[Chine] Programme Hypersonique et Near Space

[rogue0]

Le 24/1/2016à12:28, Henri K. a dit :

L'Amiral Cecil Eugene Diggs Haney, Commandant de l'USSTRATCOM (United States Strategic Command), confirme lors de son intervention vendredi dernier au CSIS (the Center for Strategic and International Studies), que les 6 tests hypersoniques Boost-Glide chinois ont tous été terminés avec succès, et que la Chine avance très rapidement pour déployer opérationnellement ce type d'armes de nouvelle génération.

Pour ceux qui sont courageux, voici son discours en entier, qui dure un peu près 1h. 

Révélation

 

 

C'est toujours mieux que de lire des conneries sensationnelles des "journalistes" à 2 x 10^-18 centimes...

Henri K.

Pour les moins courageux , voici le résumé par le site TheDiplomat

http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/us-admiral-warns-of-chinas-and-russias-growing-space-weapons-arsenal/

[Henri K.]

Ne sais pas trop quoi penser...

China’s Shenlong space plane is part of growing space warfare program: Gertz

BY BILL GERTZ on JANUARY 25, 2016 in BILL GERTZ, CHINA, THE CHINA CHALLENGE

China’s military space program is getting a boost from a recent reorganization within the People’s Liberation Army.

A Chinese military expert disclosed earlier this month that a Chinese space plane known as the Shenlong will likely be deployed with the newly formed Strategic Support Force, the PLA’s new high-technology warfare unit.

China announced in late December the launching of a significant reorganization within the PLA that includes the renaming of its missile forces as the Rocket Forces, and creating the Strategic Support Force that is designed for high-technology warfare, including space, cyber and electronic warfare.

A Jan. 8 report in Hong Kong’s Tung Fang Jih Pao quotes official military commentator Song Zhongping as saying the Strategic Support Force will be made up of an Internet Army, an Aerospace Army and Electronic Warfare Troops.

Song went on to say that the new force would be equipped in the future with the Shenlong space plane that is capable of traveling in both space and air. The plane is said to be China’s version of the Pentagon’s experimental X-37B space plane.

The Shenlong – Divine Dragon – employs high speed with maneuverability and radar-evading stealth features. It will be capable of long-range flight.

Space weapons platform

According to Song, the unmanned Shenlong is being developed as space weapons launch platform, as well as for surveillance, intelligence and early-warning missions.

It was the first time an official Chinese military representative linked the Shenlong to China’s growing space warfare capabilities.

Adm. Cecil Haney, commander of the US Strategic Command, said last week that China is developing a range of space warfare arms.

“The ability of adversaries to conduct hostile operations in space presents a multifaceted space challenge, and potentially threatens national sovereignty and survival,” Haney said in a speech to the Center for New American Security.

“This is a particular concern to me as the combatant commander responsible for space, to include how critical our space capabilities are to my foundational nuclear deterrent mission, in addition to my other assigned missions,” the four-star admiral said.

Haney said China’s military is equipped with advanced directed energy weapons that can blind satellites, and in September launched a rocket carrying 20 micro-satellites — a record number for China – that could be use for space warfare.

China also conducted the sixth successful test of a new hypersonic strike vehicle capable of traveling up to 10 times the speed of sound.

The congressional US-China Economic and Security Review Commission warned in its most recent annual report that “China is pursuing a broad and robust array of counter-space capabilities, which includes direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite systems, computer network operations, ground-based satellite jammers and directed energy weapons.”

Military analysts said the disclosure that the PLA plans to use the Shenlong for its Strategic Support Force highlights the buildup of PLA space warfare capabilities.

The PLA also is working on rapid global strike weapons, including hypersonic glide vehicles to deliver nuclear or conventional weapons, anti-satellite missiles and other weapons, and missile defenses.

“This confirms my longstanding assessment that Shenlong was always a military program and that space warfare is a principle mission of the new Strategic Support Force,” Rick Fisher, a China military affairs analyst with the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said of Song’s comments on the Shenlong.

The Shenlong has been under development since 2007 and at least one test of the plane, launched beneath the wing of an H-6 bomber, took place five or six years ago.

“One reason China did not perform a full orbital test [of the Shenlong] may have been fear of losing their spacecraft if it landed in another country,” Fisher said.

Fisher believes it is very likely the PLA will launch an operational Shenlong for both civilian and military missions. The plane is a key test bed for China’s plans to develop larger space planes that could be built in the early 2020s.

Capturing enemy satellites

“Space planes are attractive militarily because they are reusable, can be configured to perform passive or active military missions, such as capturing and returning an enemy satellite,” he added.

David M. Finkelstein, a China analyst with Center for Naval Analysis, says China’s government has been vague about the new Strategic Support Force.

However, the force appears to be the center of key high-technology capabilities the PLA needs to wage modern warfare. They include cyber, space, electromagnetic, precision strike and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The force may also include China’s growing special operations warfare forces, and its unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles and electronic counter measures forces.

“These capabilities and units reside at the heart of what the PLA refers to as ‘informationized local wars’ which the PLA’s new military strategy has identified as the type of modern warfare that the Chinese armed forces must be able to prosecute, and which, from an operational perspective, this entire reorganization is meant to facilitate,” Finkelstein wrote in a recent CNA report.

China’s military, widely criticized for its secrecy, has set off alarms in western and Asian governments with its development of space and other high-technology arms and concerns about the weapons likely will persist until Beijing is more open about its new weaponry.

Bill Gertz is a journalist and author who has spent decades covering defense and national security affairs. He is the author of six national security books. Contact him on Twitter at @BillGertz

(Copyright 2015 Asia Times Holdings Limited, a duly registered Hong Kong company. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

Henri K.

[rogue0]

Il y a 6 heures, Henri K. a dit :

Ne sais pas trop quoi penser...

China’s Shenlong space plane is part of growing space warfare program: Gertz

Henri K.

Mmmh, retour aux sources:

Est-ce que le "journaliste" Song Zhongping en question est sérieux ?
Ou souvent utilisé pour faire des pseudo-fuites officielles ?
Et as-tu retrouvé la vidéo de sa déclaration supposée ?

Pour la nature du programme, je reste open.

Après tout, je n'ai aucune preuve du contenu réel des missions du X-37

 

[Henri K.]

Suite à un problème de santé, ceci est mon dernier post ici, je dois modérer le temps que je passe à mes recherches et surtout arrêter tout partage, trop consommateur en temps et en effort. Je garde un peu l'upload sur Youtube mais je ne sais pas encore pendant combien de temps.

Si dans le passé vous avez senti d'avoir été "agressé" par mes phrases, sachez que ce n'est pas volontaire. Je me rend compte depuis longtemps que ma perception de la Chine et celle que vous avez "appris" via les médias en Europe se divergent très fondamentalement, pas parce que les faits sont différents, mais parce que l'usage et l’intérêt sont différents. Je m’efforce depuis mon retour en France de vouloir vous révéler une autre face de la vérité, mais force est de constater que c'est un effort en vain.

Peu importe, cela n'a plus aucune importance désormais. Les 2 seules choses que je vais vous dire, la première c'est de garder toujours un esprit critique et ouvert, ne croyez pas tous qu'on vous dit, y compris ce que je vous ai dit, car rien n'est gratuit. Si vous avez accès à certaines informations gratuitement, il y a toujours un but derrière, vous connaissez maintenant le mien, mais connaissez vous celui des médias ?

La 2ème est de bien prendre soin de vous.

==================================================

La Chine a procédé son 7ème essai hypersonique Boost Glide le 22 Avril 2016 depuis le centre de lancement spatial TSLC.

Un article de Jamestown qui contient un tableau de comparaison entre les USA, la Russie et la Chine, pas si mal, quelques erreurs par ci par là mais acceptable :

Chinese Hypersonic Weapons Development

 

Citation

Publication: China Brief Volume: 16 Issue: 7April 21, 2016 05:30 PM Age: 5 days

By: Erika Solem, Karen Montague

China’s military is reorganizing itself to be a more modern, effective force. On January 1, 2016, the Second Artillery Force (第二炮兵部队) (responsible for China’s nuclear and conventional ballistic missile arsenals) was reorganized into the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF; 火箭部队), elevating it to a service (军种) fully on-par with the Navy, Army and Air Force (Sina, January 1). As China streamlines its military and works to improve the quality of its personnel, several cutting edge projects are in the works to provide the People’s Liberation Army with advanced weapons. One of these is the PRC’s hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), called the DF-ZF in China and designated by U.S. defense officials as the Wu-14. The development and testing of this new class of hypersonic weaponry in China has been extremely secretive. However, its eventual operational deployment will represent a significant improvement in the PLARF’s conventional and nuclear arsenals, as it has the potential to penetrate even the strongest layered anti-missile defenses of the United States and its allies.

Hypersonic Arms Race

In addition to China, the United States and Russia are pursuing various iterations of HGVs and all three have developed prototypes of this high-tech weapon. The X-51A, Yu-71, and DF-ZF are the current HGV prototypes for the U.S., Russia and China, respectively. This new class of weapons has prompted each nation to adopt different approaches, with each model using a different engine, fuel type, and delivery method, but all HGV weapons’ core characteristic is sustained and controlled Mach 5 (3,836 mph) flight (See Table 1). [1]

Table 1: China, Russia, and U.S. HGV Names and Launch Platforms

Country

HGV Name

Launch Platform

Engine

China (PRC)

Wu-14 / DFZF

DF-11,15,16,21, 26 Variants

Single-or Two-Stage Solid-Propellant Rocket

Russia

Yu-71

SS-19 / Yu-100N

Two-Stage Liquid Fuel

United States

X-51A Waverider

B-52 bomber

Scramjet

Karen Montague & Erika Solem

The Potomac Foundation, April 2016

The variation in each country’s testing of their respective HGVs provides a glimpse into their motives for pursuing this costly technology. It is speculated that the United States hopes to improve the speed of its Prompt Global Strike capability (which would enable to hit a target anywhere in the world with a conventional warhead in less than an hour), while both Russia and the PRC want the ability to pierce U.S. missile defenses. The competition between the three countries is resulting in both a new arms race fueled by ambiguous goals and a lack of transparency on all sides.

U.S. Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Developments

To understand China’s progress toward an operational HGV, an examination of the U.S. military’s hypersonic projects is important. The United States has been researching and developing hypersonic technology since the early 2000s under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Force Application and Launch from Continental United States (FALCON) Project. Since then, the U.S. Air Force, DARPA, Boeing, and many others have collaborated on the X-51A Waverider HGV. The Waverider uses a B-52 bomber as a launch platform, is intended to be capable of Mach 5+ speeds, and is equipped with a scramjet engine that uses high speed to pressurize the air-to-fuel mixture, allowing more efficient combustion and greater speeds. The first Waverider test took place on May 26, 2010, and set a record with a 200-second burn, beating out the 12-second burn of NASA’s X-43 in 2004 (Edwards Air Force Base News, May 26, 2010). In contrast, Chinese media reports that its military has the capability to launch its HGV from a variety of types of ballistic missile models. Among these are the DF-11B, DF-15B, DF-15C, DF-16, DF-21C, DF-21D, DF-26 (rumored), and the M-20/DF-12 (Sina Military, June 18, 2015). When comparing HGV technology, the U.S.’s delivery method and intended range appear to be more ambitious. However, the U.S. program has had a much lower test launch success rate (25 percent), compared to China’s 83 percent. Despite its recent advances with its HGV program, the United States has not conducted a Waverider test in the past two years, which makes the Chinese program appear more advanced. (See Table 2)

Table 2: China, Russia, U.S. HGV Testing Records

Country

Test 1

Test 2

Test 3

Test 4

Test 5

Test 6

China

9-Jan-14

7-Aug-14

2-Dec-15

7-Jun-15

21-Aug-15

23-Nov-15

DF-ZF

Success

Failure

Success

Success

Success

Success

Duration

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Speed

Mach 10

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Mach 10

> Mach 5

Russia

27-Dec-11

13-Sep-13

Sep-14

26-Feb-15

---

---

Yu-71

Failure

Failure

Failure

Failure

---

---

(Yu-70)

Duration

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

---

---

Speed

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

---

---

U.S.

26-May-10

13-Jun-11

14-Aug-12

1-May-13

---

---

X-51A

Success

Failure

Failure

Success

---

---

Duration

3.5 Minutes

9 Minutes

(3 Controlled)

Crashed After Separation

> 3.5 Minutes

---

---

Speed

Mach 4.88

Mach 5

---

Mach 5.1

---

---

Karen Montague & Erika Solem

The Potomac Foundation, April 2016

China and its Goals for the DF-ZF

China has conducted six DF-ZF tests in the past year and a half. Although frequency does not determine test quality, it does demonstrate that China is dedicated to the successful development of this technology. Its 10th Research Institute (also known as the “Near Space Flight Vehicle Research Institute”), which is under the China Aerospace Science Industry Corporation (CASIC) 1st Academy, is the sole entity responsible for the development of HGVs. [2] This unique concentration of the entirety of the program into the 10th Research Institute seems to have facilitated a remarkably quick development of China’s DF-ZF. Unlike the United States, China is assumed to be using a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) transporter erector launcher (TEL) as the delivery method for all of its HGV tests. This design launches the boost-glide vehicle into the atmosphere along a trajectory similar to a traditional ballistic missile. After the vehicle reenters the earth’s atmosphere, it boosts itself back into the upper atmosphere. It then performs a pull up maneuver to control speed and altitude before gliding into its target (Next Big Future, August 1, 2015). The up-and-down trajectory of the HGV is believed to be able to confuse current ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems as the projectile’s erratic course prevents the system from locking onto its target. Countries in East Asia with BMD available to intercept a Chinese HGV include Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, each with U.S.-supplied PATRIOT-3 (PAC-3) batteries, along with India, Pakistan and Russia, each of whom has its own indigenous BMD, as well as BMD purchased from other countries. The DF-ZF’s unpredictable flight path and ability to be launched from a variety of missiles, each with different range capabilities, shows that China’s goals for its HGV is to evade ballistic missile defense systems that threaten its ability to launch a successful offensive or defensive strike.

A major concern about China’s HGV program is that the technology could be applied to both conventional and nuclear weapons. [3] The wreckage of China’s second (and failed) HGV test indicates that it was conducted using a liquid-fueled launch platform. This test contradicts the many reports that China is using the DF-21 solid-fueled rocket as a launch platform. However, it warrants special attention because it is the only one that has public images of its components (Arms Control Wonk, September 3, 2014). This is important because liquid-fueled launchers are associated with China’s nuclear program. The use of a liquid-fueled launch platform such as the Long March-4C (speculated to be used in the second test) indicates that China may be developing the DF-ZF for both conventional and nuclear use. An alternative explanation for the use of liquid fuel could be to compensate for the weight of the glider during acceleration to hypersonic speed. However, this explanation likely complements—rather than displaces—the theory behind intended nuclear use (Carnegie Endowment, November 21, 2014). [4]

China’s primary goal for the HGV is to have it travel fast enough while making use of the HGV’s unique flight characteristics to evade BMD systems. China has expressed its frustration with deployed U.S. BMD in the Western Pacific for over a decade due to the perception that such a system would degrade China’s limited nuclear deterrent (MOD, May 26, 2015; MOD, December 9, 2011). Further adding to China’s unease, other regional powers such as Japan and South Korea have also invested heavily in ballistic missile defense, making any sort of larger-scale engagement in the region quite challenging for China’s missile forces (CRS, April 3, 2015). Most of China’s HGV tests have attempted to travel distances up to 1,750 kilometers (1,087 miles) and have been launched from Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, located in Shanxi province (China Military Online, December 12, 2014). The intended distance of these tests is a strong indicator that China is either less advanced in its HGV development than the United States or is focused on addressing regional threats. If China successfully designs an operational short-range HGV, it will have a better chance of delivering successful missile strikes against its regional adversaries. Given China’s strategic focus on regional security issues—particularly on developing the ability to defeat Taiwan militarily—a shorter-range HGV addresses China’s more immediate needs.

Since the Taiyuan launch center is used primarily for testing new missiles, once development of the DF-ZF is complete, it likely will be relocated to PLARF bases that house compatible launchers. Because China’s DF-ZF appears to be regionally focused, there is a strong possibility that it would be placed under the jurisdiction of the 52nd Base command. The 52nd Base command covers a majority of the Eastern coast of China and it is likely that the DF-ZF will be placed directly in the 807th brigade headquarters, the 817th brigade headquarters, the 818th brigade headquarters, the 819th brigade headquarters, and/or any PLARF bases that house the HGV compatible DF-11A, DF-15B, and DF-21D. There are also specific locations under Base 53’s command on the southeast coast of China, which could also be strategic for the use of a DF-ZF in a regional strike (AusAirpower.net, January 27, 2014). The DF-11A and DF-15B are able to reach Taiwan, while the DF-21 is able to reach Taiwan, the Philippines, southern Japan, South Korea and North Korea. (See Image 1) Furthermore, it is reported that a glide vehicle extends the weapon’s range by 500–1,000 kilometers, but it is unclear if this distance is accounted for in the Chinese tests or choices of launch vehicles (Tencent News, November 27, 2015). If the additional distance was not accounted for in published distances, the HGV could have the ability to cover even the farthest parts of the South China Sea and potentially the Second Island Chain, which includes Guam.

Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Applications

One major application of a hypersonic glide vehicle could be to deliver a “decapitating strike,” which is an attack on an adversary’s command-and-control centers. An example would be to strike the U.S.’s military bases in Asia, hoping to render American forces vulnerable and incapable of an immediate retaliatory response. If conducted successfully, this approach causes an opponent to be unable to retaliate with its own weapons. Some aspects of Chinese strategy already emphasize these tactics, for example, network attacks to paralyze an opponent’s communications at the outset of a conflict. The DF-ZF could provide “hard” kill capability against hardened infrastructure or leadership facilities to complement cyber-attack “soft kills” against infrastructure. As China’s research into HGV technology progresses, a number of other strategic roles could be developed. Extended range, possibly through the use of scramjet engines (which take advantage of high speeds to compress air for combustion and greater propulsion), could give Chinese missile units the ability to destroy the assets of countries in range.

The DF-ZF does not currently use a scramjet engine like Boeing’s X-51A. However, the PRC recently announced that it is now the second country to possess this technology. Since the announcement, there have not been reports of scramjet engines being tested in the DF-ZF (Sina Military, October 9, 2015). Since scramjet engines, when successful, have the potential to travel very long distances, they are optimal for obtaining rapid global strike capability with HGVs. The majority of U.S. tests using scramjets, for example, have attempted to travel around 3,800 km, supporting the idea that the U.S. is aiming for a very long-range strike with their weapons. [5] China’s own interest in scramjets was demonstrated in 2015 when the Chinese government gave the developer of its scramjet, Wang Zhengou, an award at the 2nd China Aeronautical Science and Technology Conference, which indicates that China highly values the development of this technology (Tencent News, October 8, 2015). Although up to this point China has been testing to obtain hypersonic speeds over short distances (a function that a scramjet engine is not optimal for), their recent attainment of scramjet technology will allow them to expand the goals of their HGV development.

Yet, with or without a scramjet engine, if the PRC expands its targets to include countries outside of the East Asian region, attaching a HGV to one of its SRBMs would extend the reach of this weapon to MRBM and ICBM ranges. When conducting a conventional prompt global strike, there is the potential for other nations to associate that ICBM with a nuclear strike, which could escalate the conflict (Congressional Research Service, February 24). Because SRBMs give off a different radar return than ICBMs, using one to reach the same striking distance would not seem as threatening and would ameliorate this perception problem. The PRC’s use of a DF-21 as an HGV launch vehicle requires the use of specific locations and firing circles, many of which are well known and monitored by the United States. Since missile launch preparations are very rare, it might be possible to detect HGV-equipped DF-21s before launch.

Conclusion

Based on an analysis of China’s HGV development, the authors speculate that the PRC’s main priority for the DF-ZF is to bypass regional BMD. Of all the launchers currently deployed by the PRC, based on the assumed intent and estimated range capabilities, the DF-21 seems to be the most likely launch platform for the HGV. Unlike the DF-31, which is a liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-21 is a solid-fueled medium-range ballistic missile, which means quick preparation times compared to liquid-fueled. It also has a reported range of at least 1,500 km (932 miles), meaning it can reach all of the countries in the East Asian region. In 2001, it was reported that the solid fueled DF-21 takes anywhere between 10 to 15 minutes to prepare. [6] Since technology has advanced immensely over the last 15 years, it is very possible that it now takes even less time to prepare. The newly released DF-26 is the next generation of the DF-21 and has a longer range. It is speculated that China will use the DF-26 as a launch platform for the DF-ZF in the future (IHS Jane’s 360, November 26, 2015). No matter the type of launch platform, an HGV can extend the reach of any missile by at least 1,000 km. If the DF-ZF truly does have the capability to bypass ballistic missile defense, it has the potential to deliver a devastating conventional or nuclear strike to any country. Even the threat of its use could be sufficient to make an adversary consider Chinese demands.

There are clear symbolic and military benefits for the nation that successfully develops a hypersonic weapon. The DF-ZF, though impressive, still has a long way to go before it can truly threaten the security of the United States and its allies. Therefore, China will continue frequent testing of the DF-ZF as a display of its military’s power and advancement. Although in its current form the applications of the DF-ZF are constrained to East Asia, it is likely that China will continue to expand the range and capabilities of this weapon. Given the recent increase in investments in BMD by nations such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the DF-ZF is a potentially destabilizing capability. If China is able to complete development of the system and operationalize it over the coming years, the DF-ZF system could further erode the U.S. military’s deterrent in Asia. In the future, it will play an important role in calculating the relative balance of power in the region.

Erika Solem is a Ph. D. Fellow at the Potomac Foundation where she supports the research efforts on the "China’s 21st Century Strategic Arsenal" project. She is a first year Ph. D. student at George Washington University with a focus on Chinese Space Policy and Defense. She has extensive experience both living and studying in China.

Karen Montague is a Research Fellow at the Potomac Foundation, where she assists in war gaming and simulation development efforts and supports the research efforts on the "China’s 21st Century Strategic Arsenal" project. She earned her B.A. in International Studies from Texas A&M University in 2011 and M.S. in Defense and Strategic Studies from Missouri State University in 2013.

Notes

1. The U.S. and Russia are also developing a new class of ballistic missiles. This class would have the same high-speed, low altitude and weaving characteristics of an HGV, allowing it to travel above Mach 5 speeds and evade BMD. Most recently, Russia has developed a hypersonic missile that can be launched from a nuclear-powered submarine (RT, March 17). Currently, China has not announced or demonstrated research into this class of missiles; all three countries seem to be prioritizing development of the glide vehicle.

2. Mark Stokes with Dean Cheng, “China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. Interests” Project 2049, April 26, 2012. <https://project2049.net/documents/uscc_china-space-program-report_april-2012.pdf>.

3. Paul J. Waltrup, Michael E. White, Frederick Zarlingo, and Edward S. Gravlin, “History of Ramjet and Scramjet Propulsion Development for U.S. Navy Missiles,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Volume 18, Number 2 (1997).

4. Although China has been shifting to the use of more solid-fuel boosters for its missiles, all of the observed Chinese HGV tests are speculated to have been launched from boosters using liquid fuel. The main use of liquid fuel in China’s missile program is associated with the delivery of nuclear weapons on ICBMs. It is also possible that China is using liquid fuel in tests to obtain higher speeds, as liquid-fueled missiles have a speed advantage over solid fueled missiles.

5. James M. Acton, “China’s Offensive Missile Forces”: Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission April 1, 2015. <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Acton%20USCC%20Testimony%201%20Apr%202015.pdf>.

6. Wendy Frieman, “The Arms Control and Ballistic Missile Defense Costs of a Chinese Conflict,” in The Cost of a Future Conflict, Andrew Scobell, ed. 2001. p. 166.

http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/_CB_16_7_3.pdf

Bien à vous,

Henri K.

P.S. 1 : Une dernière chose, je déteste toujours autant Dassault, et Rafale n'est pas le meilleur avion de combat au monde. Voilà c'est dit. D'ailleurs je ne sais pas si Dassault va encore exister après 2035 si j'en crois aux sages...

P.S. 2 : Bat, arrêtes de faire croire que tu es neutre. Non tu ne l'es pas. Sors un peu, regardes un peu plus, ça va te faire du bien.

P.S. 3 : @xav, je suis très critique envers les médias, mais j'ai toujours une admiration à ce que toi et les équipes faites. Continues comme ça. Si tu as des questions et je peux encore te répondre, ce sera avec plaisir.

Modifié le 27 avril 2016 par Henri K.

[anthoemt]

la santé avant tout, mais sans détracteurs point de forum.

tu va laisser un vide certain, mais ça ne seras peut etre pas un adieu.

 

merci de tes infos en tout cas

[Majestik]

@Henri K.  Bon rétablissement, et merci pour avoir partagé tant d'informations et de points de vue... Ce n'est qu'un au revoir! 

[collectionneur]

@Henri K. Idem, Reposez vous bien.

[kalligator]

Meilleurs vœux de rétablissement, tu va nous manquer

[rogue0]

@Henri K. Bon courage, et soigne-toi bien.

A bientôt j'espère

[Bat]

Il y a 23 heures, Henri K. a dit :

Suite à un problème de santé, ceci est mon dernier post ici, je dois modérer le temps que je passe à mes recherches et surtout arrêter tout partage, trop consommateur en temps et en effort. Je garde un peu l'upload sur Youtube mais je ne sais pas encore pendant combien de temps.

Si dans le passé vous avez senti d'avoir été "agressé" par mes phrases, sachez que ce n'est pas volontaire. Je me rend compte depuis longtemps que ma perception de la Chine et celle que vous avez "appris" via les médias en Europe se divergent très fondamentalement, pas parce que les faits sont différents, mais parce que l'usage et l’intérêt sont différents. Je m’efforce depuis mon retour en France de vouloir vous révéler une autre face de la vérité, mais force est de constater que c'est un effort en vain.

Peu importe, cela n'a plus aucune importance désormais. Les 2 seules choses que je vais vous dire, la première c'est de garder toujours un esprit critique et ouvert, ne croyez pas tous qu'on vous dit, y compris ce que je vous ai dit, car rien n'est gratuit. Si vous avez accès à certaines informations gratuitement, il y a toujours un but derrière, vous connaissez maintenant le mien, mais connaissez vous celui des médias ?

La 2ème est de bien prendre soin de vous.

(...)
 

P.S. 2 : Bat, arrêtes de faire croire que tu es neutre. Non tu ne l'es pas. Sors un peu, regardes un peu plus, ça va te faire du bien.

Cher Henri,

Si les représentations culturelles peuvent assurément jouer un rôle dans la perception, que nous avons en Europe de la Chine (et inversement), en ce qui me concerne nos différends ne portent pas là-dessus mais sur ton incapacité récurrente à toi-même faire preuve du recul dont tu enjoins pourtant les autres à faire preuve, envers tes propres sources et tes propres représentations. Tu as apporté sur ce forum quelque chose de très important: une rigueur sans commune mesure dans la recherche de données techniques "à la source", pour reprendre à nouveau une de tes expressions favorites, et je t'en suis pour cela extrêmement reconnaissant. Mais en même temps, tu as doublé ce travail de rigueur technique d'une série d'approximations politiques, sociologiques et médiatiques confinant parfois à la cécité (volontaire?). C'est, principalement voire uniquement, sur ces aspects que je me suis opposé à toi, car dès que tu t'aventures sur ces terrains ta rigueur technique fait place à des considérations parfois dignes du café du commerce, quitte à balayer d'une main distraite des corpus de connaissance solidement établis en sociologie, anthropologie, histoire ou analyse des médias pour te conforter dans tes représentations subjectives et partisanes de la Chine (que je ne critique pas: nous avons tous nos points de vue et préférences). Ce faisant, tu as très régulièrement traité par le mépris des membres qui soulignaient ce décalage entre ta rigueur technique et tes approximations politico-sociologiques, revendiquant une sorte de "monopole de la vérité" sur tout ce qui concerne la Chine au nom de ton expérience sur place, et c'est pour moi cela qui a pu crisper, blesser ou passer pour de la propagande.

Tu me demandes de cesser de faire croire que je suis neutre —ce que je n'ai du reste jamais prétendu être, mais peut-être mes positions peuvent-elles parfois le laisser penser?—, mais je te suggérerais en retour de faire preuve d'humilité: tu es très investi dans ton travail de chercheur-diffuseur de technologie chinoise, mais il est important que ton indéniable expertise technique ne phagocyte pas ta capacité de recul critique sur la société. Etre critique ne consiste pas à dire sans aucune connaissance autre que "je sais bien, je l'ai vu" que les médias mentent ou font du sensationnalisme, mais à comprendre les sources et ressorts de ces représentations, et sur ce plan tu peux réellement progresser. Cela dit, ne prend pas la critique pour toi: comme spécialiste des sciences sociales amené à travailler avec des ingénieur, je peux te dire que c'est une caractéristique assez répandue parmi ceux-ci: en vertu de leur formation poussée et de leur expertise technique, ils développent souvent une propension assez importante à penser que cela leur confère une capacité d'analyse et compréhension sociale hors du commun, oubliant quelque peu qu'une société n'est pas une turbine dont on peu modéliser le fonctionnement avec quelques paramètres et équations.

Ce sermon terminé —un reste de mon passage à l'école catholique—, j'en viens au plus de mon message important: je te souhaite de tout cœur courage et meilleur rétablissement, espérant te revoir prochainement sur le forum. La santé est sans doute une des choses les plus importantes qu'on ait, et il faut pouvoir la préserver pour que le reste soit possible. Prends grand soin de toi, en France, en Chine ou ailleurs.

[hadriel]

@Henri K.  Bon courage, j'espère que tu te remettras bientôt.

 

 

[Chronos]

Tu vas nous manquer. Un bon rétablissement !

[ascromis]

@Henri K.
Meilleurs vœux de rétablissement, en gardant l'espoir de te revoir poster ASAP !

[collectionneur]

Pour en revenir au dernier post de K., la Russie n'a donc pour le moment réussi aucun de ses tests. Sait on si son programme continu malgré cela ?

[Henri K.]

CAST : Nouvelle méthode pour refroidir à Mach 20

Citation

Dans un article publié le 11 Août 2016 par l'Institut CAST (China Academy of Space Technology), filiale du groupe aérospatial chinois CASC et spécialisé dans la conception générale des engins spatiaux, on apprend qu'un chercheur chinois de cet institut et son équipe ont fait de "percée technologique" significative dans le...

http://www.eastpendulum.com/cast-nouvelle-methode-refroidir-mach-20

Henri K.

Modifié le 12 août 2016 par Henri K.

[g4lly]

5 minutes ago, Henri K. said:

http://www.eastpendulum.com/cast-nouvelle-methode-refroidir-mach-20 Henri K.

Dans ta légende "La distribution de température avec et sans le refroidissement par film d’air" C'est dans le désordre ... du moins quand on lit de gauche a droite ... ca serait plus compréhensible avec ""La distribution de température SANS et AVEC le refroidissement par film d’air""

[rogue0]

Merci pour l'info

Je pensais que les armes à énergie dirigée seraient à terme le meilleur moyen de contrer les HGV / RV / PGS (malgré leur forte résistance aux agressions thermiques, matériaux ablatifs, etc).

Mais avec ce type de technique, les HGV seront encore plus résistants à ces défenses 

[Henri K.]

Il y a 8 heures, g4lly a dit :

Dans ta légende "La distribution de température avec et sans le refroidissement par film d’air" C'est dans le désordre ... du moins quand on lit de gauche a droite ... ca serait plus compréhensible avec ""La distribution de température SANS et AVEC le refroidissement par film d’air""

Merci, c'est corrigé. J'étais naze hier soir, 4h pour pondre une merde alors que je faisais ça en moins 1h avant...

il y a une heure, rogue0 a dit :

Merci pour l'info

Je pensais que les armes à énergie dirigée seraient à terme le meilleur moyen de contrer les HGV / RV / PGS (malgré leur forte résistance aux agressions thermiques, matériaux ablatifs, etc).

Mais avec ce type de technique, les HGV seront encore plus résistants à ces défenses 

En hard kill ? Contre un engin volant de 3 à 6km/s ? Combien de joule joule il nous faut, les moyens d'acquisition qui sont nécessaires et surtout quelle précision de tir ? Il ne faut surtout pas acheter des servomoteurs "Made in China" dans ce cas ! 

Et, tout un coup j'ai un mot qui passe dans ma tête - Roswell... 

Henri K.

Modifié le 12 août 2016 par Henri K.

[christophe 38]

repose toi bien, Henri ; merci pour la qualité de tes posts et des efforts que tu as fait, pour nous, ici

 

reviens nous ASAP

[Henri K.]

il y a 1 minute, christophe 38 a dit :

repose toi bien, Henri ; merci pour la qualité de tes posts et des efforts que tu as fait, pour nous, ici

 

reviens nous ASAP

Suis pas mort ! Suis (encore) vivant !

Dis, je peux te léguer mes chats "au cas où" ? Ma femme dit qu'elle veut juste garder son coffret Aliens...

Henri K.

[rogue0]

Il y a 2 heures, Henri K. a dit :

Merci, c'est corrigé. J'étais naze hier soir, 4h pour pondre une merde alors que je faisais ça en moins 1h avant...

Tsk tsk : tu vas voir, ton médecin va finir par s'inscrire sur le forum histoire de t'espionner ahem s'assurer que tu suis le régime de désintoxications du forum repos prescrit

Citation

En hard kill ? Contre un engin volant de 3 à 6km/s ? Combien de joule joule il nous faut, les moyens d'acquisition qui sont nécessaires et surtout quelle précision de tir ? Il ne faut surtout pas acheter des servomoteurs "Made in China" dans ce cas ! 

Et, tout un coup j'ai un mot qui passe dans ma tête - Roswell...

Je n'ai pas dit que c'était pour tout de suite

Je vois pas trop comment faire du soft kill sur des engins qui sont 1) guidés et manoeuvrants, donc capables de récupérer une trajectoire perturbée et 2) à priori durcis anti-EMP.

Contre un engin subsonique non durci de la taille d'un RV, j'aurais dit que le MJ en pulsé pourrait suffire (cf les essais de laser solid state actuels classe 10kW contre des Hummer et bateaux).
Contre un engin durci, et à fortiori un nuke, faudra se rapprocher plus du GJ pour avoir la garantie de les stopper...

[Henri K.]

Nouvel essai du drone hypersonique ?

Citation

L'analyse de deux "Notice To Airmen" (NOTAM) effectives le 17 Août 2016, de 00h55 à 06h00 GMT, semble suggérer que la Chine pourrait procéder à un essai de drone hypersonique à l'Ouest de son territoire...

http://www.eastpendulum.com/nouvel-essai-du-drone-hypersonique

Henri K.

Modifié le 17 août 2016 par Henri K.

[Henri K.]

Nouvel essai du drone hypersonique au 26 Août ?

Citation

Tout comme le NOTAM A2088/16 que j'ai analysé dans l'article "Nouvel essai du drone hypersonique ?" il y a une semaine, le NOTAM A2166/16 a piqué ma curiosité ce soir pour la même raison, qui mènerait potentiellement à la même conclusion, à savoir un nouvel essai d'un drone hypersonique chinois...

http://www.eastpendulum.com/nouvel-drone-hypersonique-26-aout

Henri K.

[Henri K.]

La schizophrénie "Hypersonique"

Citation

L'interprétation de 5 nouveaux NOTAMs, valables le 5 Septembre de 01h00 à 08h00 UTC, semble suggérer qu'un essai de drone hypersonique a de nouveau eu lieu.

Pour en savoir plus : http://www.eastpendulum.com/la-schizophrenie-hypersonique

Henri K.

[Henri K.]

La Chine développe son propre drone hypersonique D-21 ?

Citation

Un nouvel essai hypersonique semble avoir eu lieu en Chine ce matin. Et si ces essais multiples depuis Septembre 2015 sont ceux d'un "D-21" à la chinoise ?

Pour en savoir plus : http://www.eastpendulum.com/schizophrenie-hypersonique-phase-ii

Henri K.