Henri K.

[Chine] DF-26 : IRBM & ASBM

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DF-26 IRBM may have ASM variant, China reveals at 3 September parade

Richard D Fisher Jr, Washington, DC - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly

02 September 2015

ChinaP_-_Main1.jpg

One of the surprising revelations from Chinese television announcers during the 3 September military parade marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War was that the newly revealed DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) may have an anti-ship variant.

In addition to conducting "nuclear counterattack" missions, the DF-26 could also attack "medium-size ships at sea" as part of "conventional long-range precision strike", said the announcer.

As the DF-26's estimated range is 3,000-4,000 km, this missile might enable the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to target US Navy formations in the "Second Island Chain" or out to Guam.

The parade announcer's indication that it could target "medium-size ships" may mean the missile is accurate enough to attack destroyer-size ships in addition to aircraft carriers.

The DF-26 could therefore be regarded as a second-generation anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) in addition to the DF-21D, which was also revealed on 3 September for the first time. The DF-21D has an estimated range of 1,700 km.

The DF-26's appearance in the 3 September parade indicates that it is a deployed system. The television announcer's mention of an anti-ship version could mean this variant is also deployed.

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Henri K.

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12 TEL IRBM/ASBM DF-26 étaient à Pékin pour le défilé, d'autres sont à l'Ouest du pays près du Désert de Gobi pour une campagne d'évaluation de mobilité et de collecte de données, selon le journal chinois "Science and technology Daily".

http://digitalpaper.stdaily.com/http_www.kjrb.com/kjrb/images/2015-09/05/01/DefPub2015090501.pdf

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Dans un article officiel de China News publié le jour de la parade V-day au 3 Septembre 2015, il est mentionné que les unités qui défilaient font parties de la flotte du Nord qui avait procédé aux tirs des missiles stratégique mobiles (missile balistique sur TEL) récemment, dans le paragraphe qui parle de l'adjoint commandant en chef de la flotte du Nord Geng Qun LIU (刘庚群). Le fait qu'ils utilisent le mot "stratégique" me laisse penser qu'il s'agit du missile ASBM DF-26, et non l'autre ASBM DF-21D, qui dans le vocabulaire officiel chinois est désigné souvent par le mot "Missile balistique de portée moyenne".

Il est donc intéressant de savoir quand précisément ces tirs ont eu lieu depuis les éléments qui nous sont accessibles.

http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2015/09-03/7504614.shtml

Jusqu'à au moins le mois Février 2015, Geng Qun LIU était encore simplement le commandant des unités de la marine basées à Dalian, j'ai commencé donc ma recherche sur toutes les indices (HYDROPAC, NOTAM, notification de navigation locale) pour la période de Q4 2014 à Août 2015, pour une direction de tir du Nord de Dalian vers le Sud, plus précisément vers la Baie de Bohai. Donc on doit rechercher les jours où les NOTAM et les notifications d'interdiction de navigation locale coïncident sur cet axe.

================================================================================

La première date qui correspond à ces critères est le 29 et le 30 Décembre 2014. Deux notifications d'interdiction de navigation de la province de Liaonin indiquent une zone large fermée pour mission militaire, et 5 notifications NOTAM sont actives pour la même période.

辽航警0310


渤海北部,12月29日0800时至12月30日2000时,在下列连线水域内执行军事任务:


A: 38°37′00″N 120°43′00″E


B: 38°22′00″N 119°55′00″E


C: 38°32′00″N 119°12′00″E


D: 39°54′00″N 119°42′00″E


E: 39°45′00″N 120°25′00″E


F: 38°43′00″N 120°04′00″E


任何船只在上述时间内不得进入该海域,希各航船注意。辽航警。

辽航警0311
渤海,12月29日0800时至30日2000时,在下列6点连线水域内执行军事任务:
1. 38°37′N 120°43′E
2. 38°22′N 119°55′E
3. 38°32′N 119°12′E
4. 39°54′N 119°42′E
5. 39°45′N 120°25′E
6. 38°43′N 120°04′E
任何船只在上述时间内不得进入该海域,希各航船注意,辽航警。

A2659/14 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED CENTERED AT N4601E12233 WITH RADIUS OF 20KM. VERTICAL LIMITS: GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 30 DEC 00:20 2014 UNTIL 30 DEC 01:15 2014. CREATED: 29 DEC 08:56 2014

A2660/14 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY: N4426E12152-N4432E12131-N4512E12152-N4506E12214 BACK TO START. VERTICAL LIMITS: GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 30 DEC 00:20 2014 UNTIL 30 DEC 01:15 2014. CREATED: 29 DEC 08:59 2014 

A2661/14 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY: N3915E12005-N3921E11938-N3947E11947-N3941E12014 BACK TO START. VERTICAL LIMITS: GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 30 DEC 00:20 2014 UNTIL 30 DEC 01:15 2014. CREATED: 29 DEC 09:01 2014 

A2662/14 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED CENTERED AT N3926E11953 WITH RADIUS OF 30KM. VERTICAL LIMITS: GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 30 DEC 00:20 2014 UNTIL 30 DEC 01:15 2014. CREATED: 29 DEC 09:05 2014 

A2663/14 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY: N3847E11948-N3850E11934-N3922E11943-N3918E12002 BACK TO START. VERTICAL LIMITS: GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 30 DEC 00:20 2014 UNTIL 30 DEC 01:15 2014. CREATED: 29 DEC 09:07 2014

ktEnhju.jpg

Sur une carte c'est plus claire : Le missile est parti d'un pas de tir situé dans la frontière entre la province de Jilin et de la Mongolie intérieure (cercle orange en haut), avec une première zone de chute du 1er étage à 150 km Sud-Ouest du point de départ. Les autres zones jaunes sont de NOTAM, et le polygone rouge vient des notifications d'interdiction de navigation qui sont identiques.

L'axe non aligné entre les 2 premiers éléments et la zone cible (cercle orange en bas) suggère une manœuvre aérodynamique en phase d'approche. La distance parcourue est un peu moins de 800 km pour ce tir :

7dYQMGI.jpg

En partant de ce pas de tir, si on trace 2 cercles de 1 700 km et de 4 000 km de diamètre, on voit des choses intéressantes :

mdcvsLf.jpg

================================================================================

La 2ème date est le 17 Juillet 2015. Je pars toujours de la notification d'interdiction de navigation LIAO-0167, qui indique la fermeture de la zone pour mission militaire :

辽航警0167


渤海北部,7月16日1200时至7月18日1800时,在下列各点顺序连线水域内执行军事任务:


1: 40°28′00″N 120°56′00″E


2: 40°20′00″N 121°08′00″E


3: 39°41′00″N 120°15′00″E


4: 38°22′00″N 120°00′00″E


5: 38°32′00″N 119°15′00″E


6: 39°42′00″N 119°36′00″E


任何船只在上述时间内不得进入该海域,希各航船注意。辽航警。

2 zones d'interdiction de vol temporaire sont actives durant cette période :

A1959/15 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY: N442549E1215205-N443140E1213035-N451158E1215228-N450604E1221348 BACK TO START. VERTICAL LIMITS:GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 2310-2350,0510-0550, 16 JUL 23:10 2015 UNTIL 17 JUL 05:50 2015. CREATED: 16 JUL 11:38 2015

A1961/15 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:N391505E1200449-N384718E1194733-N385012E1193414-N392057E1193802- N394659E1194726-N394105E1201423 BACK TO START. VERTICAL LIMITS:GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 2310-2359,0510-0600, 16 JUL 23:10 2015 UNTIL 17 JUL 06:00 2015. CREATED: 16 JUL 11:41 2015

Et on obtient ceci :

9tinOiT.jpg

En superposant le tir du 30 Décembre 2014 (en orange) et celui du 17 Juillet 2015 (en vert), on s'aperçoit que les premières zones de chute du 1er étage sont parfaitement alignées, il s'agirait donc le même type de missile. On constate un peu près la même chose pour les zones cibles.

7RHYrlZ.jpg

================================================================================

On ignore pour le moment s'il s'agit des tirs d'essai, des tirs de validation ou des tirs d’échantillonnage, mais le fait que les équipements défilés sont tous opérationnels, je pencherais personnellement plus vers des tirs d’échantillonnage, donc le missile DF-26 est pleinement opérationnel.

Henri K.

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Un article de Bill GERTZ sur IRBM / ASBM chinois DF-26...

Access vs. anti-access: China, US posture in anti-ship missile face off

BY BILL GERTZ on DECEMBER 14, 2015 in CHINA

The People’s Liberation Army last month disclosed new details about its new intermediate-range anti-ship ballistic missile known as the DF-26.

The missile can be armed with nuclear or conventional warheads and supplements the shorter range DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile that along with the DF-26 are elements of a military strategy of building arms designed to force the US military to operate further away from Chinese shores.

First displayed in September during the high-profile military parade in Beijing, the DF-26 is known by the Chinese as the “Guam killer” because it gives PLA war planners the new capability of targeting the major US military hub in the south Pacific island – out of range for most of the short- and medium-range missiles.

Two military analysts from the China Academy of Military Sciences revealed new details about the missile they described in a news article as a two-for-one weapon.

“The DF-26’s distinct characteristic of being nuclear and conventional all in one; that is, one missile body can carry a nuclear warhead for a nuclear strike against the enemy, or it can carry a conventional warhead for conventional firepower attack against the enemy,” Wang Changqin and Fang Guangming stated in the Nov. 30 issue of China Youth Daily.

“That ‘change the warhead, not the missile’ feature provides a rapid switch between nuclear and conventional.”

The conventional DF-26 system extends the striking range from the 620-mile DF-21D anti-ship missile to 2,485 miles.

The missile system also is based on a road-mobile launcher, making it difficult for U.S. intelligence assets to find and track – and counter with US sea-based Aegis missile defenses or, as on Guam, with long-range THAAD anti-missile interceptors.

“Thus it further upgrades joint land, sea, and air firepower attack capability,” the analysts said. “In particular, it can, along with forward deployed surface and underwater attack forces and ship borne, shore-based, and air war forces, execute long, medium, and short-range integrated attacks against large vessels at sea, and integrated, land, sea, and air attacks.”

The authors describe the key feature of the solid-fueled DF-26 as being fast – with the rapid switch from conventional to nuclear warheads; quick launch preparation time; and fast road withdrawal after firing.

Its modular features allow for the use of several types of warheads, including two types of nuclear re-entry vehicles, and several conventional warheads each with differing destructive capabilities, such as area attacks for use against airfields and ports, ground penetrators for buried targets, and fuel-air explosives for use against electronic targets.

The authors regard the DF-26 as a state-of-the-art missile and China’s prize possession to support what they said is the military concept of “use offense to assist defense.”

“Against time-sensitive targets such as surface ships in particular, [the DF-26] can attack at the last minute as soon as information on a ship’s movement is acquired, meaning the ship cannot get away,” Wang and Fang state.

The weapon is clearly directed at the United States, a country the authors say is taking steps to build up forces in Asia and “hype” the threat from China.

They accuse the United States of using the renamed Air Sea Battle Concept called Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons to split the region and disrupt stability.

America “has stepped up relevant preparations” for military action in the region, they say.

For these reasons, the authors argue, the DF-26 is one of the PLA’s most important weapons, despite the complexity of the its use that will require networked “combat chain” of data from numerous sensors and other systems used for targeting and attack.

China’s new weapons like the DF-26 have ended a decades-long period when the US military projected power will little or no risk. “That era is gone,” Thomas Mahnken, a US Naval War College expert on the Chinese military, said last week during a conference hosted by the Heritage Foundation.

Today, the US military is developing asymmetric responses to Chinese weapons like the DF-26 that the Pentagon calls “anti-access, area denial” arms, and that China calls “counter-intervention” weapons.

“China really has been at the forefront of pursuing some of these counter-intervention capabilities that pose a significant challenge,” Mahnken said.

“China is deploying capabilities to deter the United States and its allies from taking action close to China,” he added. “Those deployments are imposing considerable costs to us collectively and they have given Beijing momentum.”

The Pentagon’s response to these new Chinese weapons has been modest, in part due to defense budget shortfalls and demands for military support in the Middle East against Islamic State terrorism.

The US buildup in Asia so far has included the deployment of several thousand troops to Australia, the deployment of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore, and an additional attack submarine and regular rotations of B-52 and B-2 bombers to Guam.

Plans call for deploying a second aircraft carrier strike group to the region in the future.

A Pentagon policymaker outlined some steps the US military is taking to assure its forces and allies can gain access to the sea lanes and ports of the Asia Pacific in the face of the Chinese missile buildup and assertiveness.

Abraham M. Denmark, deputy assistant defense secretary for East Asia, bluntly stated last week that US forces will not be forced to retreat in the face of China’s new arms.

“I want to reiterate the US commitment to the Asia Pacific region should not be underestimated,” Denmark said. “There should be no question that the United States retains a decisive military edge today, and we are taking action to preserve and enhance our conventional deterrence for the long term.”

The immediate shift to Asia includes the best and newest weapons, he said, along with bolstering allies by providing arms and intelligence support.

Denmark did not provide details of the new capabilities planned for Asia. But he asserted that US military forces are being increased both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The plans call for trumping China’s high-technology weapons with new arms and military capabilities that will nullify the growing advantages.

For the DF-26, the Pentagon plans to disrupt the missile’s complex system for long-range strike capability through such things as cyber attacks on weapons and sensor systems. The electronic and other non-kinetic attacks will be aimed at disrupting this so-called “kill chain,” — the difficult task of finding, tracking, targeting and guiding missiles – before they can strike ships and other targets.

“We’re making heavy investments in forces for military operations in the Asia Pacific, including subsurface warfare, electronic warfare, space, cyber, missile defense, and more,” he said.

How much new military power will be added to Asia will depend on China’s behavior, Denmark said.

“How China rises and relates to the principled order that has undergirded regional peace, stability and security since the end of World War II will be a defining variable of the future security architecture of the Asia Pacific,” he said.

The recent disclosures about the DF-26 and Pentagon’s planned report shows that US-China big power rivalry is showing signs of increasing, despite the close economic and trade relations between the two states.

Bill Gertz is a journalist and author who has spent decades covering defense and national security affairs. He is the author of six national security books. Contact him on Twitter at @BillGertz

(Copyright 2015 Asia Times Holdings Limited, a duly registered Hong Kong company. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

16 TEL de DF-26 ont défilé le 3 Septembre à la cérémonie de victoire contre l'invasion japonaise

yIoaLIh.jpg

GM3Dfcr.jpg

Sur cette image que j'ai fait sur un essai de DF-26 qui a eu lieu fin 2014, on peut voir la portée pessimiste de DF-26 s'il est lancé depuis le Nord Est de la Chine

FVTDPLT.jpg

Henri K.

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Tiens HK, je suis tombé sur un article qui fournit les sources et une première traduction à cet article de Youth Daily.

Je suppose que tu as déjà accès à la source d'origine, mais pour moi c'est intéressant:
http://www.andrewerickson.com/2015/12/academy-of-military-science-researchers-why-we-had-to-develop-the-dongfeng-26-ballistic-missile-bilingual-text-analysis-links/

Je ne connais pas l'auteur, mais il a déjà publié plusieurs livres sur les forces chinoises dont un sur les ASBM.
Voilà le lien pour référence:
http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/China-ASBM_Jamestown_2013.pdf

Un avis sur le sérieux de son travail?

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Il y a encore pas si longtemps que ça, on les considère comme du bullshit chinois, de l'épouvantail, un truc qui ne peut pas exister.

Aujourd'hui, on fait couler de plus en plus de l'encre sur "eux". En pluriels puisque ce n'est plus DF-21D seul qui est en question, mais aussi DF-26, et tout un tas de système global que rares sont les pays au monde peuvent se permettent d'en disposer.

China's 2,500 Mile-Range 'Carrier-Killer' Missile: A Nuclear Threat?

Harry J. Kazianis


December 18, 2015

When Americans ponder the phrase “national security” they likely think of only one thing these days: the Islamic State. And considering the headlines, who can blame them? However, news out of China concerning a new generation of “carrier-killer” missiles—now sporting a 2,500 mile range—should remind Washington’s national security leaders of the long-term challenges America faces in the Pacific.

Countless ink has already been spilled when it comes to China’s first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), the DF-21D, over the last six years or so. In September, Beijing unveiled a longer-range version of the weapon, the DF-26. While countless news articles marked the debut of the system, specific information on the new weapon was scarce. However, thanks to the sleuthing skills of U.S. Naval War College Professor Andrew Erickson, we now know a little more about the weapon—and its possible uses beyond the much discussed “killing” of carriers.  

But first, a recap of how both the DF-21D and DF-26 work: The missile is launched from a mobile truck-mounted launcher into the atmosphere, with over-the-horizon radar, satellite tracking and possibly unmanned aerial vehicles providing guidance. It also incorporates a maneuverable warhead (MaRV) to help find its target—and defeat an adversary's missile defenses. Such a device could be instrumental in striking a vessel in the open ocean or denying access to a potential opponent in transiting to a conflict zone (think Taiwan or in the East and South China Seas).

So now that we know how the weapon works, the next set of questions are obvious: When would Beijing use it? What is the overall strategy for its use in a potential conflict? And what are its capabilities? This is where Andrew Erickson’s discovery comes in: he has uncovered the only in-depth article that gives at least some hard information concerning the weapon. While you can read the whole article here in Mandarin, written by Wang Changqin and Fang Guangming in China Youth Daily, here are five key points from the article worth knowing (the translation was also discovered by Dr. Erickson):

Point #1 - The DF-26 has multiple uses—not just killing carriers.

“In contrast with the DF-21D is the DF-26's distinct characteristic of being nuclear and conventional all in one; that is, the one missile body can carry a nuclear warhead [singular or plural not indicated] for a nuclear strike against the enemy, or it can carry a conventional warhead [singular or plural not indicated] for a conventional firepower attack against the enemy. That “change the warhead, not the missile” feature provides a rapid switch between nuclear and conventional.”

Point #2 - It Could Help Increases the Size of China’s Nuclear Arsenal in a Crisis.

“Given that China has only a limited number of nuclear weapons, and as a medium range ballistic missile, by changing to a nuclear warhead at the last minute it [the DF-26] can as needed form up a nuclear deterrent and nuclear counterattack capability linking long and short ranges and strategic and campaign roles.”

Point #3 - Mobility matters.

“Compared with silo launched and site launched ballistic missiles, another distinct characteristic of the DF-26 is that it can be launched on the move with no support. Land-based mobile launches in the past, whether with movement by rail or by road, all required a launch site prepared in advance. Although movement over a large area could be accomplished before or during a war, the destination of the move was always a prepared launch site. Because prepared launch sites are limited in number and easily exposed, destruction of a launch site could result in the bad situation of having missiles but not being able to launch them. Also, that sort of missile requires quite a lot of time to set up and get ready in a prepared launch site, which puts it at a great disadvantage against an encroaching enemy with strong mobility and a fast tempo of operation in its “combat chain.

"But the DF-26 does not rely on a site for mobile launching. It can move fast, and it has no strict demands for where it is launched. So that is helpful to movement of missile forces all over and in concealment, and it is helpful to the rapid deployment, rapid launch, and rapid displacement of combat elements. That means a boost to the missile force's survivability and to its attack ability. Against time-sensitive targets such as surface ships in particular, it [the DF-26] can attack at the last minute as soon as information on a ship's movement is acquired, meaning the ship cannot get away.”

Point #4 - Beijing wants to “use offense to assist defense” and is working towards “joint operations.”

“With the development of anti-identification, anti-interception, and highly integrated technology, the mobility, the ability to penetrate defenses, and the precision of strategic, campaign, and tactical missiles have all improved. By way of technical upgrades and merging into integrated, joint operations networked information systems, the DF-26's overall tactical and technical performance has continually improved to where it can be considered a prized possession which “uses offense to assist defense, meets challenges.”

 

Point #5 - Air-Sea Battle/JAM-GC is very much on China’s mind (maybe a reason they developed the DF-26?).

“Although the United States has repackaged “Air-Sea Integrated Battle” as a “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons” in order to balance the competing interests of the services, weaken the “hot war” flavor, lower the risk of “clashes,” and seek extra credit for “morality,” the overall message shows that its original concept and plan, “based on hot war,” “split the region,” and “disrupt stability,” is essentially unchanged. On the contrary, it has stepped up relevant preparations under the flag of “protecting regional security and peace” and “ensuring that the communal right of navigation is not changed.” For example, the Pentagon is making adjustments which will have 60% of its naval forces, including aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, cruisers, destroyers, and coastal warships deployed in the Asia-Pacific region, and bring together sea-based, air-based, and space-based forces as “joint strike task forces.” It is using political coercion, economic enticement, and diplomatic pressure to consolidate its existing military alliances, and it is using military aid and joint exercises as bribes to get certain countries to become quasi-members of a military alliance.”

Want to know more? Read the whole thing.

Harry Kazianis is the outgoing Executive Editor of The National Interest. Mr. Kazianis also serves as Senior Fellow (non-resident) for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest, Senior Fellow (non-resident) at the China Policy Institute as well as a Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Potomac Foundation. He previously served as Editor of The Diplomat and as a WSD Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum: CSIS. All views are his own. You can follow him on Twitter: @GrecianFormula.

Henri K.

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Sur 17/12/2015 at 01:13 , rogue0 said:

Tiens HK, je suis tombé sur un article qui fournit les sources et une première traduction à cet article de Youth Daily.

Je suppose que tu as déjà accès à la source d'origine, mais pour moi c'est intéressant:
http://www.andrewerickson.com/2015/12/academy-of-military-science-researchers-why-we-had-to-develop-the-dongfeng-26-ballistic-missile-bilingual-text-analysis-links/

Je ne connais pas l'auteur, mais il a déjà publié plusieurs livres sur les forces chinoises dont un sur les ASBM.
Voilà le lien pour référence:
http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/China-ASBM_Jamestown_2013.pdf

Un avis sur le sérieux de son travail?

Il suffit de voir dans l'annexe les documents qu'il a analysé, ce sont les documents R&D chinois qui sont les mêmes que moi-même j'ai étudié à l'époque.

Je n'ai pas lu l'ouvrage encoure, mais s'il cherche l'information à la source comme moi, et non comme des "journalistes" lambda qui copient / collent des informations imaginatives et sensationnelles qui ont pour seul but d'orienter la pensée du peuple, ça ne peut pas trop déconner.

Henri K.

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Sur 19/12/2015 at 21:02 , Henri K. said:

Il suffit de voir dans l'annexe les documents qu'il a analysé, ce sont les documents R&D chinois qui sont les mêmes que moi-même j'ai étudié à l'époque.

Je n'ai pas lu l'ouvrage encoure, mais s'il cherche l'information à la source comme moi, et non comme des "journalistes" lambda qui copient / collent des informations imaginatives et sensationnelles qui ont pour seul but d'orienter la pensée du peuple, ça ne peut pas trop déconner.

Henri K.

Rien n'est évident.
Tu peux avoir un Justin Bronk du RUSI qui cite toutes les bonnes sources académiques, et qui biaise toutes ses analyses par chauvinisme (ou peut être en service commandé pour BAE ).

L'auteur, Andrew Erickson, fait partie du Naval Institute US.
J'ai plutôt un bon a-priori (renforcé par ton avis), mais il peut être influencé par son patron ou le groupthink à surestimer ou sous-estimer les capacités des adversaires potentiels.

 

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Il y a 8 heures , rogue0 said:

Rien n'est évident.
Tu peux avoir un Justin Bronk du RUSI qui cite toutes les bonnes sources académiques, et qui biaise toutes ses analyses par chauvinisme (ou peut être en service commandé pour BAE ).

L'auteur, Andrew Erickson, fait partie du Naval Institute US.
J'ai plutôt un bon a-priori (renforcé par ton avis), mais il peut être influencé par son patron ou le groupthink à surestimer ou sous-estimer les capacités des adversaires potentiels.

 

Quelque soit son orientation, il a quant même basé son analyse sur les documents R&D chinois, donc sauf si tu peux lire en Chinois, ça reste la source accessible la plus proche de l'information à la source.

Il est très difficile de rester complètement neutre, je reconnais moi-même que c'est difficile. Libre ensuite à chacun de faire le tri, et ne pas considérer tous qu'on lit comme de l'argent comptant. Mais ça tu as déjà bien compris j'ai l'impression.

Henri K.

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La Chine a dévoilé pour la première fois publiquement son ASBM à portée équivalent d'un IRBM (3000 à 5000 km), DF-26, lors du défilé du 3 Septembre 2015. Un article publié le 17 Novembre 2015 dans la revue scientifique "China Awards for Science and Technology" nous apprend quelques détails intéressants sur son développement.

http://www.stawards.cn/shownews_n.asp?id=3500&class3=%BD%B1%C0%F8%B9%CA%CA%C2

La phase de pré-étude pour les technologies de MaRV a démarré en 1991, elles sont communes à tous les missiles balistiques chinois ayant cette capacité (DF-15C, DF-21C, DF-21D...). L'article parle d'un projet de reverse engineering sur la forme aérodynamique à partir d'un modèle étranger datant des années 80', il dit que les chercheurs partent des photos prises aux musées pour avoir une idée sur la forme approximative - Personnellement je penche sur le missile américain Pershing II.

 

Citation

 

1991年,我国高超声速再入空气舵机动飞行器预研攻关项目起步,朱广生以室主任助理的身份负责十大关键技术之首的“气动特性研究”项目。研究内容便是以国外20世纪80年代先进机动飞行器为原型,进行“反设计”。
  “有关国外先进飞行器的性能只能收集到零星的报导,具体尺寸不知道,只能通过别人在国外展览馆参观的时候拍的照片来推断。”朱广生介绍,“而且拍的角度不同照片也不同,只能得出一个大概的轮廓,而要得到气动外形设计的主导思想,只能另谋出路。”
  为此,朱广生独辟蹊径,采用理论分析、计算及典型风洞试验相结合的方法,反推断国外某先进飞行器的设计思路。“看照片,我就会思考他们为什么会设计成两个锥?根据人家展览的实际外形等反推出他们的设计思路,这就叫‘反设计’。”朱广生说。通过对组成飞行器的“舵”与“体”气动特性作用机理的研究,朱广生揭示了空气舵机动飞行器双锥体匹配、“体”“舵”匹配的气动变化规律。

 

L'article parle ensuite d'un premier projet de missile démarré en 1997, qui a abouti à un premier essai MaRV chinois en 2000, avec un AoA de rentrée limité à 14°. En 2002, 4 essais réussis ont eu lieu avec un AoA de 14°, 16°, 18° et 20° respectivement. Les Chinois démontrent alors que la limitation de 14° publiée par les chercheurs étrangers était trompeuse.

 

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一直到2000年,才进行我国第一个机动飞行器的飞行试验,飞行攻角被限制为14°。尽管试验很成功,但朱广生并不服气。国外专家所谓的“头激波不允许打到舵上”的说法对吗?
  后来,朱广生自己从各大资料中寻找答案。在攻克了一个个难题、破解了一道道拦路虎后,朱广生终于找到了答案。他将教科书中激波压缩之后的公式结合外形实际进行推导,再结合飞行器的实际飞行参数进行量化处理,最后发现扰动区和未扰动区的分界面形成的并不是激波而是膨胀波,而膨胀形成的热流并不高。
  朱广生将此发现写成了一篇论文向上级汇报,并得到了总师陈福田院士的支持。2002年,一院又先后打出了4发导弹,选择的攻角分别为14°、16°、18°、20°,均获得圆满成功,回收的残骸外观验证了朱广生的判断,同时也证明了当初国外专家误导了中国设计人员。

 

D'après ma lecture du texte, le projet de DF-26 a débuté aux alentours de 2002. Les quelques détails que je déchiffre de l'article sont :

* la manoeuvrabilité du MaRV est obtenu aérodynamiquement avec gouvernail
* le texte parle du passage de Mach 12 à Mach 18, qui pourrait correspondre à l'augmentation de vitesse avec la portée
* la capacité de frappe de précision est confirmée
* le ciblage se fait horizontalement, et le lancement est réalisé sans support particulier (pas de tir particulier non nécessaire)
* la trajectoire est spécifique et divisé en 3 phases différentes

 

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2002年,上级调朱广生从14所到了一院,作为武器系统的技术总负责人主持了我国首型通用中远程精确打击导弹研制,实现了带空气舵机动飞行器由马赫数12向马赫数18的技术跨越和战略武器实战能力重大突破。
  作为新型通用武器系统演示验证项目技术总负责人,朱广生提出实现中远程、高精度、实战化的技术途径,经8年2个型号的研制与飞行试验研制,确立了国家立项的系列型号主要技术方案。而作为A状态的总师,他主持的新一代中远程精确打击武器系统的工程研制,又为我国战略武器实战能力提升做出了重大贡献:在国内率先实现带空气舵机动飞行器用于远射程导弹的技术跨越;率先实现中远射程战略武器的精确打击;率先实现我国陆基机动导弹水平瞄准、无依托快速发射;创战略导弹“车载弹”长途机动直接发射的考核先例;提出“三段式”特殊弹道方案,实现战略导弹在国内有限的靶场射程进行真实环境的飞行考核。项目成果获国防科技进步一等奖。

 

Pour terminer, l'ingénieur en chef dont parle l'article, Guangsheng ZHU (朱广生), semble participer au développement de l'engin hypersonique Boost-Glide également, car le texte mentionne, dans les essais en vol, avoir vérifié :

* le rabaissement de trajectoire en phase active (boost phase)
* le planage direct avec booster discontinu
* la séparation des ailes déformables (?? doute sur ma traduction ??) de l'engin planeur

 

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新的飞行试验演示验证工作中,攻克了主动段飞行“压低弹道、非连续助推直接起滑”、级间段“瓜瓣分离”、滑翔飞行器变形翼分离等多项关键技术,又取得了飞行试验圆满成功的佳绩。

 

L'article est très intéressant...

Les missiles DF-26 au défilé :

rzT2Hca.jpg

Henri K.

Modifié par Henri K.
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