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Quelques articles très complets canadiens.

Paru dans le "journal de l'armée canadienne".

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/CAJ/default_f.asp?view=more

volume 11  no. 1,  printemps 2008

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_11/iss_1/CAJ_vol10.4_full_f.pdf

EMBUSCADES, DISPOSITIFS EXPLOSIFS DE CIRCONSTANCE ET CONTRE-INSURRECTION : L’EXPÉRIENCE FRANÇAISE 

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_11/iss_1/CAJ_vol11.1_04_f.pdf

THÉORIE DE LA GUERRE DE MANOEUVRE ET DOCTRINE DE CONTRE-INSURRECTION 

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_11/iss_1/CAJ_vol11.1_05_f.pdf

C'est très long mais intéressant... notamment le long papier sur les divers expériences française contre les IED dans le passé.

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Comment ça long 11 pages cella se parcours en peut de temps. Bon je vais relire la chose une fois tirée la plume à la main comme d’habitude dés que possible.

Pour le reste à mon époque les IDE en France c’était les piéges à Co…et on envoyait en homme de pointe soit l’idiot de service quant il sautait les autres pouvaient passer soit un moustachus pour opérer en surprise.

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Comment ça long 11 pages cella se parcours en peut de temps. Bon je vais relire la chose une fois tirée la plume à la main comme d’habitude dés que possible.

Pour le reste à mon époque les IDE en France c’était les piéges à Co…et on envoyait en homme de pointe soit l’idiot de service quant il sautait les autres pouvaient passer soit un moustachus pour opérer en surprise.

L'article sur les embuscade fait 20 pages :)

Celui sur la coin de mouvement 11 pages ;)

C'est pas très long faut juste s'y mettre.

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  • 4 months later...

http://militaire.wordpress.com/2009/01/17/prevention-engin-explosif-improvise/

8 mesures à prendre contre les IED

Quels moyens pour améliorer la prévention ?

Il doit exister des mesures visant à prévenir les risques en pertes humaines en supprimant ou en réduisant la probabilité d’occurrence des explosions liées aux engins explosifs improvisés.

8. Bien gérer ses déchets : imaginez une simple cannette de soda avec une DF et du fil de pêche et vous tenez un grand classique… Le traitement adéquat par le feu et le broyage est générallement bien appliqué. Néanmoins, dans nos secteurs d’opérations urbanisés, la gestion des ordures devient un problème stratégique aux ramifications multiples.

7. Veiller à emener un stock de munitions transportable: en cas de déplacement urgent nécessaire, seule la capacité d’emport normale pourra être utilisée, le reste devra être abandoné… Et sera récupéré et retourné contre vous.

6. Respecter les procédures de contrôle : toute consommation excessives au regard des règles d’engagement doivent faire l’objet d’une étude appronfondie. Il s’agit générallement d’un phénomène d’échelle, dont la responsabilité se situe au niveau du commandement.

5. Eviter le stockage des munitions jugées impropres  : les personnels engagés par exemple, en cas d’embuscade, veulent être légitiment sûr que leur munitions soient en parfait état de fonctionnement. Néanmoins on a vu parfois des stockages important de munitions  à cause de poussière de pierre incrustée, un corps un peu oxydé, ou une tête légerement aplatie.

4. Sécuriser les livraisons : un grand classique, une élingue qui casse, les munitions tombent éparpillées en plein désert… Lorsque l’équipe de récupération arrive, elle ne trouve que des caisses vides, voire…  rien.

3. Prévenir la prolifération d’engins non explosés : un vrai dilemme pour les équipes d’appuie feu. Lorsque vous savez que des gars à vous sont bloqués, la tentation est grande de “lâcher tout ce que l’on a” sous la main. Néanmoins, cela pose un vrai problème. En effet, la probablité de produire des engins non explosés augmente avec le volume de tirs…

2. Mettre en place un programme civils : encourager concrétement les populations à “coopéerer”; une prime argent, nourriture… est générallement offerte pour toute information permettant de mener à un lieu de fabrication des EEI ou à leurs matières premières.

1. Rechercher et detruire les lieux de production : c’est le moyen d’action le plus direct de lutte. Il peut requérir des équipes spécialisement formées et affectées exclusivement à cette tâche. En effet, certains de ces lieux peuvent être dissimulés dans des souterrains ce qui posent le problème de l’intervention en milieu souterrain.

Deux méthodes sont utilisées en synergie. D’une part, un travail de renseignement classique à partir : des documents trouvés sur un précédent site et des interrogatoires des personnels participant à ces opérations. D’autre part, un travail de profilage géographique classique  pour anticiper et localiser d’autres points de production.

Il n’y a pas de solution simple à ce problème, peut-être existe-t-il d’autre moyens de prévention pour compléter cette liste ?

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http://militaire.wordpress.com/2008/08/23/embuscade-afghanistan-soldats/

Les embuscades en Afghanistan en 10 leçons

Aperçu rapide des tactiques utilisées.

1. Les routes et cols de montagnes ont toujours été des lieux de prédilection pour tendre une embuscade. Depuis l’époque de leur confrontation avec les unités soviétiques les afghans ont appris à éliminer dés les premières secondes d’une embuscade les véhicules de commandement ou le responsable de l’unité.

L’objectif est de désorganiser rapidement l’unité ciblée en perturbant, la chaine d’information (voire les transmissions) et de commandement en empêchant le ralliement des hommes pris sous le feu.

Remarquons que l’installation de moyens de transmission redondants dans des véhicules blindés permettent de minimiser le risque d’une perte totale de transmission car les afghans ont peu de moyen de brouillage des transmissions.

2. Cette action est rendue possible par un travail de renseignement classique par l’observation systématique de la composition des colonnes aux points de passages obligatoires.

3. Les embuscades afghanes sont toujours caractérisées par un maximum d’effort pour créer la surprise.

4. La sélection méticuleuse du lieu d’embuscade est toujours associée à des positions d’embuscades bien retranchées et bien camouflée.

5. Un itinéraire de retraite bien préparé est toujours en place et couvert par une équipe dédiée.

6. Utilisation rapide de frappes multiples (début, milieu et fin de colonne) pour immobiliser l’unité visée dans la zone de tir est systèmatique.

7. Lorsque l’axe de progression est piégé, les possibilités de contournement ainsi que les éventuels axes secondaires praticables, comme l’on chèrement appris les soviétiques en leur temps.

8. Contre les patrouilles, autrement dit des forces de taille moyenne, le schéma privilégié est l’embuscade suivant le modèle du marteau et de l’enclume. Dans ce cas, seul un entrainement de coordination exemplaire associé à une bonne préparation psychologique des conducteurs permet de limiter les dégâts.

9. Le survol de l’Afghanistan est très éprouvant pour les hélicoptères les plus modernes. Seuls les appareils rustiques comme les Chinook et autre Mi8 supportent les heures des vol avec un taux de réparation acceptable.

10. Dans ces montagnes, les avions ne peuvent se substituer aux hélicoptères : car ils sont incapables de soutenir une contre-attaque. Et en cas de terrain inaccessible, ils ne peuvent mettre en place un groupe feu sur un surplomb avec un lance grenade automatique pour traiter les personnels restant.

Ce théatre d’opération est très exigeant, ainsi aucune unité ne résume sa préparation avant un départ à juste vérifier les véhicules et l’armement après un briefing en sept langues différentes… Cet article est loin d’être exhaustif, aussi n’hésitez pas à me faire part de vos remarques ou questions.

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Pour les embuscades en Astan elles sont identiques à TOUTES les embuscades du monde.

Les deux seuls facteurs aggravant sont le vécu des afghans certain sont comme les cambos viets 30 ans de guerre dans la mémoire de rudes adversaires

L’autre l’altitude qui diminue les performances des engins. Pensez que les passes donnant sur Kaboul sont à l’altitude de 3000 M environ bien plus haut que la zone de combat envisagé par les armées classique.

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  • 3 weeks later...

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/02/usg-coin-guide/

Bravo! to the dedicated team of bureaucrats and thought leaders who toiled for 2 years to produce the new US Government Counterinsurgency Guide.

This guide, written in a collaborative "whole of government" process and endorsed at the highest levels of our diplomacy, development, and defense leadership, reflects the latest doctrine (FM 3-24 and also FM 3-07). It is not, however, a tactical or operational "how-to" guide. Rather it is intended to be a "COIN 101" for policy-makers contemplating US intervention abroad. ...

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/02/usg-coin-guide/

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J'ai l'impression qu'on redécouvre avec étonnement les mêmes choses à chaque fois. Les leçons de la guerre du Vietnam ont déjà été oubliés on dirait.

A l'époque aussi les américains ont cru qu'une technologie supérieur et des gadgets suffiraient à remédier à ces problèmes, mais rien ne remplace l'expérience.

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  • 3 months later...

COMMANDER'S GUIDE TO MAAWS HANDBOOK

Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System

---> http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09-27/09-27.pdf

This Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) handbook assists company-, battalion-,

and brigade-level officers and noncommissioned officers to effectively use money as a

weapons system on the counterinsurgency (COIN) battlefield. Coalition money is defeating

COIN targets without creating collateral damage, by motivating antigovernment forces to

cease lethal and nonlethal operations, by creating and providing jobs along with other

forms of financial assistance to the indigenous population, and by restoring or creating vital

infrastructure. Money also funds other tools of war.

Key lessons:

• Money is a valuable weapons system.

• Money and contracting in a COIN environment are vital elements of combat power.

• Leaders must leverage money and contracting in operations.

• Leaders must understand funding programs and contracting.

• Brigades often lack internal resource management expertise and knowledge of

funding.

• Financial management administrative requirements in a combat environment can be

extremely burdensome but are necessary for good stewardship.

• Financial management expertise and knowledge of funding are critical to successful

operations.

• Without proactive leadership involvement, the potential for extensive fraud, waste,

and abuse of funds exists in the COIN environment.

This handbook is a guide and addresses some of the most common funds available to

warfighters. Since policies, procedures, and guidelines change as do sources and amounts

of funds available to fund warfighters, obtain the latest funding information from the

supporting resource manager before taking action to fund warfighters.

Les  100 pages suivantes dans le pdf ...

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  • 5 months later...

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2009/11/journal-how-to-break-and-open-source-insurgency.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+typepad%2FrzYD+%28Global+Guerrillas%29

How to Break and Open Source Insurgency

Short Answer:  divide it.

It's long been my contention that Iraq was stabilized at an acceptable level of controlled chaos due to a happy accident by al Qaeda (in an attempt to expand/lead the loose insurgency in a new direction).  What did they do?   They blew up the Golden Mosque in Samara in 2006.  This act of symbolic terrorism did indeed disrupt social networks as anticipated, however the consequences were ultimately disastrous for the Iraqi open source insurgency.  

The reason for this is it broke the dynamics of the open source insurgency in ways the US and Iraqi government's COIN efforts could not.  First, it created a permanent split between Sunni and Shiite insurgent groups/militias.  Coopetition ended.  Second, it motivated large Shiite militias to start an ethnic cleansing of Sunni areas.  This put acute pressure on Sunni guerrilla groups who were too small (by design to avoid US counter-pressure) to defend themselves against large militias operating in the open.  The result was an opening, very close to the one I described in my 2005 NYTimes OpEd, that allowed the US to convert Sunni guerrilla groups into militias that were not loyal to the central government (in direct contradiction to its COIN manual).  

It's a nice example of the dynamics of many to many conflict, social network disruption, and the development open source counterinsurgency.

See this excellent description at the blog, "Musings on Iraq" for more detail on the ethnic cleansing operations.  It also includes this money quote: "the majority of the Sunni insurgency gave up and switched sides to align with the Americans rather than face annihilation at the hands of the Shiite militias, Al Qaeda in Iraq, or the United States."

NOTE:  it's pretty clear from the above that social network disruption (either through attacks on symbolic targets or blood and guts terrorism) is like playing horseshoes with live hand grenades.  It's ultimately a losing strategy for advancing an open source insurgency.  Social network disruption is very likely to break standing order 6:  don't fork the insurgency.

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  • 1 month later...

Ancien d'Indochine, je viens de lire "Guérilla et contre-guérilla" (Muller Edition - http://www.muller-edition.com ), j'ai ete veritablement captive par ce livre ecrit par un combattant qui a pratique cette forme de guerre particuliere en Indochine, puis en Afrique.

Il s'agit d'un veritable manuel qui nous fait vivre avec intensite cette forme captivante de lutte asymetrique dont on parle tant aujourd'hui.

Je le recommane vivement aux camarades passiones par ce domaine.

Image IPB

Extrait:

"L'auteur est un combattant. Il a pris part à la guerre d'Indochine, a participé aux conflits du Katanga et en République démocratique du Congo (Ex. Belge).

Cette expérience de terrain lui a permis d'analyser toutes les facettes de la guérilla et de la contre-guérilla. Spécialisé dans ce type de combats il a réalisé une étude très poussée et nous fait bénéficier de ses connaissances."

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http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/12/22/beating-the-low-signature-enemy/

Beating The Low Signature Enemy

When the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) bat­tled Hezbollah to basi­cally a draw in south­ern Lebanon in sum­mer 2006, one thing that really stymied the IDF was what Israeli Brig. Gen. Itai Brun called Hezbollah’s “strat­egy of dis­ap­pear­ance”: Hezbollah fight­ers set up com­mand posts and arms stores in civil­ian build­ings; launched rock­ets from near mosques and schools; used “low sig­na­ture” weapons, such as mor­tars, anti-​​tank mis­siles and shoul­der launched surface-​​to-​​air mis­siles; and spent years build­ing exten­sive below ground for­ti­fi­ca­tions includ­ing a maze of tun­nels and bunkers.

The IDF, which had prepped for high-​​intensity bat­tle against Syrian tank armies, was unpre­pared for an asym­met­ric, low-​​signature enemy that refused to stand in the open and smile for the elec­tronic eyes on over­head drones and air­craft and ther­mal sights on Merkava main bat­tle tanks. The IDF took fairly heavy casu­al­ties try­ing to root out dug-​​in Hezbollah com­bat cells and never did stop the rain of rock­ets fired from south­ern Lebanon into Israeli towns.

The chal­lenge is how to com­pel the low-​​signature enemy to emit a detectable sig­nal, to raise his sig­na­ture level. According to a draft paper passed along to DOD Buzz, the Israelis, and cer­tain parts of the U.S. mil­i­tary, are explor­ing a con­cept called “dis­trib­uted maneu­ver,” a poten­tially promis­ing approach that could force the “hybrid” enemy to breach the detec­tion thresh­old so that he can be tar­geted and dis­patched. The paper, a joint Israeli-U.S. effort, was authored by strate­gist Frank Hoffman, who now works in the Office of the Naval Secretary.

The paper defines the hybrid threat as ene­mies that pull from the “whole menu of tac­tics and tech­nolo­gies and blend them in inno­v­a­tive ways,” con­stantly shift­ing between con­ven­tional and irreg­u­lar forms of fight­ing to wrong-​​foot oppo­nents. The hybrid threat will choose as a bat­tle­field what the Israelis term a “sat­u­rated envi­ron­ment”: “a com­bi­na­tion of com­plex or urban­ized ter­rain, large num­bers of non­com­bat­ants and an intense infor­ma­tion envi­ron­ment.” An added layer is an enemy that skill­fully uses anti-​​tank rock­ets and mis­siles and mines and IEDs to win the mobility/​counter-​​mobility battle.

Again, the fea­ture that makes this enemy so dif­fi­cult to encounter is its low sig­na­ture. The insur­gen­cies in Iraq and Afghanistan are good exam­ples of an enemy that uses the local pop­u­la­tion to hide its sig­na­ture; the only sig­na­ture typ­i­cally being the IED det­o­na­tion. Hezbollah fight­ers uti­lized ter­rain and civil­ian pop­u­la­tions to reduce their sig­na­ture level.

According to the draft paper, dis­trib­uted maneu­ver is the “fluid maneu­ver of oper­a­tional or tac­ti­cal units sep­a­rated beyond the lim­its of direct and mutual sup­port,” yet act­ing in uni­son to attack the enemy across a very large bat­tle­field and pen­e­trate deep into the enemy’s ter­ri­tory. Using a com­bi­na­tion of rapidly mov­ing ground and air forces, and direct and indi­rect fires, deep maneu­ver “serves to iso­late the adver­sary from forms of sup­port, negates his abil­ity to shift resources or react in a deci­sive man­ner.” By strik­ing deep into the opponent’s cen­ter of grav­ity, wher­ever or what­ever that might be, dis­trib­uted maneu­ver forces the hybrid threat to react, in essence, to move or fire, and thus raise his sig­na­ture level, thus negat­ing the “dis­ap­pear­ing tactics.”

The ideal end state is to pro­duce a series of actions that “cre­ates for the enemy a rapidly dete­ri­o­rat­ing, cas­cad­ing effect, shat­ter­ing his cohe­sion”; an oper­a­tional con­cept famil­iar to those who fol­lowed the “maneu­ver war­fare” school that was pop­u­lar in the 1980s.

The dis­trib­uted maneu­ver con­cept requires:

• Operational or tac­ti­cal com­bined arms teams

• Parallel oper­a­tions across the depth and breadth of the bat­tle­field

• C2 agility – enable lower ech­e­lons to respond rapidly

• Fast paced, inter­de­pen­dent com­bined arms maneu­ver capa­ble of pen­e­trat­ing deep into enemy ter­ri­tory

• Compressed sensor-​​shooter links and pre­ci­sion fires

• Ability to sup­ply ground forces with­out expos­ing one­self to an enemy’s IED kill zones.

The paper uses as an oper­a­tional vignette an Israeli thrust into south­ern Lebanon: an IDF-​​Hezbollah round two if you will. Hezbollah is entrenched in both urban and moun­tain­ous ter­rain and in densely pop­u­lated areas and all roads in are seeded with IEDs and EFPs. The IDF strikes deep with heli­borne troops to the Litani River, while dis­trib­uted armored shock groups simul­ta­ne­ously move rapidly into south­ern Lebanon, avoid­ing roads and fixed defenses, aim­ing for Hezbollah’s com­mand nodes, rocket forces and sup­ply lines.

In essence, the IDF con­ducts an oper­a­tional level “swarm­ing” of Hezbollah defenses, instead of the plod­ding attack along pre­dictable lines of advance by massed armored for­ma­tions as hap­pened in the 2006 war, and forces Hezbollah fight­ers to react and expose them­selves to strikes.

One of the biggest chal­lenges to effec­tively car­ry­ing out dis­trib­uted maneu­ver, the paper says, is gen­er­at­ing “general-​​purpose forces capa­ble of oper­at­ing inde­pen­dently at increas­ingly lower ech­e­lons.” A pri­macy is also placed on the abil­ity of units to learn and pass infor­ma­tion to accel­er­ate learn­ing and adap­ta­tion. It’s cer­tainly an inter­est­ing con­cept and mer­its fur­ther explo­ration and we’ll con­tinue to look into it as more infor­ma­tion becomes available.

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  • 1 year later...

Changement de tactique vu l'augmentation des IED. Fini le désamorcage systématique permettant d'obtenir du renseignement, on opte pour la destruction in situ permettant de gagner du temps et de protéger les troupes.

http://ukforcesafghanistan.wordpress.com/2011/02/14/commanders-to-change-bomb-disposal-tactics/

Army commanders are planning to change bomb disposal tactics in Afghanistan to cope with the surge in the number of Taliban booby traps – writes Sean Rayment, Defence Correspondent for The Telegraph.

Rather than removing bombs from the ground without blowing them up, so that they can be forensically analysed, more devices will now be simply destroyed in situ. Senior officers believe the new tactic will be quicker and safer. All six bomb disposal operators killed in Helmand since 2006 have died while attempting to remove improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from the ground so that they could be examined by intelligence staff – a process known as “exploitation”.

The current tactics are based on trying to achieve a balance between destroying bombs in order to allow greater freedom of movement for troops, and gathering intelligence to target the Taliban networks which build and plant IEDs. All information gleaned from analysing the components of an IED, such as the switch or pressure plate, the configuration of the power pack, together with any DNA evidence is fed into a NATO intelligence database. The information can then be used to either capture and prosecute those responsible or, as is more often the case, allow the special forces to target the insurgents in a strike operation.

While exploitation has met with some considerable success, there is a growing belief amongst commanders that better freedom of movement for the local population, NATO and Afghan security forces might reap greater rewards in the battle for hearts and minds. Thousands of IEDs have been buried in Helmand, especially in area where British troops are deployed. The so called “build quality” is usually poor, making handling of the devices extremely hazardous. It is no longer regarded as “tactically appropriate” to recover devices as a matter of routine.

Between the beginning of July 2009 and the end of March 2010 – the period when Taliban bomb production soared – 109 British soldiers were killed, and of those 83 died in IED blasts. Sources have said that given the number of bomb disposal teams, which are relatively few in number compared with the volume of bombs, commanders now favoured a move “to destroy rather than exploit” IEDs.

One senior source said: “Every operator who has died was killed while attempting an exploitation. The job is inherently risky. “The operational situation on the ground will always dictate whether a device is disarmed or destroyed but if an operator is clearing a route with ten devices he shouldn’t be disarming them all. “The risk is too great, but that decision is always left to the operator.”

According to the sources, “cultural” differences exits between the various experts within the Counter IED Task Force, which was established in 2009 in response to the surge in use of Taliban bombs, in their approach to dealing with the devices. Royal Engineers tend to view IEDs as an obstacle preventing freedom of movement that should be destroyed, whereas members of the Royal Logistic Corps, the unit which historically deals with IED disposal, would always seek to neutralise a device as part of the intelligence strategy.

At an inquest last week it emerged that Staff Sergeant Olaf Schmid was killed in Sangin in October 2009 while attempting an exploitation. Prior to the explosion in which he was killed, he had already removed two bombs so that they could be forensically analysed.

The other bomb disposal operators to have died in Helmand since 2006 are: Warrant Officer (2nd Class) Gary O’Donnell GM and Bar, Captain Daniel Shepherd, Capt Daniel Read, SSgt Brett Linley and WO2 Charles Wood.

Colonel Gareth Collett, head of Army Bomb Disposal, said: “It is up to the explosive ordnance disposal operator on the ground, nobody else, to make the decision to exploit or destroy any device he or she encounters, based on a thorough threat assessment of the situation, the commander’s mission and the time available. Preservation of life and property is paramount in any decision. The introduction of dedicated IEDD (Destroy) teams has enabled commanders to improve significantly the freedom of movement of coalition forces in Afghanistan in areas where there is no obvious exploitable benefit to be gained from an IED.”

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