[Survivability] et autres "ity"

[ARMEN56]

Tout ceci en vrac  avec leur terminaison « lity » ; survivability , susceptibility , vulnerability , recoverability; bref les fondamentaux dans l’approche conception  du  navire mili.

“Avoiding danger is not a realistic solution for warships (Turner et al 2006); therefore, Belcher (2008) identified four necessary steps in orderto avoid a hit:

• Avoid being detected.
• If detected avoid being identified.
• If identified avoid being targeted.
• If targeted avoid being hit.”

Excellent

http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1399992/

OUPS !!  vient de me rendre compte que ce post aurait aussi pu s'intégrer dans le fil "navire furtif".........avis ?

 

[Fenrir]

Oui et non car n'est pas forcément lié uniquement à la furtivité.

[g4lly]

Un article sympa sur la "contre désignation d'objectif" countertrageting en anglais ... avec notamment le travail de guerre élec. A lire sur le site du blog parce qu'il y a les croquis.

https://blog.usni.org/posts/2018/03/27/countertargeting-offense-enabler-and-defense-enhancer

Quote

The U.S. Navy may one day face a numerically superior opponent that uses a unique blend of technology, synchronization, and the benefit of numbers to overcome a comparative western advantage in technology. In addition to maintaining a technical edge, the Navy must revitalize its own asynchronous capabilities to develop effective countertargeting measures to counter an opponent’s numbers and achieve maritime superiority.

Thousands of drums greeted the global television audience watching the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Olympic in August 2008. With a blend of technology and synchronized choreography, the ceremonies captured China’s long history, rich culture, and tradition of innovation and invention. Nowhere was this more evident than in the “typesetting” scene recognizing China’s invention of the wooden typeset. Seemly hundreds of individual typesets moved in harmony to create three-dimensional shapes changing to a musical background. In the West, a producer would have accomplished this visual feat with a combination of technical and mechanical design, employing hydraulics, servomechanisms, pistons, and computer programming. Yet, at the performance’s end, the man under each typeset removed his enclosure to reveal this achievement was accomplished with human effort alone.

A Window into Chinese Combat?

The Olympic opening ceremonies may provide insight into how China’s navy might operationalize its strategic emphasis on asymmetric warfare.[1] This is not a simple comparison of Chinese manpower versus Western technology, but rather how the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) may counter a Western advantage in technology with a blend of its own technology, superior numbers, and ability to coordinate those numerous forces in unique and unforeseen ways.

An example is the potential employment of Harpy loitering antiradiation missiles in a coordinated attack against an Aegis-equipped ship.[2] Launched to loiter until locking on to SPY-1 or SPS-48 radar, these inexpensive kamikaze-like vehicles are meant to consume a fleet’s attention and weapon resources while higher speed antiship missiles are launched under the radar horizon, torpedo attacks are conducted, and ballistic missiles launched. The simultaneous arrival of these weapons to overwhelm an advisory’s defenses, similar to what a U.S. commander would aspire to achieve, may not be the objective. Instead, causing weapon exhaustion and crew fatigue during an extended multithreat attack may be adequate to allow for one or two missile hits sufficient to degrade a fleet’s air defense and make it more vulnerable for the second round of attacks.

Combining proven technology with numerous force components in a well-thought-out employment plan likely will be found in more than just this Chinese antisurface ship concept of operations. According to a Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) report, “the employment of integrated forces and firepower within different space and time against an opponent’s high-value targets could create an overwhelming combat effectiveness, force the enemy to follow the Chinese logic of fighting, and end in his quick defeat. . . . Despite its lack of military muscle, the PLA insists, however, that relative military power, not absolute military power, is a meaningful measure of the effectiveness of asymmetric attacks and counterattacks” [emphasis added]. [3]

U.S. Fleet Response

The U.S. fleet’s current trajectory is to respond to challenges of this sort by seeking new technologies, particularly in the form of hard-kill systems. For example, directed-energy weapons may provide a counter for swarm-like Harpy attacks. Improving Aegis system auto-coordination with gun systems may be another. Yet, technical solutions tend to be expensive and, in many cases, cost more than the threat they are designed to counter. Combined with a constrained budget, this forces a downward spiral in U.S. fleet numbers as increasing numbers of inexpensive threats must be countered with even greater technology advances. To maintain an advantage in technology is a worthy goal, but to rely on it as a sole defense at the expense of tactical development, operational response, and increasing the numbers of our own missile-carrying ships creates an operational and tactical vulnerability.

The U.S. Navy’s desire for technological solutions should be tempered and complemented by a combination of operational asynchronous and innovative approaches. The concept of “shooting the archer” instead of defeating his arrows, for example, has been shown to be an efficient approach in theater ballistic missile defense.[4] Unfortunately, Harpy truck launchers present a difficult target to find, fix, and strike before their missiles are deployed. Likewise, missile-carrying submarines may be difficult to find and kill before they launch their weapons from extended ranges. Between “shooting the archer” and “defeating the arrow” we need to uncover potential enemy vulnerabilities inside his kill chain. Another approach is to blind the archer and confuse his aim—countertargeting—which may help reduce an opposing force’s numerical advantage by providing friendly forces a temporal advantage to apply effective firepower first.[5]

Countertargeting in this case refers to all operations intent on spoiling enemy efforts at targeting U.S. forces, to include all efforts to disrupt an enemy’s kill chain prior to him launching a weapon. Countertargeting efforts occur prior to enemy missile or torpedo launch and are intended to force an advisory to spread his sensor and weapon resources among potential targets so those systems cannot be effectively massed against U.S. ships. As Milan Vego writes about the larger issue of deception, “It can induce an enemy to focus forces in the wrong place and thereby violate the principle of concentration”[6] In effect, it aims to disperse enemy intelligence resources and combat power enough to allow U.S. forces to achieve a relative combat advantage through concentration of their own power on the true objective.

Countertargeting efforts include some combination of degrading an enemy’s sensors and communication capability while presenting to him valid alternative contacts through decoys and deception.[7] The use of smoke in World War II to obscure optical range-finding sensors during gun and torpedo battles is a tactical example of countertargeting.[8] In October 1944, Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s use of barren Japanese carriers to seduce Admiral Bull Halsey’s main battle force away from Leyte Gulf and disperse U.S. forces is an operational example. John B. Dwyer’s Seaborne Deception is full of examples from World War II to the Cold War of physical decoys, electronic measures, and tactic movement being used to confuse an enemy’s sensors and offensive forces. In his discussion of the mid-Cold War Line Function Concept, Dwyer explains, “Navy ships could provide numerous deception platforms, and with all ships displaying some characteristics of a High Value Target (HVT; e.g., a carrier) while none of the ships, including HVTs, displayed all the characteristics, target selection confusion would be created; the real carrier would appear surrounded by a task force of notional ones.”[9]

Modern countertargeting methods include electronic and physical attacks on sensors; computer attacks; information, physical, electronic, and acoustic deception; ships with low radar cross section; own force electronic and acoustic emission control; screening by neutral shipping; use of weather and/or dispersants; and intelligent maneuver to deny enemy sensor use. These efforts may be employed at the operational or tactical level of war, but obtaining success at all levels is not necessary to gain some advantage in defense and enable offensive action.

Effective countertargeting measures, however, do require synergy among technology, operational art, and identification of enemy vulnerabilities. The enemy’s targeting command center must be presented with information, or denied information, that appears valid and inspires him to divert his resources away from our forces. To accomplish this requires some knowledge of how he collects and processes information. Technology and tactics then can be developed and tailored to either degrade or decoy his information system in such a way as to present a credible operational situation in his mind.

For example, assume U.S. intelligence sources determine an enemy gets information using an acoustic sensor that collects broadband noise. U.S. engineers may create a broadband noise generator to simulate an aircraft carrier and add electronic emissions to add validity to its signal. For the decoy to be effective as a countertargeting ploy, however, it also must be placed in a location where an aircraft carrier would operate, and for its’ employment to act as an offensive enabler, work in coordination with real Navy forces’ activities. A successful development effort to provide the fleet with countertargeting capabilities therefore will include intelligence professionals, scientists, engineers, and operators to identify the most effective countertargeting methods to integrate into a larger concept of operations. And an integrated operational concept is required because evidence suggests countertargeting is not immune to constraints.

Limitations of Countertargeting

If the goal is to disrupt an enemy’s kill chain to counter his advantage in numbers, the Navy needs to understand its limitations in this area as well as its capabilities. To illustrate countertargeting’s limitations in countering a numerically superior force, suppose we have one U.S. ship versus two enemy ships, with all ships capable of firing four antiship missiles, all ships within missile range of each other, and both sides attempting to target the other. The lone U.S. ship must split its weapon inventory and target two missiles per enemy ship while the enemy force can mass all eight missiles against the U.S. ship. Just to be “even,” the U.S. ship’s total defense capability must be four times that of a single enemy ship. (See figure 1.)

 

Figure 1: Missile Exchange with Enemy Twice the Number.

 

To use countertargeting to spread the enemy’s sensors and missiles and level the playing field, the Navy must create three valid decoys, so each of the four “targets”—three decoys and one actual ship—receives two missiles. (See figure 2.) Everything else being equal, as the number of enemy ships or their missile inventory increases, countertargeting effectiveness must increase by about the square of their numerical superiority for the Navy to break even.[10] This is a direct result, of course, of decoys not being able to shoot back. It also echoes past lessons that numerical superiority has a unique advantage over defense and offensive capabilities.[11] Recognizing that real maritime warfare is far more complex, this simple analysis still implies that countertargeting’s lack of offensive power limits its ability to influence a battle’s outcome.

 

 

Figure 2: Blue must create multiple decoys to spread enemy’s targeting.

 

Inspiring Countertargeting Capabilities

This is not to diminish enthusiasm for developing countertargeting capabilities, only to suggest that the Navy must recognize its limits and include it as part of a larger warfare concept of operations. Countertargeting should be viewed as an operational enabler, allowing the main objective to be accomplished. It may not have any kinetic striking power, but it can diminish a numerically superior force’s offensive capabilities.

The U.S. Navy’s considerable offensive power is sufficient to counter a more numerous enemy’s ships if that striking power can be applied without suffering too much damage to U.S. ships. Again, then, the immediate goal of countertargeting is to force an opponent to disperse his sensor and weapon capabilities to give the Navy a relative combat advantage at a particular place and time to effectively apply its striking power.

A focused and coordinated effort to rearm the U.S. fleet with effective technical and doctrinal countertargeting capabilities is warranted.[12] Every deployed fleet, battle group, and ship must be aware of and practice the capabilities we have now, as well as those obtained by future efforts. Countertargeting requires the most operational coordination at the fleet and task force levels. Employing various platforms’ capabilities to jam, intrude, decoy, mask, or disguise while simultaneously achieving the main objective requires a well-developed and trained concept of operations. Making the information warfare commander a primary player in developing warfare plans will ensure coordination with the traditional operations activities and command-and-control warfare, but every fleet operations officer should adopt deception and countertargeting as the enablers of their activities. We need to move from “Do we need a countertargeting plan?” to “What is our integrated countertargeting and strike plan?” Integrating nonkinetic enabling efforts into fleet exercises and practicing against thinking orange forces to evaluate their effectiveness should be part of instruction and inspection at the tactical training groups and the Naval War College’s maritime planner’s course.

To prepare for a battle for maritime superiority with an intelligent, disciplined, and more numerous force, the Navy must maintain a technological and operational edge to overcome the disadvantages of its smaller but potent fleet. Countertargeting capabilities are a critical element to have in the arsenal as part of a fleet-wide operational plan and should be viewed as an offense enabler as well as a defense enhancer. Formalizing an owner of fleet countertargeting developmental efforts, practice of proven operational concepts, and inspiring fleet officers to suggest innovative concepts of their own could give the Navy its own effective asymmetric approach to maintain maritime superiority.

 

Juste comme ça ... les américains kiffent les FREMM https://blog.usni.org/posts/2018/03/07/making-the-case-for-fremm

[BPCs]

Le 01/02/2018 à 11:47, ARMEN56 a dit :

OUPS !!  vient de me rendre compte que ce post aurait aussi pu s'intégrer dans le fil "navire furtif".........avis ?

Non car cela pose aussi une question qui n'est pas seulement à l'échelle d'un navire unique mais aussi à l'échelon d'un groupe.

Et aussi parce que la réponse peut aussi passer par une répartition de la cible sur plusieurs navires au lieu d'un seul.

L'archétype de ce questionnement est la survivabilité du PA qui devient la cible prioritaire de missile hypersonique ou Ballistiques qui talent directement sa survie.

Une des réponses pourrait être , comme pendant la guerre froide, de proposer plusieurs petites bases ( dkou les gripen on road, les projet zéro length take off) plutôt qu'une grande, ce qui en mer revient à raisonner en mode binaire...