[Guerre civile en Syrie]

 

Congress secretly approves U.S. weapons flow to 'moderate' Syrian rebels

 

By Mark Hosenball

WASHINGTON Mon Jan 27, 2014 5:35pm EST

 

(Reuters) - Light arms supplied by the United States are flowing to "moderate" Syrian rebel factions in the south of the country and U.S. funding for months of further deliveries has been approved by Congress, according U.S. and European security officials.

 

The weapons, most of which are moving to non-Islamist Syrian rebels via Jordan, include a variety of small arms, as well as some more powerful weapons, such as anti-tank rockets.

 

The deliveries do not include weapons such as shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, known as MANPADs, which could shoot down military or civilian aircraft, the officials said.

 

The weapons deliveries have been funded by the U.S. Congress, in votes behind closed doors, through the end of government fiscal year 2014, which ends on September 30, two officials said.

 

The apparently steady weapons flow contrasts with the situation last summer, when lethal U.S. aid to the Syrian rebels dried up for a time due to congressional reservations.

 

Congressional committees held up weapons deliveries for months over fears that U.S. arms would not prove decisive in the rebels' efforts to oust President Bashar Assad and his government and could well end up in the hands of Islamist militants.

 

A U.S. official familiar with recent developments said national security officials and members of Congress are more confident that weapons delivered to southern Syria are going to, and remaining in, the hands of moderate rebels rather than militant jihadist factions.

 

Congress approved funding for weapons deliveries to the Syrian rebels in classified sections of defense appropriations legislation, two sources familiar with the matter said. It was not clear when the funding was approved, but unclassified defense funding passed Congress in late December.

 

Some additional budget tweaks may be necessary to ensure that all the approved funding is fully available for disbursement during the current fiscal year.

 

Yet, officials who support providing U.S. arms to the rebels acknowledge that this has not greatly increased U.S. expectations of victory by anti-Assad forces, whether moderate or militant.

 

"The Syrian war is a stalemate. The rebels lack the organization and weapons to defeat Assad; the regime lacks the loyal manpower to suppress the rebellion. Both sides' external allies... are ready to supply enough money and arms to fuel the stalemate for the foreseeable future," said Bruce Riedel, a former senior CIA analyst and sometime foreign policy adviser to President Barack Obama.

 

Both U.S. and European officials said that "moderate" rebels had recently consolidated their positions in the Syrian south, where they are pushing out elements linked to al-Qaeda. More militant factions remain dominant in the north and east.

 

Another recent development favorable to more moderate factions is that Kurdish groups that had been providing weapons and other aid financed by donors in the Gulf state of Qatar indiscriminately to both moderate and religious extremist rebel factions had greatly reduced their involvement in the arms traffic, one of the officials said.

 

A White House spokeswoman had no comment. Other U.S. agencies did not respond to requests for comment.

 

As for "non-lethal" aid like communications and transportation equipment, the United States hopes to resume deliveries to moderate groups in Syria soon, a U.S. official said on Monday.

 

The United States and Britain suspended non-lethal aid to northern Syria in December after reports that Islamist fighters seized Western-backed rebel weapons warehouses, highlighting fears that supplies could end up in hostile hands.

 

"We hope to be able to resume assistance to the SMC shortly, pending security and logistics considerations," said the official, referring to the Supreme Military Council moderate rebel group. "But we have no announcements at this time," he said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

 

Non-lethal aid was resumed to civilian groups in that region in late December.

 

 

(Additional reporting by Lesley Wroughton; Editing by Dan Grebler)

 

 

Bruce Riedel

 

 

 

...

[Guerre civile en Syrie]

 

Le récit de la défection de « César », photographe de la barbarie syrienne

 

23.01.2014 à 13h59 • Mis à jour le 23.01.2014 à 18h38

Par Benjamin Barthe (Montreux, Suisse, envoyé spécial) et Stéphanie Maupas (La Haye, correspondance)

 

Dans le huis clos d'une chambre d'hôtel à Montreux, à l'écart de l'agitation causée par la conférence de paix sur la Syrie, un homme fait défiler des photos de cadavres sur l'écran de son ordinateur. Souvent nus ou couverts de haillons, les corps portent les traces de supplices variés : lacération, strangulation, électrocution, mutilation, etc. Sur le torse de la plupart des cadavres, le visage figé dans un ultime rictus, on distingue des numéros, tracés au marqueur.

 

Parfois c'est sur un bout de carton, déposé au pied du torturé, que figurent les informations. « Ce sont les numéros attribués aux détenus quand ils sont arrêtés puis quand leur décès est prononcé, explique l'homme, un opposant syrien nommé Emadeddin Rachid. Les numéros se suivent. C'est de l'abattage à la chaîne. »

 

Ces clichés, auquel Le Monde a eu un accès exclusif, ont nourri le rapport, dévoilé lundi 20 janvier par la chaîne américaine CNN et le quotidien britannique The Guardian, qui accuse le régime syrien d'avoir torturé et tué « à l'échelle industrielle ».

 

Commandée par le Qatar et rédigée par un cabinet d'avocats londoniens avec le renfort de spécialistes de la justice internationale, cette étude se fonde sur un matériau d'une nature et d'une ampleur inédite dans l'histoire de la Syrie : un stock de 55 000 photographies représentant environ 11 000 personnes tuées en détention.

 

LOINTAINE PARENTÉ

Comment leur authenticité a-t-elle pu être avérée ? Parce que la personne à l'origine de cette monumentale fuite n'est nul autre que l'auteur de la plupart des clichés : un photographe de la police militaire, qui a fait défection en 2013, désigné dans le rapport sous le nom de code « César ». Le Monde, qui est en possession de seize de ces clichés, a choisi pour l’instant de ne pas les publier.

 

Emadeddin Rachid est l'un des cerveaux de cette opération, qui a percuté de plein fouet la conférence de Montreux et déstabilisé la délégation syrienne face à la presse internationale. Agé de 48 ans, ancien vice-doyen de la faculté de charia (loi islamique) de l'université de Damas, il est l'un des responsables du Mouvement national syrien, un courant islamiste modéré représenté au sein de la Coalition nationale syrienne (CNS), la colonne vertébrale de l'opposition au régime Assad.

 

Selon toute vraisemblance, c'est grâce à une lointaine parenté entre un membre de son mouvement et « César » que le contact est établi. Longtemps chargé de prendre en photo des scènes de crimes ou d'accident, l'homme s'est vu affecter à une tout autre tâche après le début de la révolte syrienne, en mars 2011 : tirer le portrait des opposants, réels ou supposés, qui ont été torturés à mort ou froidement exécutés dans les geôles du régime.

 

Un travail de recensement photographique aussi méticuleux que mortifère, une bureaucratie de la barbarie menée dans un double but : d'une part permettre aux autorités de délivrer un certificat de décès aux familles à la recherche d'un frère ou d'un père disparu, en mettant son trépas sur le compte d'un « problème respiratoire » ou d'une « attaque cardiaque » ; d'autre part, permettre aux tortionnaires de confirmer à leur hiérarchie que la sale besogne a bien été accomplie. « Tuer ses opposants, ça fait partie de la routine du régime, explique Emadeddin Rachid. Consigner la tuerie, c'est simplement aller au bout de la routine. »

 

« CHAÎNE D'ANONYMES QUI ONT RISQUÉ LEUR VIE »

 

A l'hôpital militaire où il est assigné, « César » reçoit jusqu'à cinquante corps par jour. Chacun d'eux nécessite quinze à trente minutes de travail, car quatre à cinq clichés sont requis pour constituer le dossier de décès. Le spectacle de la sauvagerie des services de sécurité syrien éprouve durement le photographe légiste. Il est mûr pour passer à la rébellion. Six mois seront nécessaires pour mettre en place la filière destinée à récolter les preuves photographiques. « Une chaîne d'anonymes, notamment des combattants de l'Armée syrienne libre, ont risqué leur vie pour réussir ce coup d'éclat », dit Emadeddin Rachid. Il aura fallu quatre mois supplémentaires pour exfiltrer « César » et sa famille.

 

Sollicités par le cabinet londonien Carter-Ruck, trois médecins légistes et trois anciens procureurs internationaux, qui ont officié dans les tribunaux sur la Sierra Leone et l'ex-Yougoslavie, se mettent alors au travail. Bien conscient que son hostilité notoire au régime Assad risque de nuire à la crédibilité du rapport final, le Qatar a accepté de financer cette entreprise à la condition que « les pièces fassent l'objet d'une authentification appropriée et rigoureuse », souligne Cameron Doley, l'un des avocats de la firme anglaise.

 

Les experts s'immergent dans le lot d'images et acquièrent la conviction qu'il est « très peu probable » qu'elles aient pu être falsifiées. Ils rencontrent à trois reprises, au mois de janvier, le témoin à charge, le pressent de questions et finissent par se convaincre que l'homme est bien ce qu'il prétend. Bien que partisan du soulèvement anti-Assad, « “César” a rendu compte honnêtement de son expérience », assure le rapport, qui précise qu'il n'a par exemple jamais prétendu avoir été témoin des exécutions.

 

« CAMPS DE CONCENTRATION NAZIS »

 

Sur la BBC, le patron de la commission d'enquête, sir Desmond de Silva, a récusé toute interférence de Doha, le commanditaire. « L'intérêt que possède le Qatar dans cette affaire ne veut pas dire que les preuves sont fausses. Nous avons pris ce fait en compte et avons été très méticuleux dans notre façon de travailler. » Pas suffisamment au goût de la délégation syrienne à Montreux, qui a qualifié le rapport de « partial et politisé ».

 

Au Monde, Emadeddin Rachid a montré l'exemplaire scanné d'un dossier de décès constitué avec les photos de « César ». Le formulaire porte l'en-tête de la « République arabe syrienne, commandement général des forces militaires » et le cachet « Police militaire » est apposé sur les clichés post mortem.

 

Le Monde a également pu voir de nombreuses photos d'un hangar, transformé en charnier, avec une quinzaine de dépouilles décharnées éparpillées sur le sol. « C'est le garage de l'hôpital militaire de Mezzeh [nord-ouest de Damas], assure M. Rachid. Quand la morgue est pleine, c'est là que les cadavres sont jetés. Tous ces corps avec la peau sur les os, ça fait immanquablement penser aux camps de concentration nazis. »

 

L’exposé fait d’autant plus froid dans le dos que les 55 000 photos sont censées avoir été prises sur seulement deux sites : l’hôpital de Mezzeh et celui de Teshrin, toujours à Damas. « Imaginez un peu : il y a une vingtaine d’hôpitaux militaires en Syrie », insiste l’analyste Samir Al-Taqi. Cet ex-diplomate rallié à  l’opposition conseille l’Association pour les disparus et les prisonniers de conscience, implantée à Alep. « Nous allons demander aux familles qui ont perdu un proche de passer en revue les photos, dit-il. Dans ces milliers de visages, certaines identifieront sûrement un frère ou un père. Ca clouera définitivement le bec au régime. »

 

 « César », Sami et Emad espèrent qu’à moyen terme, une juridiction internationale aura l’idée et la capacité de se pencher sur leurs archives photographiques. « Si personne ne punit les auteurs de ces massacres, alors soyez-en sûr, il y a aura des massacres dans l’autre sens, prévient Emaddedin Rachid. C’est soit la justice, soit la revanche. »

 

 

Le Monde

 

[Guerre civile en Syrie]

Genève II :

 

Oh, je préfère de très loin aller plutôt ici que de suivre cela par une antenne qui surfe avec la douce ‘Russia Daily’.

[Guerre civile en Syrie]

 

Press Tv.

 

 

 

J'imagine bien.

 

 

 

Under U.S. Pressure, U.N. Withdraws Iran’s Invitation to Syria Talks

 

By MICHAEL R. GORDON, SOMINI SENGUPTA and ALAN COWELLJAN. 20, 2014

 

WASHINGTON — Under intense American pressure, the United Nations on Monday withdrew an invitation to Iran to attend the much-anticipated Syria peace conference, reversing a decision announced a day earlier.

 

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, whose decision to invite Iran had threatened to unravel the Syria talks less than 48 hours before the scheduled start, issued a statement on Monday rescinding the invitation. The United States had said it was surprised by the invitation because Iran had not agreed to conditions for the talks, to be held on Wednesday in Montreux, Switzerland.

 

Mr. Ban contended that he had been privately assured by the Iranians that they would respect the conditions. But in their public statements, Iranian officials said Iran had been invited with no such conditions attached.

 

“Given that it has chosen to remain outside that basic understanding, he has decided that the one-day Montreux gathering will proceed without Iran’s participation,” Mr. Ban’s spokesman said in the statement.

 

The invitation also angered the Syrian opposition and Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional rival and a major backer of the Syrian insurgency, and they threatened to boycott the talks.

 

The United States’ longstanding position has been that Iran, a major backer of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, must publicly endorse the mandate of the conference, which is outlined in a communiqué from a 2012 meeting in Geneva. That mandate says that the conference’s purpose is to negotiate the establishment of a transitional administration that would govern Syria by the “mutual consent” of Mr. Assad’s government and the Syrian opposition.

 

“Since Iran has not publicly and fully endorsed the Geneva communiqué,” a State Department official told reporters Monday morning, “we expect the invitation will be rescinded.”

 

Mr. Ban’s reversal appeared to have salvaged the plan to proceed as scheduled with the talks, which the United States, the United Nations and Russia had been seeking to organize for months.

 

“As we’ve stated many times, the purpose of the conference is the full implementation of the Geneva communiqué,” Jen Psaki, a State Department spokeswoman, said after Mr. Ban’s decision. “We are hopeful that, in the wake of today’s announcement, all parties can now return to focus on the task at hand, which is bringing an end to the suffering of the Syrian people and beginning a process toward a long overdue political transition.”

 

The Syrian political opposition dropped its boycott threat. But Mr. Ban’s reversal was a diplomatic embarrassment to the United Nations and to others who had wanted Iran to participate, including Russia.

 

The Russian foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, said in Moscow earlier on Monday that leaving Iran out of the talks would be an “unforgivable mistake.”

 

“Negotiations involve sitting at the table not just with those who you like, but with those whose participation the solution depends on,” Mr. Lavrov said at a joint appearance with the foreign minister of Norway.

 

The United States and several of its allies have opposed Iran’s presence at the conference in part because Iran has been a strong supporter of the Assad government, sending it arms and paramilitary fighters from its Quds force. Mr. Lavrov, in arguing for Iran’s inclusion, noted that several other countries that directly backed one side in the conflict were participating.

 

Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations special envoy for Syria, has long argued that Iran, as a major regional power, should be included in the talks. But he said last week that the decisions on whether to invite Iran had to be made by consensus among the United States, the United Nations and Russia.

 

For his part, Mr. Assad said once again that he would not share power with his adversaries or accept the creation of a transitional government.

 

Mr. Assad said in an interview with Agence France-Presse that the talks in Switzerland should focus on what he called “the war against terrorism” in his country. He described the idea of sharing power as “totally unrealistic,” and said there was a “significant” likelihood that he would seek a new term as president in June.

 

While he has made such remarks before, the timing of his latest comments seemed to underscore the complexities facing negotiators in Switzerland, despite months of preliminary negotiations to bring the combatants to the table.

 

In the region’s tangles of hostility, the invitation to Iran drew immediate objections from both the exiled political opposition to Mr. Assad and from Saudi Arabia, which is a key backer of the insurgency and the arch rival of Iran, Mr. Assad’s main regional sponsor.

 

Mr. Ban said on Sunday that Iranian officials had pledged to play “a positive and constructive role,” implying that Tehran had accepted that the negotiations were posited on the idea of a new political order in Syria.

 

On Monday, however, the Iranian state news media quoted a spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry in Tehran as saying, “We have always rejected any precondition for attending the Geneva II meeting on Syria.”

 

Within hours of Mr. Ban’s invitation to Iran, Syria’s political opposition said it would not attend the peace conference unless the gesture was rescinded.

 

“The Syrian coalition announces that they will withdraw their attendance in Geneva II unless Ban Ki-moon retracts Iran’s invitation,” a Twitter message said, quoting Louay Safi, a coalition spokesman.

 

The ultimatum came just a day after the opposition coalition, facing a boycott by one-third of its members, voted to send a delegation to the peace talks. The opposition has been under intense international pressure, including from the United States government, to participate.

 

In all, some 30 countries have been invited to Montreux for what may be a largely ceremonial opening day of the peace talks. Two days later, Syria’s government and opposition delegations are scheduled to move to Geneva to continue talks, mediated by Mr. Brahimi.

 

Diplomats and Middle East analysts say that if any breakthroughs are achieved, they will take place in Geneva, not in the opening two days in Montreux. Over all, the negotiations were not expected to yield major results, except perhaps to open up certain parts of Syria to the delivery of humanitarian aid.

 

 

The New York Times

 

[Guerre civile en Syrie]

 

Syria's Assad accused of boosting Al-Qaeda with secret oil deals

 

Western intelligence suggests Bashar al-Assad collaborating with jihadists to persuade West the uprising is terrorist-led

 

By Ruth Sherlock, in Istanbul and Richard Spencer

7:53PM GMT 20 Jan 2014

 

The Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad has funded and co-operated with al-Qaeda in a complex double game even as the terrorists fight Damascus, according to new allegations by Western intelligence agencies, rebels and al-Qaeda defectors.

 

Jabhat al-Nusra, and the even more extreme Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS), the two al-Qaeda affiliates operating in Syria, have both been financed by selling oil and gas from wells under their control to and through the regime, intelligence sources have told The Daily Telegraph.

 

Rebels and defectors say the regime also deliberately released militant prisoners to strengthen jihadist ranks at the expense of moderate rebel forces. The aim was to persuade the West that the uprising was sponsored by Islamist militants including al-Qaeda as a way of stopping Western support for it.

 

The allegations by Western intelligence sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, are in part a public response to demands by Assad that the focus of peace talks due to begin in Switzerland tomorrow be switched from replacing his government to co-operating against al-Qaeda in the “war on terrorism”.

 

“Assad’s vow to strike terrorism with an iron fist is nothing more than bare-faced hypocrisy,” an intelligence source said. “At the same time as peddling a triumphant narrative about the fight against terrorism, his regime has made deals to serve its own interests and ensure its survival.”

 

Intelligence gathered by Western secret services suggested the regime began collaborating actively with these groups again in the spring of 2013. When Jabhat al-Nusra seized control of Syria’s most lucrative oil fields in the eastern province of Deir al-Zour, it began funding its operations in Syria by selling crude oil, with sums raised in the millions of dollars.

 

“The regime is paying al-Nusra to protect oil and gas pipelines under al-Nusra’s control in the north and east of the country, and is also allowing the transport of oil to regime-held areas,” the source said. “We are also now starting to see evidence of oil and gas facilities under ISIS control.”

 

The source accepted that the regime and the al-Qaeda affiliates were still hostile to each other and the relationship was opportunistic, but added that the deals confirmed that “despite Assad’s finger-pointing” his regime was to blame for the rise of al-Qaeda in Syria.

 

Western diplomats were furious at recent claims that delegations of officials led by a retired MI6 officer had visited Damascus to re-open contact with the Assad regime. There is no doubt that the West is alarmed at the rise of al-Qaeda within the rebel ranks, which played a major role in decisions by Washington and London to back off from sending arms to the opposition.

 

But the fury is also an indication that they suspect they have been outmanoeuvred by Assad, who has during his rule alternated between waging war on Islamist militants and working with them.

 

After September 11, he co-operated with the United States’ rendition programme for militant suspects; after the invasion of Iraq, he helped al-Qaeda to establish itself in Western Iraq as part of an axis of resistance to the West; then when the group turned violently against the Iraqi Shias who were backed by Assad’s key ally, Iran, he began to arrest them again.

 

As the uprising against his rule began, Assad switched again, releasing al-Qaeda prisoners. It happened as part of an amnesty, said one Syrian activist who was released from Sednaya prison near Damascus at the same time.

 

“There was no explanation for the release of the jihadis,” the activist, called Mazen, said. “I saw some of them being paraded on Syrian state television, accused of being Jabhat al-Nusra and planting car bombs. This was impossible, as they had been in prison with me at the time the regime said the bombs were planted. He was using them to promote his argument that the revolution was made of extremists.”

 

Other activists and former Sednaya inmates corroborated his account, and analysts have identified a number of former prisoners now at the head of militant groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS and a third group, Ahrar al-Sham, which fought alongside Jabhat al-Nusra but has now turned against ISIS.

 

One former inmate said he had been in prison with “Abu Ali” who is now the head of the ISIS Sharia court in the north-eastern al-Qaeda-run city of Raqqa. Another said he knew leaders in Raqqa and Aleppo who were prisoners in Sednaya until early 2012.

 

These men then spearheaded the gradual takeover of the revolution from secular activists, defected army officers and more moderate Islamist rebels.

 

Syrian intelligence has historically had close connections with extremist groups. In an interview with The Daily Telegraph after he defected, Nawaf al-Fares, a Syrian security chief, told how he was part of an operation to smuggle jihadist volunteers into Iraq from Syria after the 2003 invasion.

 

Aron Lund, editor of a website, Syria in Crisis, used by the Carnegie Endowment to monitor the war, said: “The regime has done a good job in trying to turn the revolution Islamist. The releases from Sednaya prison are a good example of this. The regime claims that it released the prisoners because Assad had shortened their sentences as part of a general amnesty. But it seems to have gone beyond that. There are no random acts of kindness from this regime.”

 

Rebels both inside and outside ISIS also say they believe the regime targeted its attacks on non-militant groups, leaving ISIS alone. “We were confident that the regime would not bomb us,” an ISIS defector, who called himself Murad, said. “We always slept soundly in our bases.”

 

 

The Telegraph

 

[Guerre civile en Syrie]

 

Strange bedfellows -- Iran and al Qaeda

 

By Peter Bergen, CNN National Security Analyst

March 11, 2013 -- Updated 0021 GMT (0821 HKT)

 

(CNN) -- The appearance Friday in a lower Manhattan courtroom of Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, Osama bin Laden's son-in-law and one-time al Qaeda spokesman, to face charges of conspiracy to kill Americans underlines the perhaps surprising fact that members of bin Laden's inner circle have been living in Iran for the past decade or so.

 

It was Abu Ghaith's decision to leave the comparative safety of his longtime refuge in Iran for Turkey a few weeks ago that led to the chain of events that landed him in Manhattan for trial.

 

The leading Turkish newspaper, Hurriyet, reported that Abu Ghaith was detained in the Turkish capital, Ankara, in early February. Turkey then decided to deport him to his native Kuwait via Jordan, where he was intercepted by FBI agents, who escorted him to New York.

 

As is well known, many of bin Laden's family and members of his inner circle fled Afghanistan for Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban in the winter of 2001, but what is less well known is that some also fled to neighboring Iran.

 

According to U.S. documents and officials, in addition to Abu Ghaith, other of bin Laden's inner circle who ended up in Iran include the formidable military commander of al Qaeda, Saif al-Adel, a former Egyptian Special Forces officer who had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan, as well as Saad bin Laden, one of the al Qaeda's leader older sons who has played some kind of leadership role in the group.

 

Saad bin Laden spent the first six months of 2002 living in Karachi in southern Pakistan. From there he helped one of his father's wives, Khairiah bin Laden, and several of his father's children to move from Pakistan to Iran.

 

For years these bin Laden family members all lived in the Iranian capital, Tehran, under some form of house arrest. Their conditions were not unpleasant, with time for visits to swimming pools and shopping trips.

 

Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence learned that some al Qaeda operatives were living in the northern Iranian town of Chalus, on the Caspian Sea.

 

In 2002 a U.S. Navy SEAL operation into Chalus was planned and then rehearsed somewhere along the U.S. Gulf Coast.

 

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Richard Myers, called off the assault because the information about where precisely the al Qaeda members were living in Chalus was not clear.

 

A year after that operation was called off, according to US and Saudi officials, from his Iranian refuge Saif al-Adel authorized al-Qaeda's branch in Saudi Arabia to launch a series of terrorist attacks in the Saudi kingdom that began in the capital Riyadh in May 2003, a campaign that killed scores of Saudis and expatriates.

 

On the face of it, the fact that a number of al Qaeda leaders and operatives and bin Laden family members found shelter in Iran is puzzling, as the Shia theocrats in the Iranian regime are hostile to the Sunni ultra zealots in al Qaeda, and vice versa.

 

For al Qaeda's operatives, life in Iran was more secure than for many of their colleagues in Pakistan who risked capture by Pakistani forces working with the CIA or death by CIA drones.

 

The Iranian regime likely saw the al Qaeda operatives as useful bargaining chips with the United States in the event of some kind of peace negotiations with the Americans. That peace deal, of course, never happened.

 

Of course, for Iran the adage, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" may have also come into play, although there doesn't seem to be evidence that Iran and al Qaeda have ever cooperated on a specific operation.

 

That said, the 9/11 Commission found that of the 19 hijackers, "8 to 10 of the 14 Saudi "muscle" operatives traveled into or out of Iran between October 2000 and February 2001." Whether this was with any degree of Iranian complicity is still an open question.

 

The fact that leading members of al Qaeda were based in Iran from 2002 on was known to the U.S. government at the time. (In fact, in early 2003 counterterrorism officials briefed me about this development).

 

There is something of an irony here. This was during the same time period in which senior administration officials under President George W. Bush were citing the alleged presence of al Qaeda members in Baghdad and a supposedly burgeoning alliance between al Qaeda and Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein as a key reason to go to war against Saddam, Iran's bitter enemy.

 

Five years after the invasion of Iraq, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded, as had every other official investigation of the matter, that in fact there was no "cooperative relationship" between Saddam and al Qaeda.

 

In late 2008 al Qaeda operatives kidnapped Heshmatollah Attarzadeh-Niyaki, an Iranian diplomat, in the western Pakistan city of Peshawar.

 

After holding the diplomat for over a year the militants quietly released him back to Iran in the spring of 2010.

 

This was part of a deal that allowed some of bin Laden's family and al Qaeda members living under house arrest in Iran to depart, according to a Pakistani official familiar with the deal.

 

This deal did not, however, mean that relations between the Iranians and al Qaeda suddenly became all hunky dory.

 

Documents recovered at bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, following the SEAL raid there on May 1, 2011, and since publicly released portray a rather tense relationship between al Qaeda and the Iranian authorities.

 

In a letter that bin Laden wrote just five days before he died he described a document from his son Saad who had lived in Iran for years "which exposes the truth of the Iranian regime." What bin Laden meant precisely by this is not clear, but taken together with some of the other letters that were found in his Abbottabad compound it is obvious that bin Laden and his men were quite distrustful of the Iranian regime.

 

A letter to bin Laden from his chief of staff dated 11 June 2009 has a detailed account about a group of "mid level" al Qaeda members who the Iranians had recently released, including three Egyptians, a Yemeni, a Iraqi and a Libyan.

 

Bin Laden's chief of staff attributed these releases to al Qaeda's kidnapping of the Iranian diplomat in Peshawar, but added that the Iranians "don't want to show that they are negotiating with us or reacting to our pressure. ... We ask God to repel their evil."

 

In another undated letter from bin Laden to his chief off staff al Qaeda's leader gave a set of detailed instructions about how best to handle his family members living in Iran once they were released.

 

Bin Laden urged extreme caution "since the Iranians are not to be trusted." Among another precautions, he wrote that his family members "should be warned about the importance of getting rid of everything they received from Iran like baggage or anything even as small as a needle, as there are eavesdropping chips that have been developed to be so small they can be put inside a medical syringe."

 

In this letter bin Laden mentioned by name a number of his children living in Iran including his sons Ladin, Uthman and Muhammad and his daughter Fatima, who is married to Sulaiman Abu Ghaith who now sits in a Manhattan jail.

 

In October the U.S. Treasury named as terrorists six al Qaeda members living in Iran who it said are funding terrorist activities in Pakistan and sending fighters and money to Syria to fight the Assad regime there.

 

Abu Ghaith didn't play an operational role in al Qaeda -- a fact that was underlined in the charges filed against him last week in Manhattan that revolve around his role as a propagandist for the group. So it is the precise nature of al Qaeda's arrangements in Iran and the kind of activities outlined in the recent Treasury designation of the half-dozen al Qaeda members living in Iran that are likely to be of most interest to American investigators.

 

Given the fact that since 9/11, New York courts have convicted at a rate of 100% in cases that involve members of al Qaeda and associated groups, Abu Ghaith could doubtless cut an attractive plea deal for himself if he gives a full accounting of al Qaeda's murky decade in Iran.

 

 

CNN

 

[Guerre civile en Syrie]

 

Al Qaeda in Iran

 

Why Tehran is Accommodating the Terrorist Group

 

January 29, 2012

By Seth G. Jones

 

Virtually unnoticed, since late 2001, Iran has held some of al Qaeda's most senior leaders. Several of these operatives, such as Yasin al-Suri, an al Qaeda facilitator, have moved recruits and money from the Middle East to central al Qaeda in Pakistan. Others, such as Saif al-Adel, an Egyptian that served as head of al Qaeda's security committee, and Abu Muhammad al-Masri, one of the masterminds of the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa, have provided strategic and operational assistance to central al Qaeda. The Iranian government has held most of them under house arrest, limited their freedom of movement, and closely monitored their activities. Yet the organization's presence in Iran means that, contrary to optimistic assessments that have become the norm in Washington, al Qaeda's demise is not imminent.

 

Perhaps more disturbing, Iran appears willing to expand its limited relationship with al Qaeda. Just as with its other surrogate, Hezbollah, the country could turn to al Qaeda to mount a retaliation to any U.S. or Israeli attack. To be sure, the organization is no Iranian puppet. And the two have sometimes been antagonistic, as illustrated by al Qaeda in Iraq's recent attacks against Shias. But both share a hatred of the United States. U.S. policymakers should think twice about provoking a closer relationship between them and should draw greater public attention to Iran's limited, but still unacceptable, cooperation with al Qaeda.

 

Evidence of the Iranian-al Qaeda partnership abounds -- and much of it is public. This past year, I culled through hundreds of documents from the Harmony database at West Point; perused hundreds more open-source and declassified documents, such as the U.S. Department of Treasury's sanctions against al Qaeda leaders in Iran; and interviewed government officials from the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia.

 

Through that research, the history of al Qaeda in Iran emerges as follows: over the past several years, al Qaeda has taken a beating in Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa. In particular, an ongoing campaign of drone strikes has weakened -- although not eliminated -- al Qaeda's leadership cadre in Pakistan. But the group's outpost in Iran has remained almost untouched for the past decade. In late 2001, as the Taliban regime collapsed, most al Qaeda operatives fled Afghanistan. Many of the leaders, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's deputy and future successor, headed for Pakistan. But some did not, choosing instead to go west. And Iran was apparently more than willing to accept them. Around October 2001, the government dispatched a delegation to Afghanistan to guarantee the safe travel of operatives and their families to Iran.

 

Iran is in many ways a safer territory from which al Qaeda can operate. The United States has targeted al Qaeda in Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries, but it has limited operational reach in Iran.

 

Initially, Iran's Quds Force -- the division of the Revolutionary Guard Corps whose mission is to organize, train, equip, and finance foreign Islamic revolutionary movements -- took the lead. Between 2001 and 2002, it helped transport several hundred al Qaeda-linked individuals. By 2002, al Qaeda had established in Iran its "management council," a body that bin Laden reportedly tasked with providing strategic support to the organization's leaders in Pakistan. Key members of the council included Adel, Sulayman Abu Ghayth, Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, Abu Muhammad al-Masri, and Abu Hafs al-Mauritani. All five remained influential over the next several years and retained close ties to bin Laden. Among the most active of the council, Adel even helped organize groups of fighters to overthrow Hamid Karzai's regime in Afghanistan and provided support for the May 2003 terrorist attacks in Riyadh.

 

According to U.S. government officials involved in discussions with Iran, over time, the growing cadre of al Qaeda leaders on Iranian soil apparently triggered a debate among senior officials in Tehran. Some worried that the United States would eventually use the terrorist group's presence as a casus belli. Indeed, in late 2002 and early 2003, U.S. government officials held face-to-face discussions with Iranian officials demanding the regime deport al Qaeda leaders to their countries of origin. Iran refused, but around the same time, the country's Ministry of Intelligence took control of relations with the group. It set to work rounding up al Qaeda members and their families.

 

By early 2003, Tehran had detained all the members of the management council and their subordinates who remained in the country. It is not entirely clear what conditions were like for al Qaeda detainees. Some apparently suffered through harsh prison confinement, while others enjoyed informal house arrest with freedom to communicate, travel, and fundraise. Over the next several years, bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other leaders apparently sent messages to Tehran threatening to retaliate if al Qaeda personnel and members of bin Laden's family were not released. Iran did not comply. Bin Laden did not follow through.

 

After that, the details of al Qaeda's relationship with the Iranian government are hazy. It seems that many of the operatives under house arrest petitioned for release. In 2009 and 2010, Iran did begin to free some detainees and their family members, including members of bin Laden's family. And the management council remained in Iran, still under limited house arrest. Tehran appears to have drawn several red lines for the council: Refrain from plotting terrorist attacks from Iranian soil, abstain from targeting the Iranian government, and keep a low profile. As long as it did so, the Iranian government would permit al Qaeda operatives some freedom to fundraise, communicate with al Qaeda central in Pakistan and other affiliates, and funnel foreign fighters through Iran.

 

Today, Iran is still an important al Qaeda hub. Suri, who was born in 1982 in al-Qamishli, Syria, is a key operative. According to U.S. Treasury Department accounts, Tehran has permitted Suri to operate discretely within Iran since at least 2005. He has collected money from donors and transferred it to al Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan and other locations; facilitated the travel of extremist recruits from the Gulf to Pakistan and Afghanistan; and according to U.S. State Department accounts, "arranges the release of al-Qaeda personnel from Iranian prisons."

 

On the surface, the relationship between Shia Iran and Sunni al Qaeda is puzzling. Their religious views do differ, but they share a more important common interest: countering the United States and its allies, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. Iran's rationale might be compared to that of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who declared, "If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons."

 

Iran is likely holding al Qaeda leaders on its territory first as an act of defense. So long as Tehran has several leaders under its control, the group will likely refrain from attacking Iran. But the strategy also has an offensive component. If the United States or Israel undertook a bombing campaign against Iran, Tehran could employ al Qaeda in a response. Tehran has long used proxies to pursue its foreign policy interests, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon, and it has a history of reaching out to Sunni groups. In Afghanistan, for example, Iran has provided limited support to the Taliban to keep the United States tied down. Al Qaeda's proven willingness and ability to strike the United States make it an attractive partner.

 

Al Qaeda is probably making similar calculations. To be sure, some revile the Ayatollahs. Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the now-deceased head of al Qaeda in Iraq, actively targeted Shias there. In a 2004 letter, Zarqawi explained that they are "the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion." Yet, in a sign of Churchill-esque pragmatism, Zawahiri chastised Zarqawi in 2005, writing that the Shias were not the primary enemy -- at least not for the moment. It was crucial, Zawahiri explained, to understand that success hinged on support from the Muslim masses. One of Zarqawi's most significant mistakes, Zawahiri chided him, was targeting Shia communities, because such a strategy would cripple al Qaeda's support among the broader Muslim community. And most al Qaeda operatives since the debacle in Iraq have cautiously followed Zawahiri's lead. 

 

Moreover, Iran is in many ways a safer territory from which al Qaeda can operate. The United States has targeted al Qaeda in Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries, but it has limited operational reach in Iran. In addition, Iran borders the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, making it centrally located for most al Qaeda affiliates. No wonder that Suri has been able to move money and recruits through Iran to various theaters, including al Qaeda central in Pakistan. Although most governments in the region have clamped down on al Qaeda, Iran's willingness to allow some activity sets it apart.

 

With the management council still under limited house arrest, Iran and al Qaeda remain at arm's length. But that could change if Washington's relationship with Tehran does. So far, the conflict between Iran and the West has been limited to diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions. It has also occasionally deteriorated into cyber attacks, sabotage, assassinations, kidnappings, and support to proxy organizations. But much like the struggle between the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War, it has not spilled into overt conflict. Should an increase of those activities cause a broad deterioration in relations, however, or should the United States or Israel decide to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran and al Qaeda could come closer together.

 

The United States should think twice about actions that would push Iran and al Qaeda closer together -- especially a preemptive attack on the country's nuclear program.

 

For one, Iran would likely respond to an attack by targeting the United States and its allies through proxies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries. The regime might increase its logistical support to al Qaeda by providing money, weapons, housing, travel documents, and transit to operatives -- some of which it is already doing. In a worse scenario, Tehran might even allow al Qaeda officials in Iran to go to Pakistan to replenish the group's depleted leadership there, or else open its borders to additional al Qaeda higher-ups. Several of the operatives already in Iran, including Adel and Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, would be especially valuable in this regard, because of their prestige, experience in paramilitary and external operations, and religious credentials. In an even more extreme scenario, Iran could support an al Qaeda attack against the United States or one of its allies, although the regime would surely attempt to hide its role in any plotting. Based on Iran's cautious approach over the past decade, Tehran's most likely strategy would be to gradually increase its support to al Qaeda in response to U.S. actions. That way it could go slowly, and back away at any time, rather than choosing an all-or-nothing approach from the start.

 

It would be unwise to overestimate the leverage Tehran has over al Qaeda's leadership. The terrorist organization would almost certainly refuse Iranian direction. But given the group's current challenges, any support or tentative permission to plot on Iran's soil would be helpful. It could set about restoring its depleted senior ranks in Pakistan and other countries, or else rebuild within Iran itself. The organization might thus be amenable to working within Iranian constraints, such as seeking permission before planning attacks in the West from Iranian soil, as long as the taps were flowing.

 

It is true that the United States has limited leverage with Iran, but it still has several options. The first, and perhaps easiest, is to better expose the existence and activities of al Qaeda leaders in Iran. Al Qaeda has killed tens of thousands of Sunnis, Shias, and non-Muslims over the past two decades and has unified virtually all governments in the world against it. Iran, too, has become an international pariah. Its limited aid to al Qaeda is worthy of further public condemnation. But Iran has largely escaped such scrutiny.

 

The United States could encourage more countries to prohibit citizens and companies from engaging in commercial and financial transactions with al Qaeda leaders and their networks in Iran. The U.S. Treasury and State Departments have taken steps against some al Qaeda operatives and their supporters in Iran, including against Suri and his circle. But those efforts have not been coupled with robust diplomatic efforts to encourage other countries to do the same. Nor have they been successful in eliminating al Qaeda's sanctuary in Iran.

 

Finally, the United States should think twice about actions that would push Iran and al Qaeda closer together -- especially a preemptive attack on the country's nuclear program. Thus far, Iran and al Qaeda have mutually limited their relationship. It would be a travesty to push the two closer together at the very moment that central al Qaeda in Pakistan has been severely weakened.

 

Thankfully, there is still time to deal with the problem. But the stakes are too high for the United States to remain quiet any longer.

 

 

Foreign Affairs

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs

 

[Guerre civile en Syrie]

 

US secretly backs rebels to fight al Qaeda in Syria

 

Sources tell Telegraph that America is backing 'friendly' rebels with millions in cash and non lethal aid to take on extremists in Syria

 

By Ruth Sherlock, Antakya

8:20PM GMT 21 Jan 2014

 

The United States and Gulf countries have been secretly backing efforts by opposition rebels to destroy al-Qaeda's most extreme wing in Syria, diplomats and rebels involved in the plan have told The Telegraph.

 

As Western leaders publicly push the Syrian regime and the opposition to the Geneva II peace conference that begins Wednesday Washington has also been quietly supporting moves by Saudi Arabia and Qatar to give weapons and cash to rebel groups to fight al-Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS) in Syria.

 

One source said the US was itself handing out millions of dollars to rebel groups best equipped to take on the extremists while another confirmed America was providing non-lethal aid.

 

The development marks a new phase in the conflict, with international backers working directly with rebel commanders to target al-Qaeda cells, who are seen as a major threat by Western intelligence agencies.

 

"Everyone is offering us funding to fight them," said one commander in a rebel group affiliated to the Western-backed Supreme Military Council. "We used to have no weapons with which to fight the regime, but now the stocks are full."

 

In the past year ISIS has "hijacked" the Syrian revolt. Made up partly of foreign jihadists, it has sought to impose a medieval style Islamic caliphate run under a strict interpretation of Sharia law in rebel-held areas. They assassinated rival rebel commanders who they feared might be conspiring against them, or whose power they perceived as a threat.

 

The final affront, in rebel eyes, came in December when ISIS tortured and killed Abu Rayyan, a popular doctor and commander in a rebel brigade.

 

The subsequent battle against ISIS, which began a fortnight ago and has already claimed more than 1000 lives, is being touted by local commanders as a spontaneous reaction to the spate of assassinations of comrades.

 

However, the Telegraph can reveal that in late December, a delegation including US and Saudi officials met in Turkey with senior rebel leaders.

 

According to two sources – one whose brother was at the meeting: "They talked about the fighting with ISIS, and the Americans encouraged the commanders to attack."

 

The Syrian Revolutionary Front, whose main commander, Jamal Maarouf, is allied to Saudi Arabia, and the Army of Islam, a new coalition of the moderate rebels sponsored by Qatar, have continued to liaise with the CIA and Saudi and Qatari intelligence, others close to meetings said.

 

These groups received a boost in arms supplies. According to a source who facilitates governments' lethal and non-lethal aid to Western-friendly groups: "Qatar sent arms first. Saudi Arabia didn't want to be out done, so one week before the attack on ISIS, they gave 80 tons of weaponry, including heavy machine guns".

 

A resident living close to bases for the Army of Islam and the Syrian Revolutionary Front in Syria's Idlib province said he had seen 15 trucks "filled with weapons going to the bases".

 

Washington did not directly give arms, he said, but backed Saudi Arabia in its funding of the groups. The United States has, however, also been giving $2 million in cash every month as an unofficial hand out, splitting that amount between western friendly rebel groups, the source added.

 

Senior commanders in both groups confirmed they had received some funds, but refused to say whether it was specifically for the purpose of attacking ISIS. They are wary of being compared to the so-called "Sunni Awakening" of 2006 in Iraq, when the US military encouraged former insurgents to rebel against their al-Qaeda allies, as many Islamist groups in Syria consider the term offensive.

 

Nonetheless, the recent fighting marks a dramatic change in the pace of battle, after months of stalemate in the fight against Mr Assad.

 

On the same day earlier this month, rebel groups, confident and well armed, launched coordinated attacks against ISIS at militarily strategic points across three different provinces in the north of the country, as well as in the central city of Hama. ISIS was also at the same time engaged in fighting across the border in Iraq's western Anbar province, where its forces tried to capture the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi.

 

Muhannad Issa, a rebel commander who led an assault against ISIS in the Syrian town of Salqeen, in Idlib province, said: "All the commanders united for a meeting and we agreed they had to be finished. We gave them six hours to surrender after they took one of our bases. When the ultimatum expired, we cleaned them out. In one hour we pushed them from four of their strongholds."

 

One activist in Salqeen, who watched local members of ISIS coming under attack, said: "Jamal Maarouf's group attacked with full force. The ISIS guys were besieged. Jamal Maarouf was screaming over the radio, 'Give up or we are coming to kill you, just as we kill the Syrian regime.' There was an Australian jihadist there, and he was trembling."

 

In recent days al-Qaeda's retreat has slowed. The group has retaken the Syrian city of Raqqa – its main stronghold until now – and several towns on the outskirts of Aleppo. It is also surviving, in smaller numbers, in the city of Saraqeb in Idlib province.

 

Nevertheless it is hoped that the inroads made against ISIS will improve support for the Syrian opposition on the ground, thereby boosting their credibility at Geneva.

 

In answer to suggestions that the US and Saudis are helping the rebels against the al Qaeda linked extremists a Western diplomat told the Telegraph: "Coordination is continuing with the main international supporters of the armed groups. ISIS has fought back but the momentum of the other groups is continuing and that is a good springboard for the Geneva conference".

 

 

The Telegraph

[Armée de l'air des E.A.U]

Ils ne prendront pas du F-15 et encore moins du F-18. Car ‘la frontière’ consiste à ne surtout pas mettre tous ses œufs dans

le même panier - comme KSA - . Donc encore une fois - oui, c’est très long - patience.

[Guerre civile en Syrie]

 

Syrie : des preuves que « le régime est une machine à tuer »

 

20.01.2014 à 21h48

Mis à jour le 21.01.2014 à 11h45

 

Un rapport, réalisé par trois anciens procureurs internationaux sur la base du témoignage d'un ancien geôlier, accuse Damas d'avoir systématiquement recours à la torture dans ses prisons. Le document de 31 pages, publié lundi 20 janvier par la chaîne CNN et le quotidien The Guardian (attention, certains photos peuvent être choquantes), contient des images de corps portant des marques de lacérations, de strangulation ou d'électrocution, des visages sans yeux et des corps affamés dont la plupart montrent des signes de torture.

 

Ancien procureur du Tribunal spécial pour la Sierra Leone, David Crane n'hésite pas à affirmer qu'il s'agit de « preuves évidentes [montrant] que le régime d'Al-Assad est une machine à tuer ». M. Crane a travaillé avec Desmond de Silva, ancien procureur en chef du Tribunal spécial pour la Sierra Leone, et Geoffrey Nice, ancien procureur en chef lors du procès de l'ex-président yougoslave Slobodan Milosevic.

 

« IL DEVAIT PHOTOGRAPHIER CHAQUE CORPS »

 

Les auteurs du rapport affirment disposer de 55 000 images d'au moins 11 000 victimes des geôles syriennes, mortes entre mars 2011 et août 2013. Ils les ont obtenues grâce à un policier militaire qui travaillait secrètement pour l'opposition. Identifié sous le pseudonyme de « Caesar », l'homme leur a expliqué avoir été photographe pour la police militaire, avant de faire défection et de fuir le pays. Sa mission aurait été de prendre des images des cadavres. Il assure cependant n'avoir pas assisté à des séances de torture.

 

« Lorsque les détenus étaient tués, leurs cadavres était transportés à un hôpital militaire où Caesar était amené. Accompagné par un membre de l'administration judiciaire, il devait photographier chaque corps. Il pouvait y en avoir 50 par jour », affirment les auteurs du rapport.

 

L'homme aurait fait sortir les images du pays en les transmettant à un contact au sein d'un groupe d'opposition soutenu par le Qatar. Après l'avoir rencontré à trois reprises lors des dix derniers jours, les experts l'ont jugé « crédible »  et « sincère ».

 

«  CONVAINCRE UN TRIBUNAL » INTERNATIONAL

 

Pour les juristes, ces preuves sont « capables de convaincre un tribunal de l'existence de meurtres et tortures sytématiques par des agents du gouvernement syrien. Cela pourrait contribuer à trouver des crimes contre l'humanité, et à étayer des accusations de crimes de guerre contre le régime syrien ».

 

Comme le note The Guardian, « l'ONU et des experts indépendants ont déjà récolté de preuves d'abus de la part du régime et des rebelles, mais selon les auteurs du rapport, il s'agit ici de preuves plus détaillées et prouvant des crimes sur une plus grande échelle que tout ce qui a été découvert jusqu'ici ».

 

Et, si la fin du conflit syrien n'est pas en vue, un panel de juges et de juristes travaillent déjà à la conception d'une cours pour permettre aux victimes de se faire entendre. « C'est totalement inédit », explique à l'AFP David Crane. « En général, la communauté internationale observe et attend. Une fois qu'une solution politique a été trouvée et que la tuerie s'est arrêtée, tout le monde peine à trouver la marche à suivre », souligne M. Crane, professeur à l'université de Syracuse, aux États-Unis.

 

Commandé par un cabinet d'avocats londonien agissant pour le Qatar, le rapport est mis à la disposition de l'ONU, des gouvernements et des associations humanitaires. « Sa publication semble ne rien devoir au hasard », poursuit le quotidien britannique. En effet, la conférence de Genève 2, à laquelle doit participer le régime ainsi que l'opposition syrienne, doit avoir lieu mercredi en Suisse.

 

Le rapport sur la torture systématique en Syrie (attention, certains photos peuvent être choquantes)

 

Syria Report Execution Tort by matgoa

 

 

Le Monde

[Guerre civile en Syrie]

 

UN Secretary General's Invitation to Iran to Attend Geneva II

 

Press Statement

Jen Psaki

Department Spokesperson

Washington, DC

January 19, 2014

 

The United States views the UN Secretary General’s invitation to Iran to attend the upcoming Geneva conference as conditioned on Iran’s explicit and public support for the full implementation of the Geneva communique including the establishment of a transitional governing body by mutual consent with full executive authorities. This is something Iran has never done publicly and something we have long made clear is required.

 

We also remain deeply concerned about Iran's contributions to the Assad regime's brutal campaign against its own people, which has contributed to the growth of extremism and instability in the region. If Iran does not fully and publicly accept the Geneva communique, the invitation must be rescinded.

 

 

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/220043.htm

 

 

...

[Armée de l'air des E.A.U]

C'est vraiment réalisable comme projet? La création d'une armée commune du golfe ? A part l'Arabie Saoudite et son vasal Le Bahrein, les autres pays veulent réellement faire cause commune? Quand on voit les divergences d'intérêt que ces pays ont eu (en particulier l'antagonisme AS Quatar sur des dossiers comme la Syrie), ça me surprendrai qu'ils fusionnent réellement leur armée. Quand on voit ce que donne l'Europe de la Defense...

 

...

 

Non, non c’est extrêmement sérieux.

 

Je ne crois pas qu’il faille comparer cela à l’Europe. Les Européens - malgré énormément de choses en communs - n’ont pas d’atomes aussi crochus à ce point - malheureusement - .

 

Les états du GCC ont une langue, histoire, culture, traditions, religion unique.

 

Quant au fameux antagonisme KSA/Qatar  - vu de là-bas - il n’est pas aussi fort qu’il y parait.

 

Saudi Arabia prevails over Qatar on Syria issue

 

 

Ils ne cessent de multiplier les entrainements en commun.

 

GCC forces in military exercises

 

Anatolian Eagle 2013-2

 

Gulf armies wrap up joint military drill, stress capability to deter enemies

 

Royal Saudi Air Force to take part in Anatolian Eagle exercise

 

 

Où de rapprochements plus techniques pour plus d’interopérabilité - KSA n'a pas de F-16 parmi le GCC - .

 

Royal Saudi Air Force Partnership

 

 

...

[Armée de l'air des E.A.U]

Les UAE rendent le service militaire désormais obligatoire.

 

UAE Cabinet introduces mandatory military service for all Emirati males

 

 

Bonus…

 

UAE to create 'Sandhurst' type military college

 

GCC to have 100,000-strong joint security force

 

 

 

...

[Armée de l'air saoudienne]

Je pense que le reste viendra progressivement.

 

Kingdom to manufacture 70% of military hardware locally

 

Kingdom to boost military industries

 

Alsalam builds F-15 parts

[Armée de l'air saoudienne]

 

BAE Systems Saudi Arabia concluded a contract for the processing capacity to repair Typhoon aircraft in national facilities

 

Saturday 11 August 2012

 

BAE Systems Saudi Arabia is very pleased to announce that it has invested SAR-65M ((US $17 million) with Advanced Electronics Systems (AEC) and Rockwell Collins Deutschland (RCD) to bring into Saudi Arabia the repair capability for the Cockpit Interface Unit (CIU) & Interface Processor Unit (IPU) key avionics boxes on the Typhoon Aircraft, the Royal Saudi Air Force’s (RSAF) and Salam Project Office’s latest and most advanced fast jet aircraft.

 

This repair capability is expected to be installed and commissioned in the AEC facilities in Riyadh in June 2014 with In Kingdom repairs for the CIU & IPU commencing shortly thereafter.  This investment with AEC and RCD will be followed up later this year with a further investment which will bring additional avionics repair capabilities to AEC.

 

Jim McDowell the Managing Director & CEO of BAE Systems Saudi Arabia said “BAE Systems is proud of it’s partnerships with the RSAF and Saudi Industry and these investments reinforce BAE Systems allegiance to industrialisation which will see significant elements of the Typhoon Aircraft’s repair capabilities moving to Saudi Arabia providing long term employment of Saudi Nationals in a multitude of technical roles in the Typhoon supply chain”

 

Dr Ghassan Shibl the CEO of AEC welcomed these investments saying that, “These are important investments which demonstrate BAE Systems commitment to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and AEC which will introduce AEC into the supply chain for the RSAF’s Typhoon aircraft bringing repair capabilities into Saudi Arabia while creating new jobs”

 

Dr Oliver Stucky, Director Programs, EuMEA Airborne Solutions, from Rockwell Collins Deutschland said “This investment extends further the excellent relationships Rockwell Collins has with both BAE Systems and AEC and we look forward to working with both organisations to introduce more indigenous avionics capabilities to Saudi Arabia” .

 

http://www.baesystems.com/article/BAES_086038/bae-systems-saudi-arabia-concluded-a-contract-for-the-processing-capacity-to-repair-typhoon-aircraft-in-national-facilities?_afrLoop=322284647213000&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null&baeSessionId=PSXGSJvVGl04wxYM1X2nzLGkRZyLtT3FpWVpfThN3h1YYMzn9gSR!1801251929#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dnull%26baeSessionId%3DPSXGSJvVGl04wxYM1X2nzLGkRZyLtT3FpWVpfThN3h1YYMzn9gSR%25211801251929%26_afrLoop%3D322284647213000%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dqavbursln_4

 

Advanced Electronics Company

 

 

...

[Armée de l'air saoudienne]

Les Anglais avec l’Eurofighter Typhoon et le Tornado fournissent bien tout cela à KSA.

[Armée de l'air saoudienne]

Le package complet allant avec l’acquisition de la flotte de F-15SA.

 

America's Saudi air war

 

Sheppard celebrates opening of RSAF Country Liaison Office

 

Royal Saudi AF's top training leader sees 'inspiration' at Sheppard

 

Royal Saudi Air Force students graduate at Sheppard AFB

 

Saudi student receives top graduate

 

RSAF SNCO earns 364th TRS E&E top grad award

 

 

Une grande partie des pays du GCC étant équipé de chasseurs F-16. La fameuse interopérabilité auquel je faisais référence auparavant.

 

Royal Saudi Air Force Partnership

 

 

La maintenance sur place…

 

 

 

MEPC - Maintenance in the Desert Kingdom (PDF)

 

Middle East Propulsion Company

 

 

 

...

[Armée de l'air saoudienne]

Je ne crois pas que KSA veut du Rafale, un jour. Quand au Koweit et au Qatar, ils suivront les UAE (Je me suis expliqué sur les raisons plus haut).

 

UAE: Nibras-Al Ain Aerospace Park

 

[Armée de l'air saoudienne]

C'est vrai?

Moi ca me semble ultra saugrenu...

Pour quoi faire? des ronds dans 2 mers de 100km de large?

Autant des moyens defensifs serieux je comprends, autant un LHD, c'est clairement une arme de deploiement. Deploiement ou?

Envahir l'Iran?

 

 

Il ferait des très gros ronds plutôt dans l’océan Indien.

 

Iran, qui sait… ;)

[Armée de l'air saoudienne]

ASMP-A : jamais la France ne donnera cette technologie à un pays étranger.

Rafale : on peut rêver

CDG sister ship : déjà que des soums on ne sait même pas si ils ont les capacités de les mettre en place, alors un PA

Centrale Areva - EDF : prospect en cours.

TGV : Trop tard c'est Talgo qui a le contrat.

 

• Cela peut-être plus surement l’AASM Hammer (Une partie des Paveway est déjà fabriqué à KSA).
• Ça en prend le chemin et l’achat englobera aussi le Qatar et le Koweït. Les UAE veulent être un pôle industriel aéronautique militaire dans le GCC et il y a un mouvement dorénavant très fort vers l’interopérabilité dans une défense commune du GCC.
• Un ou deux Mistal LHD pour KSA, pas une idée tout à fait saugrenue.
• Cela sera soit la France/Chine, soit la Corée du Sud. Exigence première – vue situation Iran -, large ToT et fourniture garantie de technologie d’enrichissement uranium à faible niveau (Sinon Chine).
• Il y a d’autres lignes GV programmées à travers tout KSA mais aussi des connexions vers/entre Qatar, UAE, Koweït, Bahrein, Oman (Accord GCC).

[Armée de l'air saoudienne]

Mouais, on attends de voir signé de glorieux contrats car les journaux nous promettaient une avalanche de dollards lors de la visite d'Hollande la bas,

 

On attends toujours une signature.

 

Beaucoup exigent une alliance stratégique très claire dont une très large partie de clauses avec ToT - préalable quasi exigé par KSA et UAE désormais - (C’est âpre, au moindre petit détail, long).

[Armée de l'air saoudienne]

A mon avis, le KSA veut faire comme les UAE, c'est a dire une doublette des equipements, une complementarité. Pourquoi? Parce que les US se barrent du M-E, parce ils n interviennent plus (syrie) ou alors joue un jeu pas net (iran). Ne parlons meme pas des brits... 

 

Tout cela à la fois et beaucoup plus si affinité...

 

 

 

 

Fear and Loathing in the Kingdom

 

BY John Hannah

NOVEMBER 29, 2013

 

Pundits and policymakers are missing the big worry about the Obama administration's Iranian nuclear deal: its greatest impact is not ensuring that Iran doesn't get the bomb, but that the Saudis will.  

 

Indeed, the risk of arms race in the Middle East -- on a nuclear hair trigger -- just went up rather dramatically. And it increasingly looks like the coming Sunni-Shiite war will be nuclearized.

 

Two aspects of the agreement, in particular, will consolidate Saudi fears that an Iranian bomb is now almost certainly coming to a theater near them. First, the pre-emptive concession that the comprehensive solution still to be negotiated will leave Iran with a permanent capability to enrich uranium -- the key component of any program to develop nuclear weapons. In the blink of an eye, and without adequate notice or explanation to key allies who believe their national existence hangs in the balance, the United States appears to have fatally compromised the long-standing, legally-binding requirements of at least five United Nations Security Council resolutions. If the Saudis needed any confirmation that last month's rejection of a Security Council seat was merited -- on grounds that U.S. retrenchment has rendered the organization not just irrelevant, but increasingly dangerous to the kingdom's core interests -- they just got it, in spades.

 

Second, the agreement suggests that even the comprehensive solution will be time-limited. In other words, whatever restrictions are eventually imposed on Iran's nuclear program won't be permanent. The implication is quite clear: At a point in time still to be negotiated (three years, five, ten?) and long after the international sanctions regime has been dismantled, the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program will be left unshackled, free to enjoy the same rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as any other member in good standing. That looks an awful lot like a license to one day build an industrial-size nuclear program, if Iran so chooses, with largely unlimited ability to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium, a la Japan.

 

But of course Iran is not Japan -- a peaceful, stable democracy aligned with the West. It is a bloody-minded, terror-sponsoring, hegemony-seeking revisionist power that has serially violated its non-proliferation commitments and which aims to destroy Israel, drive America out of the Middle East, and bring down the House of Saud.

 

Whether or not President Obama fully appreciates that distinction, the Saudis most definitely do.

 

Of course, Saudi concerns extend well beyond the four corners of last week's agreement. For Riyadh, Iran's march toward the bomb is only the most dangerous element -- the coup de grace in its expanding arsenal, if you will -- of an ongoing, region-wide campaign to overturn the Middle East's existing order in favor of one dominated by Tehran. The destabilization and weakening of Saudi Arabia is absolutely central to that project, and in Saudi eyes has been manifested in a systematic effort by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to extend its influence and tentacles near and far, by sowing violence, sabotage, terror, and insurrection -- in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and most destructively of all, in the IRGC's massive intervention to abet the slaughter in Syria and salvage the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

 

Fairly or not, from the Saudi perspective, the nuclear deal not only ignores these central elements of the existential challenge that Iran poses to the kingdom's well-being, it threatens to greatly exacerbate them by elevating and legitimizing the Islamic Republic's claim to great power status. As surely as Obama's chemical weapons deal with Syria implicitly green-lighted the intensification of the Assad regime's murder machine, so, too, the Saudis fear, a nuclear deal with the mullahs will grant a free hand -- if not an implicit American imprimatur -- to the long-standing Iranian quest for regional supremacy that, to Saudi minds, won't end until it reaches Mecca and Medina. 

 

It should be said that Saudi paranoia about being sacrificed on the altar of a U.S.-Iranian deal is nothing new. But the fact is that, today, the Saudis look around and believe they've got more reasons than ever before to think that they're largely on their own.

 

As the saying goes, even paranoids have enemies. On one issue after another that they've deemed absolutely vital to their interests -- Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and now Iran -- the Saudis view the Obama administration as having been at best indifferent to their most urgent concerns, and at worst openly hostile. To Saudi minds, a very clear and dangerous pattern has now been conclusively established. And its defining characteristic is not pretty at all to behold: the selling out of longtime allies, even betrayal. Indeed, the Saudi listen to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rail against the Iran deal and realize that even Israel, by leaps and bounds America's foremost friend in the Middle East, is not immune. And they wonder where in the world does that leave them. How do you say "screwed" in Arabic?

 

The crisis of confidence in the reliability, purposes, and competence of American power has reached an all-time high. The Saudis have taken due note of National Security Advisor Susan Rice's declaration that "there's a whole world out there" beyond the Middle East that needs attention, and her predecessor's lament that the United States had "over-invested" in the region. The kingdom has become increasingly convinced that there's a method to Obama's madness, a systematic effort to reduce America's exposure and involvement in the region's conflicts, to downsize Washington's role and leadership, to retrench and, yes, to retreat.

 

Whatever the reason -- a weak and unprincipled president, a tired and fed up population, a broken economy and dysfunctional politics, growing energy independence (the Saudis cite all these and more) -- there's a growing conviction in Riyadh that the United States has run dangerously short of breath when it comes to standing by its allies in the Middle East. Obama wants out. Face-saving deals on issues like Syria and Iran that are designed not to resolve the region's most dangerous problems, but rather to defer them from exploding until he's safely out of office are the order of the day -- Saudi vital interests be damned ... or so they fear. 

 

It must be noted that the breach in trust has become intensely personal. The Saudi dismay with Obama and his chief lieutenants is hard to overstate at this point. Secretary of State John Kerry in particular has become a target of derision. In the days immediately following the Assad regime's Aug. 21 chemical weapons attack, the phone calls between Kerry and senior Saudi leaders apparently ran fast and furious. Proof that Syria had smashed Obama's red line on chemical weapons was overwhelming, Kerry assured his interlocutors. A U.S. attack to punish the Assad regime was a sure thing. The Saudis were ecstatic, convinced that at long last Obama was prepared to get off the sidelines and decisively shift the conflict's trajectory in favor of the West and against Iran. Intelligence, war planning and targeting information were allegedly exchanged. Hints abound that the Saudis were ginned up not only to help finance the operation, but to participate actively with planes and bombs of their own. King Abdullah is rumored to have ordered relevant ministries to prepare to go to the Saudi equivalent of DEFCON 2, the level just short of war.

 

Then, on Aug. 31, the Saudis turned on CNN, expecting to watch President Obama announce the imminent enforcement of his red-line -- only to see him flinch by handing the decision off to Congress. The Saudis were enraged, dumbfounded, and convinced that Kerry had deliberately deceived and misled them. Told that Kerry himself had been caught largely unaware by Obama's decision, the Saudis were hardly mollified. A liar or an irrelevancy? Either one was disastrous from their perspective.

 

Unfortunately, the routine has repeated itself several times since -- on one issue after another considered critical to Saudi interests. Hence: Riyadh learned about the U.S.-Russia deal on Syria's chemical weapons from CNN. Riyadh learned about Obama's decision to suspend large chunks of military assistance to Egypt from CNN. And two weeks ago, Riyadh learned that the P5+1 was on the verge of signing an initial (and from its perspective, very bad) deal with Iran from CNN -- even though Kerry had just been in Saudi Arabia earlier that week in an effort to contain at least some of the fallout from the Syria fiasco. Instead, he ended up doubling down on the breach. Detailed revelations in recent days that for the better part of a year, the Obama administration has been engaged in secret bilateral talks with Iran that it sought to keep hidden from its allies -- while merely adding detail to what the Saudis had already suspected from their own sources -- will no doubt only further stoke the kingdom's fears that the fix is in between Washington and the mullahs.

 

An atmosphere this poisonous is dangerous, to say the least. The incentive for the Saudis to engage in all kinds of self-help that Washington would find less than beneficial, even destructive, is significant and rising. Driven into a corner, feeling largely abandoned by their traditional superpower patron, no one should doubt that the Saudis will do what they believe is necessary to ensure their survival. It would be a mistake to underestimate their capacity to deliver some very unpleasant surprises: from the groups they feel compelled to support in their escalating proxy war with Iran, to the price of oil, to their sponsorship (and bankrolling) of a much expanded regional role for Russia and China at America's expense. Convincing ourselves that the Saudis will bitch and moan, but in the end prove powerless to act in ways that harm key U.S. interests would be a very risky strategy.

 

Which brings us to the question of the Saudi bomb. King Abdullah has been unequivocal with a series of high-level interlocutors going back several years: If Iran gets the bomb, we get the bomb. There's not much artifice to the man. He's been clear. He's been consistent. He's not known to bluff. And I believe him.

 

Whether or not all the stories about the longstanding arrangements with the Pakistani nuclear program are true, there's enough of a link there that no one should be too shocked if we wake up next week, next month, or next year to discover that a small nuclear arsenal has suddenly shown up in the Saudi order of battle. If the prospect of an Israel-Iran nuclear standoff doesn't quite get your pulse to racing, how do you feel about adding a Saudi-Iran standoff to the mix?

 

Think of two nuclear powers eyeball to eyeball across the Strait of Hormuz -- with religious hatreds boiling over, ballistic missile flight times measured in minutes, and command and control protocols, well, less than robust. Even short of a nuclear exchange, what do you think that would do to the price premium on a barrel of oil? Can anyone say "instant global recession"?

 

That's clearly the direction we're headed, and it's my hunch that the Iran deal has pushed the day of reckoning dangerously closer. I don't know if it's possible at this late date to walk the Saudis back from the ledge. But the Obama administration should try. I think the place to start, and rapidly, is with the Saudi national security advisor and intelligence chief, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Formerly Riyadh's ambassador to Washington, Bandar is now clearly the tip of the spear in King Abdullah's efforts to combat the Iranian threat around the region -- not to mention the principal point of contact in the kingdom's thick relationship with Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment. He's been in virtually every major international capital in recent months -- with the notable exception of Washington. That alone speaks volumes of how much the situation has deteriorated. President Obama personally needs to get Bandar in the Oval Office as quickly as possible for a very frank discussion about the strategic situation in all its complexities -- and what the United States and Saudi Arabia, together, can do about it. At this point, no one else but the commander-in-chief stands a chance of convincing the Saudis that more desperate measures are not called for. 

 

Exactly what Obama would have to say to make the sale is another matter. On the nuclear deal, he'd have to be able to guarantee that any follow-on agreement would, at a minimum, see Iran compelled to accept a massive roll-back of its existing capabilities -- as close to zero as possible -- as well as a specially-designed, highly-intrusive verification regime. And should Iran reject that bottom-line, the president would have to be equally convincing that he's prepared to walk away from a bad deal and use force decisively to dismantle the most dangerous elements of the Iranian program. Should it come to that, and as a mark of his seriousness, he might broach the range of important contributions the Saudis could make to such an effort -- including managing global oil markets and Arab public opinion, basing and over-flight rights, financing, and direct military participation.

 

On the broader Iranian regional challenge, Syria is absolutely central for the Saudis. The president would need to be able to say something new and compelling about a genuine shift in U.S. strategy, one seriously committed to working with the kingdom to change the balance of power on the ground against the Assad regime and its Iranian backers, while marginalizing al Qaeda. Obama also be well-served by a serious discussion of Saudi regional priorities, and ways that Washington is prepared to cooperate with Riyadh in a sustained and careful way to advance our common interests -- in weakening Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Iran's influence in Iraq.

 

The chances that President Obama will be prepared to do any of this, I admit, are slim to none. Doing what comes as second-nature to Iran's leaders -- fighting and negotiating with your enemy at the same -- is just not in his DNA. Moreover, it would be completely contrary to his broader strategic purpose of extricating the United States from what he sees as the Middle East morass. The fact is that Obama thinks he's on the right track. If that makes the Saudis uncomfortable, if it forces them to adjust and take matters more into their own hands, so be it. To his mind, there's really not much that they can do without shooting themselves in the foot. At the end of the day, Obama believes, the Saudis know that they need us far more than we need them, and will act accordingly. At most, a pat on the head, a few vague reassurances that we take their concerns seriously, and a promise to consult more frequently on key issues will suffice to keep them quiet and in line.

 

I hope he's right. But I strongly suspect that he may be wrong and that we all could be in for a rude awakening at some point. My fear is that in a few years time, we will look back and conclude that President Obama -- who came to office with the lofty ambition of restoring America's standing with the Arab world and strengthening the global non-proliferation regime -- has instead done extensive damage to both causes that will be difficult, if not impossible, to repair in short order, and will come at a very, very high price in blood, treasure, and U.S. interests. If that's the case, we're in for a very rocky road, indeed. Buckle up.

 

 

Foreign Policy

 

 

Too late...

[Armée de l'air des E.A.U]

Il y a une incohérence le satellite ‘Helios II’ pèse 4 200 kg.

 

Je crois que j'ai trouvé la réponse.

 

http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/20130723trib000777032/comment-la-france-a-vendu-deux-satellites-d-observation-hyper-sophistiques-aux-emirats-arabes-unis.html

 

 

 

...

 

Sérénité dans le camp français

 

Fin 2012, les industriels français - Astrium et TAS - sont confiants dans la compétition qu'ils livrent depuis 2008 aux Emirats désireux de s'équiper de deux satellites d'observation ayant une résolution de 50 cm - à l'époque les Emiratis ne veulent pas plus. C'est le projet Falcon Eye. Les Français ont fait une meilleure proposition que l'américain Raytheon, qui est 20 % plus cher. Ils sont favoris et attendent fin 2012 un geste du prince héritier pour terminer à Abu Dhabi la négociation du contrat. Car c'est lui, et lui seul, qui décide des investissements en matière de défense et des coopérations militaires aux EAU. Début décembre, une délégation émiratie de haut niveau assiste à Kourou au lancement du satellite d'observation français Pléiades 1B par le lanceur russe Soyuz. Il règne encore dans le camp français un optimisme raisonnable. Même si les discussions trainent comme souvent dans le Golfe, cela ne provoque pas plus d'inquiétude que cela en France.

 

Un nouveau compétiteur redoutable, Lockheed Martin

 

Pourtant ce que ne savent pas encore les deux groupes français, c'est que les Américains, et plus précisément, Lockheed Martin, ont contre-attaqué et obligé les Emirats à considérer une proposition non sollicitée très intéressante, notamment sur le plan technique. Le groupe américain propose un satellite dont la commande a été annulée par la National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), une agence du département de la défense des Etats-Unis qui a pour fonction de collecter, analyser et diffuser du renseignement géospatial en utilisant l'imagerie satellite. Avec un satellite sur les bras, Lockheed Martin saute sur l'opportunité de le proposer aux EAU. Ce satellite - Digital Globe - a une résolution de 34 cm, bien supérieure à celle proposée dans le cadre de l'appel d'offre. Washington s'est également mis au service de son industrie en signant avec Abu Dhabi un accord intergouvernemental régissant les conditions d'utilisation du satellite. Bref, la machine américaine déroule toute sa puissance face à des petits "Frenchies", qui n'ont pas encore senti la menace.

 

En février, au salon de l'armement d'IDEX à Abu Dhabi, douche glacée pour les Français. Les Emiratis les informent de la proposition de Lockheed Martin qu'ils ne semblent pas pouvoir refuser. Abu Dhabi est alors très près d'accepter l'offre américaine. Pourtant, de façon très opportune, cheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, qui a noué des relations de confiance avec Jean-Yves Le Drian, accepte d'attendre une nouvelle offre des deux constructeurs tricolores. Sonné par cette mauvaise surprise, le camp français « cornaqué » par le ministre repart au combat et décide de réagir face à cette nouvelle proposition venue d'ailleurs, qui rebat toutes les cartes de cette compétition.

 

Une nouvelle offre française

 

Demandé par les deux constructeurs depuis plusieurs mois, un accord intergouvernemental, exigé par les Emiratis, est finalement signé par la France. Lors de son passage au salon de défense IDEX, le ministre de la Défense paraphe à la satisfaction des Emiratis cet accord avec le prince héritier. Et il assure qu'il reviendra aux Emirats avec une nouvelle offre française définitive et engageante six semaines après. Ce qui a été fait même si Jean-Yves Le Drian n'est pas revenu aux Emirats. « Nous devions rétablir un cadre de confiance et un dialogue respectueux entre la France et les Emirats Arabes Unis, explique Jean-Yves Le Drian. Je ne viens pas aux Emirats avec un catalogue d'armements mais pour avoir une relation de confiance dans la compréhension de l'un et de l'autre ».

 

A son retour en France, Jean-Yves Le Drian est très clair. Pas question pour les industriels de partir en ordre dispersé. Astrium et TAS, qui se chamaillent pour tirer les prix au plus bas, doivent coopérer - l'Etat a été très clair, il veut une offre commune. Les deux constructeurs travaillent sur une nouvelle offre technique améliorée pour la mettre au niveau de celle de Lockheed Martin. Ce qui n'est irréalisable pour les deux partenaires. Deux solutions sont étudiées. Soit dégrader une version d'un satellite de type Helios, soit augmenter la performance d'un satellite de type Pléiades. C'est la deuxième solution qui est retenue, ce qui exige quelques petits développements à réaliser par rapport aux satellites français en service. Cette solution permet en revanche de proposer par la suite un nouvel équipement de très haute résolution à l'export. « Astrium et Thales ont bien travaillé », souligne le ministre.

 

 

GeoEye-2 Entry Shakes Up U.A.E. Satellite Competition

 

By Peter B. de Selding, Warren Ferster | Feb. 1, 2013

 

PARIS and WASHINGTON — U.S. geospatial-information providers DigitalGlobe and GeoEye have thrown a curve ball into the long-running competition between U.S. and European hardware builders for a satellite contract with the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) by proposing to sell the U.A.E. the nearly completed GeoEye-2 satellite, industry officials said.

 

DigitalGlobe and GeoEye, whose merger cleared final U.S. government approval Jan. 31, would thereby be spared the expense of storing GeoEye-2 for three years while waiting for the orbiting WorldView-1 satellite to reach retirement.

 

Herndon, Va.-based GeoEye and Longmont, Colo.-based DigitalGlobe have said the merged company will operate a fleet of three satellites, fewer than the combined four or five satellites the two companies would operate if they remained in competition.

 

The U.A.E., led by its air force, has been talking for years about purchasing its own high-resolution optical satellite system instead of relying on images purchased from suppliers like GeoEye and DigitalGlobe in the United States, and Astrium Geo-Information Services in Europe.

 

U.S. and European bidders have admitted to being exasperated that the contest seems to be never-ending, but the prospect of a $1 billion sale is too enticing for them to stop sending teams to the U.A.E. to keep their bids active.

 

In September, a U.A.E. air force official said the competition was nearing completion and had been narrowed from an initial 11 bidders to finalists from Europe and the United States. According to industry officials, bidders on the program included a team of Astrium and Thales Alenia Space of Europe; Lockheed Martin Space Systems of Sunnyvale, Calif., builder of GeoEye-2; and a team of Raytheon Intelligence and Information Systems of Aurora, Colo., and Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp. of Boulder, Colo.

 

The two European companies also joined to build the French Pleiades satellites, which are dual-use assets whose imagery is available for commercial sale, with a portion of the image-taking ability reserved for the French Defense Ministry.

 

The United States and France, which along with Israel are the nations that have been most active in developing their own high-resolution optical satellite capabilities, have arrived separately at the same policy on imagery exports: A 50-centimeter ground-sampling distance, meaning objects of that size and larger can be distinguished, is allowable, while images sharper than 50 centimeters require special government approval.

 

U.S. manufacturers have been slow to seize export opportunities for Earth observation satellites, but Astrium and Thales Alenia Space have sold several spacecraft equipped with high-resolution imaging cameras, notably to Turkey, Kazakhstan and South Korea. None collects imagery at resolutions sharper than 50 centimeters.

 

It remains unclear what conditions, if any, the U.S. government — which has made it clear it supports U.S. industry involvement in the competition — has set on the U.A.E. sale, and specifically whether the camera U.A.E. planned for GeoEye-2 would be replaced by another, less-capable system to stay within the 50-centimeter limit. As designed, the satellite’s imager can detect objects with a diameter of 34 centimeters from its planned operating altitude.

 

The U.A.E. air force official said when the procurement process began nearly a decade ago, it was unclear whether a U.S. company would be allowed to bid. The easing of U.S. export restrictions since then has permitted the U.A.E. to benefit from a healthy trans-Atlantic competition.

 

GeoEye has estimated that the GeoEye-2 satellite will end up costing between $820 million and $850 million, including its launch and insurance. The company said that as of June 30 it had spent $718 million on the program. The satellite had been scheduled for a mid-2013 launch aboard a Lockheed Martin-supplied Atlas 5 rocket, and GeoEye had said it had until March to inform Lockheed Martin whether it would proceed with the launch.

 

With the merger with DigitalGlobe — which looks more like an acquisition by DigitalGlobe than a merger — now complete, GeoEye and DigitalGlobe are free to plan their combined orbital fleet and prepare for GeoEye-2’s storage.

 

Asked about the GeoEye-2 offer, one industry official said it appears to be outside the specifications set by U.A.E. officials for the competition. The official conceded it would not be the first time a customer changed specifications midway through a competitive bidding process.

 

In a statement to SpaceNews emailed Feb. 1, DigitalGlobe spokesman Robert Keosheyan said, “DigitalGlobe acknowledges receiving an unsolicited inbound expression of interest from the UAE and is in the process of considering whether to engage in discussions.”

 

 

Space News

[Armée de l'air des E.A.U]

 

Rp Defense

 

La France décroche un contrat dans le spatial militaire à Abu Dhabi

 

21/07/2013 Par Véronique Guillermard

 

Astrium et Thales fourniront deux satellites de renseignement. Un contrat de plus de 700 millions d'euros.

 

C'est le premier grand contrat export du quin­quennat dans la défense. Il marque le retour de la France dans les pays du Golfe. Ce lundi soir, Jean-Yves Le Drian, le ministre de la Défense, accompagné de François Auque, PDG d'Astrium, filiale spatiale d'EADS, et de Jean-Loïc Galle, son homologue de Thales Alenia Space (TAS, cofiliale de Thales et de ­Finmeccanica), doivent par­ticiper à une cérémonie à Abu Dhabi pour fêter la signature d'une commande de plus de 700 millions d'euros. Le contrat porte sur la livraison à l'armée émirienne de deux ­satellites militaires d'observation de très haute résolution de type Helios et d'une station terrestre. Avec les contrats de main­tenance, le contrat approche des 800 millions d'euros.

 

«C'est une très grande satisfaction pour la France et pour notre industrie de défense. Lorsqu'ils s'entendent, les industriels français sont compétitifs. Ils sont capables de gagner face à l'américain Lockheed Martin aux Émirats arabes unis, qui sont de redoutables clients», se félicite-t-on dans l'entourage de Jean-Yves Le Drian.

 

Une base interarmée depuis 2009

 

Engagées en 2008, les discussions ont connu des hauts et des bas. «Jean-Yves Le Drian a repris ce dossier et l'a placé en haut de ses priorités. Le climat de confiance qu'il a su créer, son implication ainsi que celle du président de la République ont permis la signature du contrat», insiste François Auque, PDG ­d'Astrium, mandataire juridique de ce contrat dont la maîtrise d'œuvre et la responsabilité sont partagées avec TAS.

 

Les négociations ont été particulièrement délicates. «Jamais auparavant, la France n'avait accepté d'accorder une aussi haute résolution en vendant des satellites militaires. Ce contrat marque le prolongement de l'engagement de la France dans la région depuis l'implantation de la base française interarmée à Abu Dhabi en 2009», explique François Auque. La commande est assortie d'un accord stratégique entre les deux gouvernements impliquant notamment une coopération des services et le partage des données.

 

Elle prévoit également un ­transfert de savoir-faire dans la conduite de programmes avec des formations d'ingénieurs émiriens au sein des usines d'Astrium à ­Toulouse et de TAS à Cannes. La ­fabrication des deux satellites sera 100 % réalisée en France et représente l'équivalent de 1000 emplois (avec la sous-traitance) pendant quatre ans et demi à cinq ans, jusqu'à la livraison. Les deux satellites seront tirés par la fusée italienne Vega depuis Kourou, en Guyane.

 

Ce contrat «valide la méthode Le Drian», insiste-t-on à l'Hôtel de Brienne. Le ministre s'est rendu quatre fois aux Émirats, «prenant le temps de construire une relation avec le cheikh Mohammed ainsi qu'un partenariat stratégique. Cela en travaillant en bonne intelligence avec les industriels mais sans mélanger les genres. Le ministre n'est pas un VRP». Au ministère de la Défense, on estime que ce partenariat a vocation à se «traduire dans d'autres domaines en fonction du besoin du client». La France espère en effet signer des contrats pour des radars, des blindés ainsi que des avions de combat.

 

 

LeFigaro

[Armée de l'air des E.A.U]

...

 

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140105/DEFREG04/301050006

 

 

Ce n’est pas le satellite de reconnaissance de type ‘Pléiade’ qui a été proposé et retenu par les UAE mais celui de type ‘Helios II’.

 

Le type ‘Pléiade’ est en négociation pour KSA qui pourrait lui préférer ‘Helios II’ aussi - à ma connaissance bien plus performant -.

 

 

 

 

France to deliver satellites worth Dh3.4bn to UAE

 

Awad Mustafa

July 23, 2013

 

ABU DHABI // The UAE has ordered two surveillance satellites from France worth almost Dh3.4 billion.

 

The deal was signed by Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and French defence minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, the state news agency Wam said yesterday.

 

Two high-resolution Helios-type military observation satellites and a ground station will be delivered to the Armed Forces.

 

The satellites will be provided by Franco-Italian defence firm Thales Alenia Space and Astrium, a subsidiary of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company.

 

Twenty engineers will be trained to use the new equipment, Agence France-Presse reported.

 

The agreement was signed in Abu Dhabi and was worth "a little over €700m [Dh3.39 billion]", said Astrium's chief executive, Francois Auque.

 

France and the UAE said the agreement was a sign of good cooperation between the two countries.

 

"The two sides reaffirmed that for more than four decades, the UAE and France have enjoyed a strong and effective bilateral relationship, underpinned by a long history in the areas of energy and defence," Wam said.

 

It added the deal was part of a "strategic partnership framework" agreed to by the President, Sheikh Khalifa, and French president Francois Hollande during a state visit to Abu Dhabi in January.

 

Sources from the French ministry of defence were quoted this week in the French daily newspaper Le Figaro saying this deal marked the first major defence export contract for France within the past five years.

 

"It marks the return of France in the [Arabian] Gulf," a source was quoted as saying. "It is a great satisfaction for France and for our defence industry."

 

 

TheNational.ae