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Polybe

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  1. ...ouais enfin à chaque rezzou, y a l'aide de la France... Mon propos c'est d'étudier le "pourquoi" virer les US et pas les français (c'était l'inverse jusqu'à présent), puis le "comment" faire sans les français.
  2. Un SGTIA Wagner et quelques Su-25/Mi-24 et N'Djamena sera tenue. Et c'est tout ce qui compte.
  3. Je ne sais pas non plus, mais quand on regarde sur une carte ce qu'il y a autour, je me dis que l'agenda US n'est pas celui des acteurs de la sous-région. Pour ces derniers, négocier avec les djihadistes n'est pas du tout un tabou, voir souhaitable. Forcément en partant de là... Ajoutons que si les acteurs économiques deviennent turcs, iraniens ou chinois, les présences militaires occidentales peuvent gêner. Maintenant @Ciderstout à fait d'accord pour dire que ça pose des questions. Dans le cas du Tchad, il faut toujours un dispositif anti-rezzou. Je suppose que la France suffit, sans aide US. Pour l'instant. Parce que ça les russes pourraient parfaitement le fournir aussi.
  4. Pas dans l'économie du pays. Et il existe des intérêts autres qu'économiques. Les relations du Tchad (politiques, diplomatiques et ethniques) avec ses voisins ne sont par exemple pas du tout compatibles avec une puissance comme celle des USA. La France a peut-être un jeu un peu plus subtil sur ce plan.
  5. Pas foutu dehors..."les premiers" ! Ne présageons pas de l'avenir. ^^ Après si les US ont fait comme partout, c'est à dire "balec, je paye donc je fais ce que je veux !", possible que ça n'est pas fait plaisir chez les tchadiens. Je me demande aussi quels intérêts les US ont là-bas, et à quel point ça vient à l'encontre des intérêts tchadiens. Le djihadisme et les intérêts de pays musulmans, de la Russie ou de la RPC ne sont pas nécessairement un problème pour les locaux ! Là où les US ne semblent pas montrer une grosse envie d'investir localement. Cela peut expliquer des choix logiques et cohérents des tchadiens.
  6. En général, c'est que l'adversaire a repéré la même chose de ta part, sur son territoire. ^^ Ou qu'en terme de politique intérieure, il faut démontrer quelque chose à tes dirigeants/à ta population, voir à tes alliés ("Regardez à quel point ce que je vous dis est vrai"). Plus subtil, ça peut indiquer une source commune aux trois affaires...
  7. C'est je pense, outre le terrorisme, le danger principal au Niger. Et la junte ne me parait pas très prompt à jouer l'unité inter-ethnique.
  8. Oui enfin les locaux peuvent vite s'énerver...le toubou moyen est sanguin si je puis dire. ^^ Après honnêtement, si on paye, oui ils se tairont. Moi ce dont je doute, c'est la volonté de cette junte, très "nationaliste du Sud-Ouest" du Niger, à vouloir partager avec les ethnies "du Nord" (touaregs et toubous).
  9. Satisfaire l'aile droite russe en sacrifiant un pion qui perd de l'intérêt ? Ivanov, c'est la team Shoïgou. Peut-être contrebalancé le pouvoir.
  10. ...y aussi la question de "qui" va voir l'argent. Vu la zone, les ethnies du coin ne sont pas trop représenté au gouvernement.
  11. Concernant la Russie, on a les résultats du sondage dans les région de Moura et d'Hombori ?
  12. Point ISW du 24/04 : "The Kremlin explicitly threatened Armenia if Armenia does not resume active engagement in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and resume its pro-Kremlin alignment. Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan announced on April 23 that he would not participate in the International Meeting of High Representatives for Security Issues in St. Petersburg on April 24 and 25.[47] Grigoryan’s refusal to participate in a Russian-led multilateral meeting is likely part of a continuing Armenian effort to distance Armenia from political and security relations with Russia by freezing its participation in the CSTO and refusing to participate in multilateral political and security engagements.[48] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) board meeting on April 23 to discuss promoting Russian interests in the South Caucasus, in which he claimed that the West is attempting to strategically defeat Russia by destabilizing ”other parts of the post-Soviet space, including the South Caucasus.”[49] Lavrov blamed the West for allegedly attempting to undermine and destroy Russian security and economic relations with countries in the South Caucasus. Lavrov is likely attempting to portray Armenian efforts to deepen relations with the West as a deliberate hostile Western effort against Russia to set information conditions to justify any potential future Russian efforts to coerce or force Armenia to resume its pro-Russian alignment. The Russian MFA also explicitly threatened Armenia by claiming that the West is attempting to “drag the South Caucasus into a geopolitical confrontation” between Russia and the West and warning that Armenia could “go down the wrong path,” following Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s April 5 meeting with senior EU and US officials.[50] CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov (a Kazakh official) also directly threatened Armenia if it did not resume active engagement in the CSTO. Tasmagambetov stated in an interview published on April 24 that the CSTO is aware of NATO’s activity in the South Caucasus and that the CSTO Secretariat’s analysts indicate that the balance of power in the South Caucasus may change if Armenia leaves the CSTO.[51] Tasmagambetov stated that he hopes that the likelihood of a “confrontation” between the CSTO and Armenia is “no more than hypothetical” but that such a confrontation would require all parties to consider their resources and capabilities. Lavrov’s and Tasmagambetov’s threats against Armenia were made around the April 24 Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day indicating that Russia likely intended to tie a tragedy in Armenian history with Armenia’s efforts to distance itself from Russia." Le caïd de la cité d'à côté se joint au caïd local pour taper le mec à terre... Après ça à le mérite d'être clair. L'Arménie, avec l'Azerbaïdjan, la Turquie et la Russie pas en sa faveur doit serrer très fort les fesses. Je me demande si la France espère vraiment faire quelque chose dans le coin.
  13. Extrait du point ISW du 23/04 : "Moldovan authorities confiscated over one million dollars from Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politicians at the Chisinau airport on the night of April 22 to 23, and the opposition politicians likely intended to use to bribe protestors and voters. Moldovan law enforcement officers conducted over 150 searches mostly at the Chisinau airport and in some personal homes after receiving a tip that opposition politicians who were returning from the April 21 meeting of Moldovan opposition politicians in Moscow, which resulted in the creation of the pro-Russian Moldovan Victory electoral bloc, were smuggling money into Moldova.[22] Moldovan authorities reported that they confiscated about 62,000 rubles (about $660), 3,000 euros (about $3,200), and over $1.1 million during the searches. The Moldovan General Police Inspectorate Chief Viorel Cernauteau stated on April 23 that the money was meant to finance Moldovan political parties led by affiliates of US-sanctioned, pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor. Unspecified actors reportedly used “couriers” to transport the money from Russia to Moldova and promised them compensation ranging from 300 to 500 euros (about $320-520). Cernauteau noted that the “couriers” carried under 9,000 euros (about $9,600) of cash to avoid customs laws which require people to declare amounts over 10,000 euros (about $10,700). Shor reportedly paid demonstrators to protest Moldovan President Maia Sandu in 2022, and Moldovan authorities are investigating the Shor Party for bribing voters during the 2023 Gagauzia gubernatorial election.[23] Moldovan authorities have also detained members of Moldovan parliament who reportedly took bribes from Shor affiliates.[24] ISW previously assessed that the creation of the Victory electoral bloc would allow the Kremlin to focus on a unified political effort as part of its efforts to destabilize Moldovan society, attack Moldova’s democratic government, and prevent Moldova’s accession to the European Union (EU).[25]" Cela commence à riposter aux manoeuvres du camp d'en face. Je subodore que la Moldavie a vu des alliés très interessés lui présenter des dossiers de renseignement bien remplis, gratuit. Je me demande si quelque part ils tapent pas "juste" dans un système en place de longue date. Extrait du point ISW du 24/04 : "Moldovan authorities filed a criminal case against Yevgenia Gutsul, the Kremlin-affiliated governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, for campaign finance violations as Moldovan officials continue to warn about Russia’s threat to Moldova. Moldovan media reported on April 24 that the Moldovan Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office completed its criminal investigation into Gutsul’s connections with the Shor Party, a political party that sanctioned pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor founded and financed, and filed a criminal case against Gutsul on two counts of knowingly accepting financial support from an organized criminal group.[57] The Moldovan Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office determined that Gutsul knowingly transported unaccounted funds from an organized criminal group likely based in Russia to Moldova and used those funds to support the Shor Party’s activities in Moldova while Gutsul worked as a secretary for the Shor Party from 2019 to 2022. The Moldovan Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office also charged Gutsul with knowingly organizing and paying anti-government protesters over 42.5 million Moldovan lei ($2.39 million) in illicit funds in October and November 2022. Gutsul denied the Moldovan government’s allegations and claimed that the Moldovan government fabricated the case against her.[58] The new pro-Russian Moldovan Victory electoral bloc, which is also affiliated with Shor, responded to the case and demanded that the Moldovan government end its “groundless” and politically-motivated prosecution of Gutsul.[59] The Victory electoral bloc threatened that “provocations” by the Moldovan government could “destabilize the situation in Gagauzia.” Pro-Kremlin actors may seize on and spin the legitimate criminal charges against Gutsul to justify Russian intervention and aggression in Moldova as necessary to protect Russia’s “compatriots abroad.” Moldovan Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi stated during an interview with Bloomberg published on April 23 that Moldova is a “petri dish” of Russian hybrid warfare and election meddling.[60] Popșoi stated that Russia is using a range of covert and informational tactics to destabilize Moldova, including smuggling money into Moldova to bribe voters and protestors, creating deep fake videos of Moldovan politicians, and conducting cyberattacks against Moldovan infrastructure. Russia reportedly conducted a significant cyberattack against the Moldovan postal service and temporarily disrupted postal services in February 2024, and Moldovan authorities notably confiscated over one million dollars from Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politicians at the Chisinau airport on the night of April 22 to 23.[61] Popșoi, citing Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, noted that Russia is conducting daily rhetorical attacks against Moldova and Moldovan officials and that Moldovan officials are monitoring the possibility of a future Russian military threat to Moldova. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is likely engaged in hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing Moldovan society, degrading Moldova’s democracy, and preventing Moldovan’s accession to the EU.[62]" ...et la suite de l'affaire !
  14. Si ça vient de l’extérieur et que c'est illégal d'écouter, ça n'est pas la raison d'être de la DGSE ? Là on parle de la police...
  15. Oui alors la dernière partie je pense que l'on peut oublier. ^^
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