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  1. J'ai toujours entendu dire de la part de mes amis arabes, que le moyen, quasi unique, d'aller au paradis de façon certaine dans l'islam était de convertir quelqu'un, d'en faire un "client" (plus le terme arabe en tête).

    C'est cela selon eux qui expliquerait le très fort prosélytisme des dictatures et autres royaumes musulmans (des royaumes de la péninsule arabique, ou encore de Kadafi qui arrosait tout dictateur africain fraichement converti). Donc pas vraiment et/ou seulement une lutte d'influence, mais belle et bien un procédé quelque peu anarchique et empreint de superstition pour s'assurer une place au paradis.

     

     

    Ce n’est pas vrai. Il faudrait d’abord que le converti devienne un véritable musulman au cours de son existence restante (Accepté au Paradis au jour du jugement dernier). Et de deux cela n’exclurait nullement le dit ‘convertisseur’ - qualifié de musulman uniquement que par lui-même - de son propre jugement personnel au jour dernier équivalent. 

     

     

     

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  2. Assad annonce une amnistie générale pour les déserteurs

    Le président syrien Bachar el-Assad a publié samedi un décret annonçant une amnistie générale pour les milliers de militaires ayant déserté son armée.

     

     

    http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/assad-annonce-une-amnistie-generale-pour-les-deserteurs-25-07-2015-1951435_24.php

     

     

    lol Il croit qu’ils vont peut-être changer d’avis et venir quand même combattre pour lui un jour ??? De plus en plus de jeunes alaouites - et plus vieux - eux même fuient l’enrôlement avec la complicité active de leurs proches.   ^ ^

     

     

     

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  3. Dans ce cas ca voudrait dire se foutre sur la gueule avec l'armée syrienne et la chassé d'Alep. Je crois que l'annonce mentionnait le fait qu'elle ne visait pas la SAA. 

     

     

    http://www.air-defense.net/forum/topic/12467-guerre-civile-en-syrie/page-718#entry888123

     

     

     

     

    Following a final declaration of the agreement on the no-fly zone, the jets of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria will not be permitted within the zone, and those which violate this will be targeted.

     

     

     

    Comprendra qui veut...   O0

     

     

     

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  4. ...

     

    Parce que sinon ça veut dire que les USA ont donné leur accord à une intervention pour créer une zone tampon (ce qu'ils ont catégoriquement refusé l'année dernière) et cela impliquerait une opération bien plus importante de l'armée turque avec des ... troupes au sol... Bref je n'y crois pas un instant. 

     

     

    Bingo!!!

     

     

    Turkey, US to create ‘ISIL-free zone’ inside Syria

     

    Serkan Demirtaş - ANKARA

    July/25/2015

     

    Turkey and the United States have agreed on a military action plan with the objective of clearing the Turkish-Syrian border of jihadist terrorists in what the two countries have called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)-free zone.

     

    This action plan was part of a comprehensive deal between the two allies which has been seen a “a game changer” in the fight against ISIL by the United States administration, whose warplanes will be able to use this region’s most strategic military base in İncirlik as part of its aerial campaign against jihadist positions.

    The ISIL-free zone will be 98 kilometers long and 40 kilometers wide and situated between the Mare-Jarablus line. A good portion of this area is currently under ISIL control, and Turkey already vowed it would not tolerate the jihadists posing a threat to the Turkish border.

     

    Sources emphasized they have opted to call it the “ISIL-free zone” instead of a “security or safe zone” because the objections raised by Washington, who refrained from giving the wrong message to the Syrian regime, as well as Russia and Iran. The idea of the name is to show that the main objective of this Turkish-American joint fight is eliminating ISIL in this particular area and not fighting the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

     

    The aerial campaign will be largely carried out by U.S. jets deployed to the İncirlik base and Turkish participation will be considered only when necessary, sources stressed. However, this aerial protection will not be classified as an effort to build a no-fly zone over Syrian airspace. Together with aerial strikes, Turkish long-range artillery units will also be used if necessary.

     

    Turkey had already reinforced its military presence along the Turkish border, especially across the Mare-Jarablus line, after ISIL began to advance to northwestern Syria in a bid to threaten the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and to spark a fresh refugee influx towards Turkey.

     

    FSA to control the emptied zone

     

    The plan crafted by Ankara and Washington foresees the deployment of FSA units to this area if ISIL is completely cleared from that particular zone, which would both prevent the Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD) from further expanding its influence towards the West and create a safe environment for either sheltering Syrians fleeing violence or those who want to return to their homelands.  

     

    Turkey is currently hosting at least 1.8 million Syrians in its territories, with around 265,000 of them in refugee camps. There have been concerns ISIL’s drive through the populous Western parts of Syria could spark fresh refugee inflows into Turkey.

     

    Hurriyet Daily News

     

     

    Cela donnerait à peu près ceci  - Je penche plutôt pour la seconde option. Soyons téméraire - :

     

    http://www.air-defense.net/forum/topic/12467-guerre-civile-en-syrie/page-718#entry888123

     

     

    40 kilomètres de profondeur.

     

    9734701jtiriyrtit7.jpg

     

     

     

    50 kilomètres de profondeur.

     

    8483902ji44jrtit7.jpg

     

     

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  5. Turkey launches second wave of airstrikes against ISIS in Syria, hits PKK camps in Northern Iraq

     

    ISTANBUL

    Saturday, July 25 - 2015

     

    Turkish F-16 jets took off from their airbase on late Friday as part of the second wave of operation against the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) units in Syria.

     

    The operation ended at around 2. am local time and Tırkish mediasoucres reported that the jets have returned back to the airbase in Diyarbakır.

     

    In the operation five PKK camps of Zap, Basyan, Gare, Avashin and Metina in Northern Iraq were also targeted along with ISIS-held areas. PKK's headquarters located on Qandil Mountains in Northern Iraq were reportedly targeted in the attacks as well.

     

    About 20 Turkish F-16 jets took off at around 10.30 pm local time from Diyarbakır 8th Main Air Base Command located in southeastern Turkey.

     

    Nine of the jets set for the PKK camps crossed the border at 10.55pm local time and entered Iraqi airspace.

     

    Commercial flights between 11.30 pm local time on Friday and 9.00 pm on Saturday in the region have been suspended until further notice. Turkish Airlines has also stopped all flights from Istanbul to Hakkari in Turkey.

     

    DAILY SABAH

     

     

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  6. Turkish airstrikes target ISIL in Syria

     

    ANKARA

    July/24/2015

     

    Turkey carried out airstrikes against three Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) targets in Syria for 13 minutes early July 24.

     

    Three Turkish F-16 fighter jets took off from the 8th Main Jet Base in the southeastern province of Diyarbakır at 3:12 a.m. and hit two ISIL headquarters and one rallying point inside Syria with guided missiles from 3:40 a.m. to 3:53 a.m., Turkish Prime Minister's Office said in a statement.

     

    The operation was named after Yalçın Nane, a non-commissioned military officer who was killed during Turkish army's first gunfight with ISIL on the border in the province of Kilis on July 23.

     

    Ankara informed its allies before the military operation on early July 24 that hit ISIL targets, a Turkish official told the Hürriyet Daily News.

     

    ISIL targets were located near the Havar village of Syria, which is across Turkey's Kilis on the border, according to Doğan News Agency.

     

    Private broadcaster CNNTürk reported that the Turkish jets launched their missiles from Turkey, without entering the Syrian airspace.

     

    The decision was taken at a special security meeting in Ankara late July 23, hours after the clash on the border.

     

    "The state of the Republic of Turkey is decisive in taking any precaution to safeguard its national security," the official statement confirming the airstrikes said on July 24, adding that the Turkish F-16s returned to their bases at 4:24 a.m.

     

    Suicide bombing triggers more violence

     

    The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) had announced that five armed terrorists opened fire at a military outpost on Syrian border on July 23 and killed one non-commissioner officer, while wounding two troops. As a result of Turkish retaliation, one ISIL militant was killed and three ISIL vehicles were hit.

     

    Hours before the July 23 border clash which involved four Turkish tanks, Turkey agreed to open its İncirlik military base to aircraft of the anti-ISIL coalition.

     

    The new joint action consensus between Turkey and the United States also covers a partial no-fly zone over the Turkey-Syria border.

     

    The 90-kilometer line between Syria’s Mare and Cerablus will be 40 to 50 kilometers deep, sources told daily Hürriyet, while elaborating on the security steps outlined by Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, following a cabinet meeting on July 22.

     

    Turkey also recently decided to beef up security on its borders with Syria by flying surveillance balloons and building a two-fenced border system with a new moat.

     

    On July 20, 32 people were killed by a suicide bombing in a Turkish town on the Syrian border that the government blamed on ISIL.

     

    This sparked an upsurge in violence in Turkey’s Kurdish-dominated southeast, where many accuse the Turkish authorities of collaborating with ISIL, accusations Ankara denies.

     

    Turkish police on July 24 launched raids to arrest suspected members of ISIL and other militant groups, including the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), in an apparent bid to stamp down on all sources of violence, the state-run Anadolu Agency said.

     

     

    Hurriyet Daily News

     

    Partial no-fly zone included in US-Turkey consensus: Turkish sources

     

    Uğur Ergan - ANKARA

    July/24/2015

     

    A recent joint action consensus between Turkey and the United States, which includes the use of the İncirlik Airbase in southern Turkey in fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) jihadists, also covers a partial no-fly zone over the Turkey-Syria border, according to Turkish sources.

     

    The 90-kilometer line between Syria’s Mare and Cerablus will be 40 to 50 kilometers deep, sources told daily Hürriyet, while elaborating on the consensus outlined by Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, following a cabinet meeting on July 22.

     

    However, sources avoided saying whether such a zone would be broadened in the future.

     

    This security line will prevent radical groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Nusra Front from gaining the mentioned land.

     

    U.S.-led coalition jets will provide security over the land “when needed,” carrying out “attacking or exploration” flights, sources said.

     

    Jets belonging to Turkey, which is not a member of the coalition but lends support to the anti-ISIL fight, will also be allowed to take similar flights “when needed,” the sources added.

     

    The coalition jets will be allowed to use the İncirlik NATO base and Turkish air field, they said.

     

    In addition, an artillery backing by the Turkish military has also been considered. The consensus also covered permissions for jets from other countries which may possibly join the coalition in the future.

     

    The use of the airfield will be coordinated with the Turkish army, sources said.

     

    Following a final declaration of the agreement on the no-fly zone, the jets of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria will not be permitted within the zone, and those which violate this will be targeted.

     

    The agreement did not directly target the Syrian-Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), but a counter move will be possible if the PYD and its armed force, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), threaten the Turkish border, namely bidding to change the demographic structure, according to sources. However, they said the U.S. would not take a direct stance against the PYD, which is now fighting against ISIL.

     

    The coalition jets will also be able to use bases in the southeastern provinces of Batman, Diyarbakır and Malatya in cases of emergency.

     

     

    Hurriyet Daily News

     

     

    8857361cjigjrtit7.jpg

     

    1120552cjritri45.jpg

     

     

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  7. Je dis ca en passant, je ne sais pas ce qu'il en est de l'expansionnisme iranien...

     

    <_<

     

     

    Rouhollah Khomeini : «L’islam impose à tout homme adulte, dans la mesure où il n’est pas handicapé ou invalide, de se préparer à la conquête des nations, afin que les commandements de l’islam soient partout obéis. Ceux qui étudient la guerre sainte islamique comprendront pourquoi l’islam veut conquérir le monde. ( … ) Ceux qui ne connaissent rien à l’islam prétendent qu’il met en garde contre la guerre. Ceux-là sont des sots. L’islam dit : Tuez tous les incroyants tout comme ils vous tueraient tous ! Cela veut-il dire que les musulmans doivent attendre paisiblement qu’on les massacre ? L’islam dit : Tuez-les, passez-les par l’épée et dispersez (leurs armées). Cela veut-il dire qu’il faille attendre jusqu’à ce qu’ils triomphent de nous ? L’islam dit : Tuez au service d’Allah ceux qui pourraient vouloir vous tuer ! Est-ce que cela signifie que nous devons nous rendre à l’ennemi ?

     

    L’islam dit : Le bien n’existe que grâce à l’épée et à l’ombre de l’épée ! Les gens ne peuvent pas devenir obéissants si ce n’est sous la menace de l’épée ! L’épée est la clef de la porte du paradis, qui ne peut être ouverte que pour les saints combattants ! Il y a des centaines d’autres psaumes (coraniques) et d’hadiths qui exhortent les musulmans à estimer la guerre et à combattre. Est-ce que tout cela signifie que l’islam est une religion qui empêche les hommes de faire la guerre? Je crache sur les âmes folles qui tiennent de tels propos.»

     

    Holy Terror: The Inside Story Of Islamic Terrorism - 1987

    by Amir Taheri

     

     

     

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    • Upvote (+1) 1
  8. ... Le régime des mollahs ne veut pas s'étendre en envahissant les autres pays du Golfe et porter la guerre sur presque tous les continents, enfin je crois. 

     

    C’est tellement mignon de s’en convaincre. Le régime ornementé de sa délicate feuille de vigne n’est que le sample remastérisé d’un très antique morceau. C’est méconnaitre les antagonismes millénaires dans cette région et tout ce qu’ils charrient de désirs. D’autres partagent le même avis que le mien.

     

     

    What to Do About an Imperial Iran

     

    Tehran has regional ambitions of glory and influence dating back to the Persian Empire. And here’s why that should worry the West.

     

    BY JAMES STAVRIDIS

    JUNE 30, 2015

     

    The headlines: A charismatic and wily Iranian leader seeks to expand the borders of his nation, pushing aggressively against neighbors in the region and especially to the West. Iran exerts dominance in a wide range of regional capitals, from Baghdad to Beirut. Trade routes are opening, and wealth will begin into flow to the nation, enabling further adventurism. Sound familiar?

     

    Actually, this describes the foundation of the Persian Empire about 2,500 years ago by Cyrus the Great. The empire at its peak ruled over 40 percent of the global population, the highest figure for any empire in history. It stretched from the littoral of the eastern Mediterranean to the coast of the Arabian Gulf, encompassing what are today Libya, Bulgaria, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Afghanistan. Cyrus the Great said, “You cannot be buried in obscurity: You are exposed upon a grand theater to the view of the world.”

     

    We don’t tend to think of today’s Iran as an imperial power, but the Iranians certainly do — indeed, it is woven into their national DNA and cultural outlook. And we need to decide how to deal with the reality of Iranian geopolitical outreach, which will only increase if the sanctions come off.

     

    Tehran’s geopolitical strategy — underpinned by the Shiite faith as a religious movement — is taken directly from the playbooks of the first three Persian empires, which stretched over a thousand years. Iran seeks regional dominance, a significant global level of influence, and the development of a power center that is not a bridge between East and West, but rather a force in its own right.

     

    As the West grapples with the significant issues surrounding Iran’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction — and rightly tries to resolve them through diplomacy — we need to be keenly aware of the imperial ambitions of Iran and how they will be significantly empowered by the lifting of economic sanctions. A full lifting of the economic sanctions would, by some estimates, cause a surge of revenue to Iranian coffers in the range of $100 billion a year or more, by putting to work as much as a third of the economy that has idled due to the economic barriers. Some of this would be used to improve the economy in Iran, of course, but it would at a minimum provide much additional funding for external activities around the region and the world.

     

    A glance around the region shows the power and reach of Iran today, despite the significant imposition of sanctions. Indeed,

     

    Iran is deeply and successfully dominating politics in the capitals of four major states in the region from Beirut to Baghdad, Sanaa to Damascus.Iran is deeply and successfully dominating politics in the capitals of four major states in the region from Beirut to Baghdad, Sanaa to Damascus. And Iran is also punching above its weight in Kabul and Bahrain. If the sanctions are lifted, a significant amount of those resources would be available to fund a variety of causes — from Lebanon’s Hezbollah to Yemen’s Houthis.

     

    What should we do? Are there opportunities as well as risks here?

     

    First, we need to reassure increasingly nervous allies in the region that we are aware of the broad campaign of Iranian imperial activity. Both Israel and our Sunni partners in the Gulf are clearly concerned that we are trying desperately to disengage from the region — the Pacific “pivot,” the “leading from behind” in Libya, the lack of resolution in dealing with Syria early in that crisis — are all indicators to them of American pullback. The glaring lack of several heads of state at the Camp David Middle East summit directly reflects this.

     

    We can and should reassure allies through high-level diplomatic engagement — but what they really want is high-technology weapons via sales and arms transfers; trainers and advisors stationed in the region; frequent deployments of highly capable U.S. military units; and political support against Iran in its adventurism.

     

    Second, a specific area of cooperation that would be powerful and well-received would be in the world of cyber. The Saudis remember very well the devastating attacks against Saudi Aramco and are concerned about rising Iranian capability in this area. While the Israelis are well-defended, they too welcome partnership in offensive cyber-research and operations — which may end up being Plan B for dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat if diplomacy fails.

     

    Third, Washington should redouble our intelligence gathering efforts against Iran. The West has been very focused on counter-proliferation operations and inspection regimes, which, of course, makes sense as it grapples with the nuclear issue. Over time, however, we need to increase the persistence of broader intelligence collection against Iranian institutional and leadership targets to understand the goals and objectives of the regime in a broader way than simply “they want nuclear weapons.” What are the long-term regional goals? Which nations do the Iranians prioritize in their influence campaign? Where are their geopolitical red lines? How central is the Shiite religious underpinning to these geopolitical objectives? We don’t know as much about these themes as we should.

     

    Fourth, as difficult as it will be to do so, the West needs to keep an open channel for dialogue with Iran. If a satisfactory agreement can be concluded to curtail, or at least significantly diminish, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran, that is all to the good. I am skeptical but hopeful on that point. But the larger question is: What are the long-term ambitions of Iran, the inheritor of a grand Persian tradition? An open dialogue, with a realistic sense of both their history and their current trajectory, will be crucial to managing this larger challenge.

     

    Henry Kissinger told me in 2009 as I began my tour as supreme allied commander at NATO that “every solution is merely an admission ticket to the next problem.” If we do manage to solve the nuclear issue with Iran, the next problem will be an ambitious and relatively well-funded nation with distinct ambitions in not only its region, but globally. Stay tuned.

     

    Foreign Policy

  9. Autre question, si on était intervenu en Syrie des le début, Daech n'existerait pas ?

     

     

    Oui et non. En tout cas certainement il ne serait pas devenu aussi puissant. Le mal se nourrit toujours du désespoir.

     

    Excellent documentaire :

     

    http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2t7e41

     

     

    Durée : 52 minutes

    Auteur Réalisateur : Martin Smith

    Adaptateur : Yuri Maldavsky

    Production : WGBH Boston / Rain Media

    Année : 2014

     

     

    ...

  10. Turkey Plans to Invade Syria, But to Stop the Kurds, Not ISIS

     

    Thomas Seibert

    06.28.151:18 PM ET

     

    The Turkish military is not enthusiastic and Washington may have its doubts, but President Erdogan appears determined to set up a buffer zone.

     

    ISTANBUL—Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is planning a military intervention into northern Syria to prevent Syrian Kurds from forming their own state there, despite concerns among his own generals and possible criticism from Washington and other NATO allies, according to reports in both pro- and anti-government media.

     

    In a speech last Friday, Erdogan vowed that Turkey would not accept a move by Syrian Kurds to set up their own state in Syria following gains by Kurdish fighters against the so-called Islamic State, or ISIS, in recent weeks. “I am saying this to the whole world: We will never allow the establishment of a state on our southern border in the north of Syria,” Erdogan said. “We will continue our fight in that respect whatever the cost may be.” He accused Syrian Kurds of ethnic cleansing in Syrian areas under their control.

     

    Following the speech, several news outlets reported that the president and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu had decided to send the Turkish army into Syria, a hugely significant move by NATO’s second biggest fighting force after the U.S. military.  Both the daily Yeni Safak, a mouthpiece of the government, and the newspaper Sozcu, which is among Erdogan’s fiercest critics, ran stories saying the Turkish Army had received orders to send soldiers over the border. Several other media had similar stories, all quoting unnamed sources in Ankara. There has been no official confirmation or denial by the government.

     

    The government refused to comment on the reports. Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said “the necessary statement” would be issued after a regular meeting of the National Security Council, which comprises the president, the government and military leaders, this Tuesday.

     

    The reports said up to 18,000 soldiers would be deployed to take over and hold a strip of territory up to 30 kilometers deep and 100 kilometers long that currently is held by ISIS. It stretches from close to the Kurdish-controlled city of Kobani in the east to an area further west held by the pro-Western Free Syrian Army (FSA) and other rebel groups, beginning around the town of Mare. This “Mare Line,” as the press calls it, is to be secured with ground troops, artillery and air cover, the reports said. Yeni Safak reported preparations were due to be finalized by next Friday.

     

    There has been speculation about a Turkish military intervention ever since the Syrian conflict began in 2011. Ankara has asked the United Nations and its Western allies to give the green light to create a buffer zone and a no-fly area inside Syria in order to prevent chaos along the Turkish border and to help refugees on Syrian soil before they cross over into Turkey. But the Turkish request has fallen on deaf ears.

     

    The latest reports fit Erdogan’s statement on Friday and the government position regarding recent gains by Syrian Kurds against the Islamic State. The Syrian Kurdish party PYD and its armed wing YPG, affiliates of the Turkish-Kurdish rebel group PKK, have secured a long band of territory in northern Syria from the Syrian-Iraqi border in the east to Kobani.

     

    Ankara is concerned that the Kurds will now turn their attention to the area west of Kobani and towards Mare to link up with the Kurdish area of Afrin, thereby connecting all Kurdish areas in Syria along the border with Turkey. Erdogan expects that the Syrian Kurds, whose advance against ISIS has been helped by airstrikes from the U.S.-led coalition, will go on to form their own state as Syria disintegrates after more than four years of war.

     

    PYD leader Saleh Muslim denied that Syria’s Kurds intend to do this. 

     

    But Turkey’s leaders are not convinced that is true. The daily Hurriyet reported Erdogan and Davutoglu wanted to “kill two birds with one stone” with a military intervention along the Mare Line. One aim would be to drive ISIS away from the Turkish border, depriving the jihadists of their last foothold on the frontier and thereby cutting off supply lines. Such a move would tie in with the U.S. strategy to contain and weaken ISIS.

     

    A second goal of the operation would be closer to Ankara’s own interests. The English-language Hurriyet Daily News quoted one source saying there was a need to  “prevent the PYD from taking full control over the Turkish-Syrian border,” and also to create a zone on Syrian territory rather than in Turkey to take in new waves of refugees.

     

    But the military is reluctant, the reports said. Generals told the government that Turkish troops could come up against ISIS, Kurds and Syrian government troops and get drawn into the Syrian quagmire. Retaliation attacks by ISIS and Kurdish militants on Turkish territory are another concern.

     

    Finally, the soldiers pointed to the international dimension. The military leadership told the government that the international community might get the impression that Turkey’s intervention was directed against Syria’s Kurds, the newspaper Haberturk reported.

     

    Turkey’s NATO partners, some of whom have deployed troops operating Patriot missile defense units near the Syrian border to shield member country Turkey against possible attacks from Syria, are unlikely to be happy with a Turkish intervention.

     

    Turkey’s pro-government press insisted there were no tensions between civilian and military leaders in Ankara. “If the government says ‘go,’ we will go in,” the pro-Erdogan daily Aksam wrote, attempting to sum up the military’s stance in a headline.

     

    On Sunday, fighting broke out between ISIS troops and FSA units near the town of Azaz, close to the Turkish border crossing of Oncupinar. News reports said ISIS was trying to bring the Syrian side of the border crossing under its control. The area of the latest clashes lies within the “Mare Line” cited as the possible location of a Turkish incursion.

     

    The Daily Beast

     

     

  11. Ah, et quel est l'intérêt pour le gouvernement turc de nier le soutien qu'il apporte aux rebelles?

     

     

    <_<

     

    Et quel est l’intérêt des services secrets US, Français, Anglais de ne pas diffuser sur la place public dans le détail le type d’aide et d’opérations sur le terrain apporté en soutient aux rebelles en Syrie ?

     

     

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  12. La chute de l'article parle d'elle même :

    Une belle mise en perspective de ce qu'est la démocratie turque aujourd'hui.

     

     

    Si l’opération était classée ‘Top secret’ - et elle devait l’être indubitablement - par le gouvernement démocratiquement élu. Alors oui tous ces membres des services de l’état ont bien agi contre la sureté supérieure de pays. Rien d’extraordinaire à leur poursuite.

     

     

     

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  13.  

     

    J’adore le Figaro. Scandale du point de vue de qui ? La minorité infinitésimale d'opposition politique du pays qui n’a absolument aucune assise ou/et aussi de la communauté alévi (Place Taksim) de Turquie ?

     

     

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  14. Bashar al-Assad's spy chief arrested over Syria coup plot

     

    Ali Mamlouk, the head of the country's National Security Bureau, has been removed as the regime of Bashar al-Assad begins to show divisions over the role of Iran

     

    By Ruth Sherlock, and Carol Malouf in Beirut

    7:00AM BST 11 May 2015

     

    The Assad regime has placed its intelligence chief under house arrest after suspecting he was plotting a coup, in a sign that battlefield losses are setting off increasing paranoia in Damascus.

     

    Ali Mamlouk, the head of the country's National Security Bureau, and one of the few officials still to have access to President Bashar al-Assad, was accused of holding secret talks with countries backing rebel groups and exiled members of the Syrian regime.

     

    Mr Assad is struggling to keep together the regime’s "inner circle" of the regime, who are increasingly turning on each other, sources inside the presidential palace have told The Telegraph.

     

    Even before Mamlouk’s arrest, the web of intelligence agencies with which the regime has enforced its authority for four decades was in turmoil, with two other leaders killed or removed.

     

    Last month, Rustum Ghazaleh, the head of the Political Security Directorate, died in hospital after he was physically attacked by men loyal to General Rafiq Shehadeh, his opposite number in military intelligence, who was in turn sacked.

     

    The role being played in the war by Iran, Syria's regional ally, is said to be at the heart of the arguments, with some of the “inner circle” afraid that Iranian officials now have more power than they do.

     

    Iran’s influence has been crucial in bolstering Syria’s defences against the rebels, but even that has been crumbling in the face of recent rebel advances in the north.

     

    It was as Syrian troops lost control of Idlib city and Jisr al-Shughour to an alliance of Islamist rebels including Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s local branch, that Mamlouk reportedly began to make contact with hostile governments and former regime officials.

     

    "Mamlouk had been communicating with Turkish intelligence through an intermediary," said a senior regime source with direct knowledge of the plan.

     

    Mamlouk had also used a businessman from Aleppo as an intermediary to contact Rifaat al-Assad, Bashar’s uncle, who has lived abroad exile since he was accused of seeking to mount a coup in Syria in the 1980s.

     

    Rifaat al-Assad declined to comment on the reports, but one informed source, who asked not to be named, said that " there is a big interest among the Syrian officers and military for Rifaat Assad to come back to Syria”.

     

    Iranian operatives in Syria are believed to have taken command of large areas of government, from the central bank to the battle strategy.

     

    "Most of the advisers at the presidential palace are now Iranian," said a source close to the palace. "Mamlouk hated that Syria was giving her sovereignty up to Iran. He thought there needed to be a change.”

     

    Ghazaleh is believed to have shared this view of the Iranian influence.

     

    Like Mamlouk, Ghazaleh was born to a Sunni Muslim family, and was opposed to the power being acquired in the country by Shia Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and its Lebanese proxy Hizbollah.

     

    Issam al-Reis, a spokesman for the Southern Front rebel groups, who are fighting close to Ghazaleh’s home village in Deraa, said intelligence picked up from captives and others suggested Ghazaleh was fiercely hostile to Iran.

     

    “He was complaining that he and his men were being treated like scum, whilst the Iranians and their militias were lords,” he said.

     

    "Shehadeh arrested two of Ghazaleh's nephews from his home town because they had refused to fight under Iranian command. Ghazaleh went to the military intelligence headquarters to defend them and get them released, but there Shehadeh's men beat him."

     

    Suffering from brain damage, Ghazaleh spent several weeks in hospital before the regime formally announced his death on 24th April.

     

    Mr Reis’s account was corroborated by two sources inside the regime, who asked to remain anonymous.

     

    The regime in Syria is of critical importance to Iran, who uses Syria as the primary route through which to arm Hizbollah.

     

    With the fortunes of the two regimes so inextricably linked, Iran has bankrolled and provided the expertise and the weapons for President Assad’s war.

     

    Syria’s ailing economy would likely have collapsed were it not for the credit facility provided by Tehran – more than $15 billion to date, according to Damascus’ finance minister.

     

    Last month, when senior officials in Syria's regime made one of their regular visits to Tehran, the meetings were tense, and at sometimes fraught, a source close to the Iranian government told the Telegraph.

     

    "Members of the regime said that they were losing control of Syria. At one point they even suggested considering cutting a deal with the opposition," the source said.

     

    "The Iranians were furious, after all they had done to help. They would not lose control."

     

    Charles Lister, a Syria expert with the Brookings Institution said that recent events have left the regime facing its most critical situation in years.

     

    “Iran appears to be calling the shots now,” said Mr Lister. “This is partly from the fear that the regime might collapse from the inside out. Tehran is trying to create a brick wall around them.”

     

     

    The Telegraph

  15. An Eroding Syrian Army Points to Strain

     

    By ANNE BARNARD, HWAIDA SAAD and ERIC SCHMITT

    APRIL 28, 2015

     

    BEIRUT, Lebanon — The Syrian Army has suffered a string of defeats from re-energized insurgents and is struggling to replenish its ranks as even pro-government families increasingly refuse to send sons to poorly defended units on the front lines. These developments raise newly urgent questions about the durability of President Bashar al-Assad’s rule.

     

    “The trend lines for Assad are bad and getting worse,” said a senior United States official in Washington, who, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss confidential intelligence assessments, nevertheless cautioned that things had not yet reached “a boiling point.”

     

    The erosion of the army is forcing the government to rely ever more heavily on Syrian and foreign militias, especially Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite group allied with Iran. Hezbollah now leads or even directs the fight in many places, angering some Syrian officers, said several Syrian soldiers, as well as the senior United States official and a Syrian with close ties to the security establishment. Most Syrians interviewed asked that their names be fully or partially withheld to avoid reprisals.

     

    This month, government forces have crumbled or fled in areas long cited by officials as markers of enduring state control. Insurgents seized Idlib, a northern provincial capital, and the lone working border crossing with Jordan in the south. Counteroffensives failed, and advances this week have brought a newly cohesive insurgent coalition closer than ever to Mr. Assad’s coastal strongholds. The coalition consists mainly of Islamist groups that include Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, the Nusra Front, but oppose the Islamic State.

     

    Throughout the country, there are signs of strain that contrast with Mr. Assad’s public confidence. The government recently dismissed the heads of two of its four main intelligence agencies after they quarreled; one later died, reportedly after being beaten by the other’s guards.

     

    Officials in provincial capitals like Aleppo and Dara’a are making contingency plans to preserve cash and antiquities and evacuate civilians. Foreign exchange reserves, $30 billion at the start of the war, have dwindled to $1 billion.

     

    The already-crowded coastal provinces are straining with new arrivals from Idlib, with some saying officials have turned them away. In central Damascus, checkpoints are fewer and more sparsely staffed, as militiamen are sent to fight on the outskirts, and young men increasingly evade army service.

     

    Even in areas populated by minority sects that fear hard-line Islamist groups like Nusra and the Islamic State — such as Druse in the south, Assyrian Christians in the north, and Ismailis in Hama — numerous residents say they are sending their sons abroad to avoid the draft, or keeping them home to protect villages.

     

    That has accelerated the transformation of Syria’s once-centralized armed forces into something beginning to resemble that of the insurgents: a patchwork of local and foreign fighters whose interests and priorities do not always align.

     

    Four years ago, Syria’s army had 250,000 soldiers; now, because of casualties and desertions, it has 125,000 regulars, alongside 125,000 pro-government militia members, including Iranian-trained Iraqis, Pakistanis and Afghan Hazaras, according to the senior American official in Washington.

     

    And Syrians are not always in charge, especially where Hezbollah, the best trained and equipped of the foreign militias, is involved.

     

    “Every area where there is Hezbollah, the command is in their hands,” said the Syrian with security connections. “You do something, you have to ask their permission.”

     

    That, he said, rankled senior security officials who recalled the rule of Mr. Assad’s father, Hafez, in the 1980s, when Hezbollah’s patron Iran was the junior partner in the alliance with Syria.

     

    American officials are exploring how to exploit resulting tensions between Syrian and Hezbollah commanders, said the senior American official.

     

    An official in the region sympathetic to Hezbollah said that enemies were trying to exploit natural tensions that “happen between allies, and between brothers and sisters in the same house,” but would not succeed.

     

    “Even if Hezbollah does battle alone, it is with Syrian approval,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. “Hezbollah is only a stone that helps the builder.”

     

    But others see a loss of Syrian sovereignty to Iran, which needs Syria as a conduit to arm Hezbollah. Charles Lister, a Syria expert at the Brookings Doha Center in Doha, Qatar, said Iran with the help of Hezbollah and other militias is building “a state within a state in Syria — an insurance policy to protect itself against any future Assad demise.”

     

    Ali, 23, a soldier on leave in Damascus from the southern front, said one of his officers, a major, had complained that any Hezbollah fighter was “more important than a Syrian general.”

     

    Then there is simple jealousy. Hezbollah fighters are paid in dollars, while Syrian soldiers get depreciating Syrian pounds. Hezbollah fighters get new black cars and meat with rice, Ali said, while Syrian soldiers make do with dented Russian trucks and stale bread.

     

    A student who recently fled Damascus after being constantly stopped at checkpoints to prove he is not a deserter said that Hezbollah now runs his neighborhood in the old city and once helped him solve a problem between his brother and security forces. (Syrian police, he said, are so little seen that people now smoke hashish openly.)

     

    “If you have Hezbollah wasta,” or connections, he said, “your problems will be solved.” The student identified himself only as Hamed Al Adem, a name he uses as a performance artist, to protect family members still in Damascus.

     

    Even so, Hezbollah is not in a position to bail out Mr. Assad the way it did in 2013, when it sent hundreds of fighters to crush the insurgent hub of Qusayr, near the Lebanese border.

     

    Hezbollah now has more fighters and advisers in Syria than ever, about 5,000, American intelligence officials said. But, said the Syrian with security connections, they “only interfere in areas that are in their own interests.”

     

    The official sympathetic to Hezbollah said it has “maybe thousands” of fighters along the Lebanese border, hundreds in the south, bordering Israel, and only dozens around divided Aleppo, Syria’s largest city.

     

    It had none in Idlib city, which he said may have fallen because some Syrian officers failed to correctly assess threats.

     

    The Syrian with security ties said the leadership had not made a priority of defending Idlib. Many government troops, he said, fled after insurgents knocked out their communications network and called “God is Great” from the mosques.

     

    “Damascus and the Syrian coast, other than this nothing is important. Nothing,” he said, adding of Mr. Assad: “He doesn’t give a damn if Syria is destroyed.”

     

    One long-serving soldier said his cousin called from a hastily dug foxhole near Idlib to send shaky goodbyes to his mother. The soldier, who serves on another front and has lost an uncle and a cousin in battle, was enraged to hear that the 10 men pinned down there lacked even a vehicle to flee.

     

    “If I have a kid, I won’t send him to the army,” he declared, complaining that his monthly pay covers just 10 days’ worth of expenses. “Why be killed or slaughtered?”

     

    In Sweida, the mostly pro-government, mostly Druse southern province, “In every single house there is one man at least wanted for the army service,” said Abu Tayem, a Druse activist there.

     

    Last week, he said, after a friend of his was arrested for evading the army, residents attacked security officers, captured one and traded him for the prisoner. Recently, the government tried to recruit Druse forces to be trained by Hezbollah, but few signed up after hearing they would be asked to fight Sunnis in neighboring Dara’a.

     

    To enlist at this point would be foolish, not to speak of dangerous, said Majed, 19, a Druse whose father helped him evade the draft. “When the regime is gone, then our neighbors will be our enemies,” he said.

     

    Fayez Korko, 48, said he helped organize an Assyrian militia in northeastern Syria after villagers concluded that the government’s promises of protection were “empty words.” He called the government “the best of the worst” — better than extremist Islamists — but said that Assyrians would rather die defending their villages than on faraway fronts.

     

    Events like the fall of Idlib, said the Syrian with security ties, are frustrating even a core government constituency — minority Alawites, who belong to Mr. Assad’s sect and disproportionately serve in the military. They are beginning to doubt that the president can protect them, as they gambled in sticking with him for an existential fight, said the Syrian, who is Alawite.

     

    “Syria is not you,” he said, addressing Mr. Assad, “and you are not Syria.”

     

    Correction: May 2, 2015

     

    Because of an editing error, an article on Wednesday about the erosion of the Syrian Army as it suffers a string of defeats and struggles to replenish its ranks misstated the reason that a Syrian with close ties to the security establishment spoke on the condition of anonymity. The Syrian, who said the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah was leading the fight in many places, angering Syrian officers, asked that his name not be used out of concern for his safety, not so he could discuss confidential intelligence assessments.

     

    Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad reported from Beirut, and Eric Schmitt from Washington. Reporting was contributed by Maher Samaan and Ben Hubbard from Beirut; Somini Sengupta from Amman, Jordan; and an employee of The New York Times from Damascus, Syria.

     

     

    The New York Times

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