces détachées. Elles sont pensées pour une classe de blindé faiblement protégé.

La communalité avec la BFV est plus cohérente car elle permet d'atteindre des poids plus élevés. De plus, l'on se rend compte que le train de roulement Bradley devient la norme. Il n'équipe plus seulement les M2-3. On trouve ses pièces dans le châssis reconstruit du M-109 PIM dont la production commence et l'AAV-7 A1 au standard RAM/RS.

GD oublie qu'ils ont les Stryker. L'US Army n'avait rien entre les camions et les Bradley, maintenant, il y a 9 brigades sur Stryker. Ce n'est pas rien car ils pourront facilement proposer des modernisations.

Ils réagissent aussi violemment car sur le programme MPC de l'US Marine Corps, leur proposition n'est peut être pas terrible. BAE en retravaillant le SuperAV d'Iveco a peut être un candidat vraiment amphibie. En apparence au moins, c'est le plus crédible. L'AMV proposé par LM n'est peut être pas ridicule même s'il doit avancer moins facilement. Je ne suis pas sûr que la variante de Piranha que GD propose soit vraiment penser pour flotter. Même si cela se travaille.

Modifié par Serge

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GD jette l'éponge :

Tank Wars: General Dynamics won’t protest AMPV to GAO, Targets Hill

By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. on April 15, 2014 at 4:39 PM


General Dynamics says the Army’s AMPV (Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle) competition is stacked against its 8×8 Stryker.

WASHINGTON: General Dynamics has pulled back from the long-shot path of formal protests over the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV), but its quieter campaigns on Capitol Hill and in the Pentagon will continue — and those efforts may have better odds.

At stake is the Army’s largest weapons program to survive sequestration (so far), its $6 billion replacement for its almost 3,000 geriatric M113s. General Dynamics Land Systems insists that the Army has set up the competition to favor rival tank-builder BAE Systems and that it will not even compete for AMPV — which would probably leave a single bidder — unless the Army changes the rules.

So GD took the unusual step of filing a formal protest with the Army before submitting a proposal. (General Dynamics spokesman Peter Keating said he’d never heard of GD doing such a thing before; companies usually don’t protest a contract until they lose the bid). Army Materiel Command – unsurprisingly — rejected the protest. Last night, in a two-sentence statement, the company officially said it wouldn’t take the next step of protesting to the independent Government Accountability Office — but…..:

“We will continue to discuss the AMPV program with the U.S. Department of Defense and the Congress. We do not believe a GAO protest is the right forum for this issue and we will not file one.”

That surprised me, because I’d expected General Dynamics to go to GAO. What did they have to lose? But one of Washington’s most well-informed defense insiders, consultant and thinktanker Loren Thompson, explained why an appeal to GAO could have undermined General Dynamics’ efforts on the all-important congressional front:

“If something is tied up in review at GAO, then there’s less likely to be action by congressional committees, because they don’t want to predispose the outcome of the protests,” Thompson told me. “I would interpret this decision as indicating GD thinks its prospects are better on Capitol Hill,” where its strategy would not be to annul the competition but to make the Army buy a mix of BAE Bradley and GDLS Stryker vehicles.

“I should mention I’m a consultant to both companies, which is not the most comfortable position to be in at the moment,” Thompson chuckled, emphatically declining to pick a side.

What he would say: “Both of these companies are fielding seasoned lobbyists who understand the Hill far better than your typical player does,” Thompson told me. “[but] if I were the Army… I would notice the fact that GD has a long track record of getting Congress to do things the Army has not required.”

Thompson was referring to the government-owned but General Dynamics-operated tank plant in Lima, Ohio. Congress has repeatedly added money to keep buying more M1 Abrams tanks than the Army has requested rather than let Lima shut down even temporarily, as had been the Army’s plan.

But getting Congress to add money to an existing program is a lot easier than convincing legislators to take sides between companies and to intervene in an ongoing competition. Nor is General Dynamics without fierce detractors on Capitol Hill.

“It might be dawning one someone at some level of GD that continuing to hammer their No. 1 customer, the Army, in public and ask their friends in Congress to do something totally unjustified might not be worth the effort,” said one congressional source when I asked about the decision not to go to GAO. “We’ll see.”

Congress is hardly General Dynamics’ only avenue of attack. Its statement emphasizes the company is still talking with the Defense Department. Indeed, GD is still talking with the Army. What’s more, Army Materiel Command, the agency that publicly rejected GD’s protest, just yesterday posted additional technical information on its contracting website for the program and offered still more upon request, data that General Dynamics has said it needs for any successful bid.

General Dynamics’ argument is that the AMPV requirements effectively rule out their 8×8 Stryker because no wheeled vehicle can do 100 percent of what the Army wants and thus favor some variant of BAE’s tracked M2 Bradley. The Army has offered both competitors Bradleys for them to convert to AMPVs if they desire, but BAE has much more experience modifying its own product than does General Dynamics. That’s another thing GD says is deal-breakingly unfair unless the Army gives them much more technical data on the Bradley — which it just did.

Some words of caution. It’s too early for GD to have assessed whether what it needs is actually in the new data.

GD still has some options. Proposals are due to the Army on May 28th, a month before either the Senate Armed Services Committee or the House Armed Services Committee mark up the relevant section of the defense policy bill. (A HASC spokesman politely declined to comment). Even then, favorable mark-up language would take months and multiple votes to make its way into law.

But specific legislative action may not needed. If the Army sees political problems coming for AMPV, after it’s already had to give higher-priority armored vehicle and scout helicopter programs, it may decide it can’t risk a fight on Capitol Hill. While the service is hardly going to change the terms of the competition between now and the 28th, it may give General Dynamics at least some of what it wants.

Modifié par Serge

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J'ai entendu dire que le Stryker avait une protection anti-mine appelé double-V hull, j'ai pas trouvé d'image, je me demande comment l'effet de souffle est redirigé. :huh:

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J'ai entendu dire que le Stryker avait une protection anti-mine appelé double-V hull, j'ai pas trouvé d'image, je me demande comment l'effet de souffle est redirigé. :huh:

Je ne sais pas si c'est exactement le cas sur Stryker. Mais les coque en W contient une zone sacrifielle au centre du W, avec un partie fragile qui conduit a un évent, évent qui permet la baisse rapide de la pression.

Dans un Stryker avec le moteur a l'avant, il est possible que la coque en W est une fragilité dans la berceau moteur, l'explosion qui aurait lieu au centre entre les deux essieu avant serait alors canalisé dans le compartiment moteur puis évacué vers le haut meme si ca doit arracher tout le moteur.

Je ne sais pas si l'arriere est aussi en W.

L'autre option c'est la canalisation de l'onde de choc le long de v interne du W vers l'avant et vers l'arriere.

La derniere c'est que l'onde qui bute dans l'interieur du W le "rempli" format alors un grand V virtuel.

On ntrouve ce genre de brevet sur les coque "catamaran" anti explosion.

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Pour le Stryker DVH.

Ce blindé est l'eritié des Piranha-III, donc II, dont le ventre est plat. Cette génération de blindés n'a jamais intégré le minage de harcèlement. Ils datent du tout début des années 90.

Le premier lot de M-1126 était à fond plat puis a été modernisé avec un fond à V double. L'US Army démonte le blindé et le remonte dans une nouvelle caisse blindée dessinée avec ce fond.

Cette forme n'est pas un W mais une caisse avec un profil où deux V dont superposés. Comme c'est une modification, il ne peut avoir un V unique, simple comme sur un Buffel. Il a un dessin intermédiaire qui évite au véhicule de prendre 40cm de hauteur en plus. Pour ce faire, en partant du centre de la caisse, il y a une première inclinaison en V assez faible puis, quand on se rapproche des bords, l'inclinaison devient plus forte.

C'est moins efficace qu'un unique V très marqué qui dévie le souffle. Mais c'est mieux qu'un fond plat qui s'oppose au soufle.

Ce V double est une solution pour les blindés pour lesquels on cherche à contenir la hauteur.

Modifié par Serge

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Je ne sais pas si c'est exactement le cas sur Stryker. Mais les coque en W contient une zone sacrifielle au centre du W, avec un partie fragile qui conduit a un évent, évent qui permet la baisse rapide de la pression.Dans un Stryker avec le moteur a l'avant, il est possible que la coque en W est une fragilité dans la berceau moteur, l'explosion qui aurait lieu au centre entre les deux essieu avant serait alors canalisé dans le compartiment moteur puis évacué vers le haut meme si ca doit arracher tout le moteur.Je ne sais pas si l'arriere est aussi en W.L'autre option c'est la canalisation de l'onde de choc le long de v interne du W vers l'avant et vers l'arriere.La derniere c'est que l'onde qui bute dans l'interieur du W le "rempli" format alors un grand V virtuel.On ntrouve ce genre de brevet sur les coque "catamaran" anti explosion.

Ne pas confondre en anglais le double-V et double-U.

Le concept de catamaran est inemployable car fait perdre trop de place.

Il y a aussi la solution de la blast-chimney, cheminé à souffle qui elle est plus compact.

Voilà ce que cela donne :


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Tu me mets le doute.

Ça ne ressemble pas à une transmission de Piranha à moins que la transformation soit plus complexe que ce à quoi je pensais.

Vu comme ça, c'est séduisant mais j'ai un doute sur le centre. Ça me semble piégeux.

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Tu me mets le doute.

Ça ne ressemble pas à une transmission de Piranha à moins que la transformation soit plus complexe que ce à quoi je pensais.

Vu comme ça, c'est séduisant mais j'ai un doute sur le centre. Ça me semble piégeux.


Ca y ressemble avec l'arriere en bas l'avant en haut.



C'est spécieux non ? Je veux dire si l'engin explosif se trouve au milieu de la route le W devient un piège à souffle non ?


En fait ca piege le souffle localement mais la pression s'exerce alors orthogonnalement a V, donc plus vers le plancher cabine mais vers le V sacrifiable.


De plus je suppose que le V creux du milieu produit un grand V virtuelle en renvoyant l'onde de choc comme un coin d'onde.


A priori c'est moins efficace que le V classique, mais ca permet de mitiger le blast sur des engin pas prévu pour sans modifier la garde au sol.


Les autres effets du W, c'est un effet raidisseur sur le plancher, le blindage cinétique supplémentaire, et l'absorbtion du choc par déformation du V limitant l'onde de choc dans le plancher cabine.

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HASC throws General Dynamics little bone on AMPV

By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. on May 01, 2014 at 5:12 PM


A variant of BAE System’s tracked M2 Bradley, shown here, is the odds-on favorite to beat General Dynamics’ wheeled Stryker for the Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle contract.

A House Armed Services subcommittee passed its markup of its part of the annual defense bill that would — among many other things — freeze some funding for the Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Program. AMPV is the service’s biggest weapons program left standing after sequestration’s budget cuts. Contractor General Dynamics had protested the competition was unfair and pledged to take its case to Congress. So the company hailed the legislative language to at least one reporter as soon as it was made public yesterday. But, on closer examination, the subcommittee threw GD a bone but it’s not one with much meat on it.

“It means nothing,” one Hill staffer said. “Only a 20 percent fence and a cupcake report for the Army to write.” The language that the HASC tactical air and land forces subcommittee passed today would allow the Army to spend 80 percent of the funding allocated for the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle. To get the last 20 percent, the Army just has to submit a report on the program by March 1st, 2015.

The report requirement does have two interesting wrinkles — but they mainly illustrate how limited General Dynamics’ ambitions have become. First, while the current AMPV program will replace vulnerable Vietnam-vintage M113 armored vehicles now serving with tank brigades, the subcommittee also tells the Army to study replacing M113s in other units, especially higher echelon formations more removed from frontline fighting. Second, when it comes to the Armored Brigade Combat Teams themselves, the subcommittee only asks specifically about one of the AMPV’s five missions, the “medical evacuation” variant, a kind of armored ambulance. Specifically, the subcommittee wants to see if this one mission could be performed by a wheeled vehicle.

Why do wheels matter? At one point, General Dynamics was trying to build a tracked candidate for AMPV, but that never materialized. So GD is stuck offering its eight-wheel-drive Stryker, which generally costs less to operate than tracked vehicles but can’t cross certain terrain as well, especially soft ground. A big part of General Dynamics’ protest — predictably rejected by the Army — was the argument that the mobility requirements for AMPV effectively ruled out any wheeled vehicle, which would mean an automatic win for BAE System’s tracked Bradley. (Both Strykers and Bradleys have solid combat records in Iraq).

“This language demonstrates that the subcommittee recognizes the AMPV acquisition strategy needs to be improved,” General Dynamics declared yesterday. Maybe so, but what it also declares is that General Dynamics and its backers in Congress may be giving up on ever getting the whole AMPV contract and have started focusing on splitting the buy. Under such a “mixed fleet” plan, the Army would buy tracked BAE Bradleys for the roles that require the most mobility but buy Strykers for less demanding missions, like the armored ambulance and support vehicles not assigned to combat brigades.

BAE’s statement on the matter says “the House’s language clearly dismisses the notion of a split buy.” But as I read the bill, it’s silent on the question, one way or another.

So would the Army consider a split buy? Perhaps. But it’s very unlikely to want a mix of tracked and wheeled armored vehicles within the armored brigade combat team: The mobility differences would hinder cross-country maneuver, the mechanical differences would increase maintenance demands.

That said, commanders might be content with lower-mobility vehicles serving in rear-echelon units outside the armored brigades. But given the Army’s budgetary agonies, the service is not going to start buying new vehicles for those lower-priority units any time soon.

Modifié par Serge

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US Army awards AMPV to BAE Systems, future fights loom

By PAUL McLEARY 8:53 a.m. EST December 24, 2014

WASHINGTON — The US Army surprised no one by awarding BAE Systems a contract on Dec. 23 potentially worth $1.2 billion to begin building the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV).

BAE was the only contractor still in the running for the program after one-time competitor General Dynamics Land Systems pulled out of the competition in May, complaining that the requirements the Army drew up unfairly favored the tracked Bradley Fighting Vehicle derivative that BAE Systems was submitting.

The initial $382 million award calls for BAE to deliver 29 vehicles in five variants in a 52-month engineering, manufacturing and development phase that will lead to contract to replace all of the obsolete 2,897 M113 vehicles in the Army's Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT).

"Today's announcement sets in motion a long-awaited and important modernization effort for the Army" said Brig. Gen. David Bassett, the Army's program executive officer for Ground Combat Systems.

"The AMPV family of vehicles will fill critical force protection, survivability and mobility capability gaps inherent in today's Armored Brigade Combat Teams," Bassett said.

The award also provides an optional low-rate initial production phase. If awarded, the company would produce an additional 289 vehicles for a total contract value of $1.2 billion.

Eventually, the AMPV "will support the M1 Abrams and the M2/M3 Bradley to resupply the formation, conduct battle command functions, deliver organic indirect fires, provide logistics support and medical treatment, perform medical and casualty evacuation, and, most importantly, function as an integral part of the ABCT formation," said Col. Michael Milner, the Army's AMPV project manager.

A big issue with the aging M113 — which was terminated in 2007 — is that it was unable to fully keep pace with the service's armor formations. In a statement, the service contended that the new AMPV "will be able to move as rapidly as the supported primary combat vehicles during unified land operations over multiple terrain sets. The combined protection and automotive performance capabilities of the AMPV will enable units to operate more securely and efficiently in the same operational environment as the combat elements."

But the drama earlier this year between BAE, General Dynamics, the Army, and Capitol Hill is hardly over.

This contract only covers units at the brigade level and below within the ABCT. There are still another 1,922 M113s in use supporting Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) that the service eventually wants to replace.

And that's where GD has been focusing its lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill, hoping to place a version of its eight-wheeled Stryker vehicle in the role.

"The EAB level replacements may have different requirements than the current procurement, and have not yet been developed. The Army is currently assessing how it will address these emerging requirements," said Milner.

But these plans can all change once the Army finally has to reckon with the fiscal year 2016 budget, in which the sequestration cuts are scheduled to come back in full force.

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Les versions SAN de l'AMPV seront bien sur châssis Bradley :

US Army leaders make case for AMPV decision

By Joe Gould 3:40 p.m. EDT March 31, 2015

HUNTSVILLE, Ala. — US Army officials shot down the possibility for a wheeled ambulance variant of the armored multipurpose vehicle (AMPV), just the latest chapter in a drama over the vehicle between industry, the Army and Capitol Hill.

In December, the US Army awarded a contract worth $1.2 billion to BAE Systems to begin building the AMPV. BAE was the only contractor still in the running after General Dynamics Land Systems pulled out of the competition in May, complaining that the Army's requirements unfairly favored the tracked Bradley fighting vehicle derivative that BAE was submitting.

BAE is signed to deliver 29 vehicles in five variants in a 52-month engineering, manufacturing and development phase that will lead to a contract to replace all 2,897 M113 vehicles in the Army's armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs). However, GD lobbied the Hill get its eight-wheeled Stryker vehicle in the running for an ambulance variant and another 1,922 M113s in use supporting echelons above brigade (EAB) the service eventually wants to replace.

In a brief at an Association of the US Army convention here, acquisitions officials strove to put the matter to rest, outlining why the BAE's tracked vehicle provided the best mobility, as compared with the Stryker on a variety of terrain, particularly for an ABCT, and defending the program's fairness.

"The AMPV was about meeting the requirements, there was never a specification for a wheeled or tracked vehicle," said Col. Michael Milner, the AMPV project manager. "We provided industry a list of requirements, industry was able to provide feedback and eventually was issued an RFP [request for proposals] on those requirements. The proposal selected did happen to be a tracked vehicle."

Brig. Gen. David Bassett, the Army's program executive officer for Ground Combat Systems, said Stryker ambulances were "wonderful in their intended formations," but an ABCT's ambulances need to be able to go wherever the brigade's other vehicles go to retrieve wounded soldiers.

"We want to make sure we can get an ambulance to that point of need," Bassett said. "The arguments about the mobility being roughly equivalent are using analytical methods that don't represent the true traffic-ability of a wheeled versus a tracked solution."

The medical evacuation variant transports medics to troops on the front line, and evacuate them to a treatment variant, which is used to carry equipment for a battalion aid station.

Bassett said officials wanted to provide the best vehicle under a particular price, and "need to leverage" common components with the Bradley.

The aging M113 was terminated in 2007 because of it lacked required armor and was unable to accommodate modern electronics. The AMPV, with 78 percent more space and two, 400-amp generators, would include mortar carrier, mission command, general purpose, medical evacuation and medical treatment variants, all on a similar chassis.

Milner touted a common drive train, power plant, electronics and underbody across the five variants, all mature systems that would speed production and fielding. The drive train and suspension are common to the Bradley and the Paladin Integrated Management, a self-propelled howitzer.

The plan is to go to a preliminary design review this summer and a critical design review next summer, with first delivery in late 2016. From there, intermittent tests will lead to the limited user tests in late 2018. The fielding is not going to be complete until the mid-2020s.

The matter of wheeled versus tracked vehicles is not entirely settled, as other studies are ongoing.

The Army released one study to the House Armed Services Committee last month, and it found that the other units in the brigade had similar requirements to the AMPV, "but that's not to say those will be the requirements."

The Pentagon's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office is expected to complete its study soon that concentrates on medical variants, Milner said.

The Army is also conducting a formal analysis of alternatives for echelons above brigade at the behest of the Senate Appropriations Committee tat is expected to wrap in 2016.


Twitter: @reporterjoe

Modifié par Serge

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March To AMPV

By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

on March 31, 2015 at 6:03 PM


US Army slide

The future Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) compared to the M113 it will replace

HUNTSVILLE, ALA: The lethally under-armored M113 “battle taxi” will celebrate its seventieth birthday before the Army replaces it with a new Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle.

Under current plans — which assume spending levels well above those allowed by the Budget Control Act (aka sequester) — AMPV production at contractor BAE Systems will max out at 180 vehicles a year, Col. Mike Milner, the AMPV program manager, said today at AUSA Global, the new and improved version of the old AUSA Winter conference. That’s enough vehicles to modernize 1.3 armored brigades a year. With 12 such brigades in the Army, the last would replace its M113s in the “late 2020s,” Milner said.

But the Army has another 1,900 M113s in other formations. Their replacement is currently undecided. Whether it’s AMPV or something else, however, there’s no way it will be finished before 2030.


Army M113 in Vietnam

That’s seven decades after the M113 entered service in 1960. Even in Vietnam, it was considered so vulnerable to mines that many soldiers preferred to ride on top, with the whole vehicle between them and the blast, rather than risk being pulped inside. In the age of the roadside bomb, many commanders in Iraq refused to let their M113s off-base. That problem won’t get fixed for a decade or more for most Army units.

Across the board, “production rates that we’re currently funded to in the combat vehicle modernization portfolio are not optimal rates,” said Brig. Gen. David Bassett. As Program Executive Officer for ground combat systems, Bassett oversees not only AMPV but M1 Abrams tanks, M2 Bradleys, and Paladin howitzers. His staff’s analysis shows major potential cost-efficiencies at higher production rates, he said. Army budgeteers are fully aware of the benefits, but they don’t have enough money.

Those funding limits leave a big question mark over what will replace M113s outside the armored brigades. AMPV is obviously a leading candidate, but rear-echelon units might not require the same performance. “There are multiple studies out there for echelons above brigade,” Milner said. One study for the House Armed Services Committee done in February found many such units have similar requirements to AMPV, but they are not necessarily identical. The Senate Appropriations subcommittee on defense has asked for another.

This potentially opens the door to General Dynamics, which refused to enter its eight-wheel-drive Stryker vehicle in the AMPV competition, arguing the Army had levied unreasonably high requirements for cross-country mobility that no wheeled vehicle could meet.

“There was never a specification for it to be a wheeled or tracked vehicle,” emphasized Milner. “The proposal that was selected did happen to be a tracked solution, but it was not required to be one.”


Army graphic

The problem with that answer is the Army did require the AMPV to be able to keep up with frontline elements of the armored brigade, and those are tracked vehicles. In fact, the plurality are M2 Bradley troop carriers, from which the winning AMPV design derives. The upgraded M109 Paladin howitzer will also have a Bradley power train and suspension. Overall, choosing BAE’s design over General Dynamics’ allows 75 percent of the armored brigade’s combat vehicles to share the same automotive components. That eases maintenance and logistics, as well as guarantees they can keep up with one another.

Critics argue that AMPV is a support vehicle that doesn’t need the exact same performance as a frontline war machine. It’s true, Bassett admitted, that if you look at the entire mission profile, a Stryker can go almost everywhere a tracked AMPV can. But that almost is a killer — literally.

Army models show a Stryker ambulance would perform worse than a Bradley variant on many kinds of rough terrain, especially soft ground like sand, rice paddies, or mud. It’s a matter of simple physics: Tracks distribute a vehicle’s weight over a much wider area than wheels, so they’re less likely to bog down, the same way boots do better in mud than heels. If an armored ambulance can’t get to the front line, wounded soldiers are more likely to die.Army graphic

That armored ambulance is just one variant of the AMPV, however. It would evacuate wounded soldiers back to a forward aid station just behind the lines, often set up from a sister AMPV, a mobile surgery called the medical treatment vehicle. Other AMPV variants include a mortar carrier, providing close-in fire support; a command vehicle; and a general purpose carrier for supplies and soldiers.

The Army doesn’t want to compromise on cross-country performance of any of these variants. With General Dynamics and other wheeled-vehicle advocates lobbying hard on the Hill, that decision will remain one for vigorous debate.

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