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Le Ground Combat Vehicle est lancé pour 2017.

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Je me demande bien à quoi pourrait nous servir un bousin pareil complètement indéployable et inutile pour 99% de nos opérations.

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Eh bhein....Sacré raison.. Les routes en Israel sont-elles plus larges?

Euh ca dépend a Gazaa et au Liban y a pas vraiment de gabarit sauf la largeur du pays :lol:

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Le Namer découle d'une philosophie totalement différente à la notre: le but est de protéger au maximum les soldats, c'est dans le cadre d'opération à 50km grand maximum de la base, dans un milieu urbain. Pas besoin de s'embêter à faire un véhicule projetable, amphibie NRBC, etc. On lui demande juste de pouvoir survivre à un conflit dans la zone.

Ce sont les D9 et les Merkava qui font la route.

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Sauf que l'on ne verra jamais les Namer se balader à 50km de leur base... sinon ils ne quitteront jamais les states :lol: . Dans le contexte particulier d'Israël, cela peut être un bon APC surblindé. Peu de chance de voir un ATGM moderne, peu de chance de voir un canon de calibre supérieur 12.7mm, le blindage fera surtout face à de l'IED et de la roquette artisanale made in Gaza. A trimballer c'est comme un MBT avec toute la logistique qui va avec, sa conso de pétrole doit être joyeuse et sa capacité tout terrain limitée par son poids. Ca peut aller pour faire mumuse avec des insurgés sous armés dans les faubourgs de leur réserve naturelle de gazaouis, mais coller ça en Astan ou tout pays un tant soit peu montagneux avec des chemins qui ont du mal à encaisser le VAB... Ca va rester dans la plaine et prendre la poussière en faisant des ronds autour des FOB.

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De 64 à 84 tonnes le GCV prends du poids...

http://www.dsi-presse.com/?p=5431#more-5431

Certes je voudrais bien voir la bête, mais surtout comprendre les 84 tonnes (si c'est ce poids au final) qu'est ce qui justifie d'employer un blindé de 84 tonnes!

autant un NAMER présente des avantages à mon sens, mais un super namer ....

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Hmm…peut être le poids de la cabine pressurisé lors de ses immersions sous-marines, ou lors des OPEX en atmosphère raréfié ou toxique sur d’autres planètes ?

Ou les américains détiennent encore de scientifique nazis, mis au secret, et qui ont tenté de ressusciter le Mauss ? Ou le blindage est à base d’Iridium ?

Blague à part, vouloir embarquer jusqu’à 11 homme ce n’est pas un chouia trop ? Je sais que les Retex de l’Astan/Irak ont montré le besoin de débarquer beaucoup de pioupious, mais est-ce qu’opérationnellement ça a une justification ? N’est-ce pas un risque démesuré de voir shooter tout une section d’un coup ?

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Le groupe embarqué est (sera?) de 9 hommes, sans doute une nécessité de transporter un groupe par véhicule plutôt que les 3 groupes sur 4 bradleys (cfRETEX ) qqui eux transportent 6 à 7 combattants débarqués.

cette adaptation du nombre de VCI à la section a certainement du générer pas mal de cafouillage...

Mais bon, cet augmentation du nombre de combattants débarqués ne justifie pas une telle augmentation de poids.

Plus sérieusement a force d'alourdir pour protéger on oublie que la mobilité est LE facteur de protection, insuffisant en lui-même mais nécessaire!

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Un point sur la forme de l'avenir de la force lourde de l'US-Army:

WASHINGTON: The battle over the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle isn't only about one war machine and what it may weigh (80-plus tons) or cost ($13 some million). It's just one front in a larger war over the Army's armored heart and its role in the nation's strategy.

As budgets tighten and the military reorients from Afghanistan to the Pacific, the nation can get by with "substantially smaller ground forces," said Andrew Krepinevich, the influential director of the Center for Strategic and Budget Assessments. A former Army officer himself, Krepinevich has repeatedly called for cutting the Army in favor of air and naval forces. In particular, he told AOL Defense, out of all the Army's various branches, "armor/mechanized infantry is certainly a bill payer."

While some heavy forces are necessary insurance against the unlikely event of a major ground war, Krepinevich said, he estimated that the Army could safely cut its armored battalions by about 20 percent. Blitzkrieg-style ground campaigns are increasingly impractical in the face of modern smart weapons, he argued, so the Army need not invest heavily in forces to repell them.

"Where would we see a traditional invasion? Maybe in the Korean peninsula?" Krepinevich asked. But even there, "it's not like 1950 where there are hundreds of thousands of North Koreans coming across the border," he said, and the South is now wealthy enough to defend itself without US tank units on the ground. Instead, he argued, the Army should invest in missile defenses, cybersecurity, and other capabilities to support the Air Force and Navy in a long-range "AirSea Battle" against China or Iran.

Not so fast, said one of the Army's most interesting observers. "Everything about AirSea Battle is wrong," retorted Maj. Gen. Robert Scales, retired commandant of the Army War College. "We are not going to fight China, and should we ever do something that dumb, we are not going to fight them in a major sea battle; it doesn't play to the equities of the PLA [People's Liberation Army]. The idea of a Leyte Gulf on steroids is completely ridiculous."

"After every [ground] war," Scales told AOL Defense, "every president says well we'll never do that again, and we do. We always do. Why? Because the enemy knows what our weaknesses are."

Like past enemies, from the Chinese forces in Korea to the North Vietnamese Army to the Iraqi insurgents, Scales argued, future foes will avoid confronting US air and sea superiority. Instead, they'll seek to draw us into protracted ground wars, where armored vehicles are our troops' best protection. Since World War II, "we've never run out of fighter planes, we've never run out of ships; we've always, always run out of infantry," Scales said. "Nothing substitutes for mass and the ability to achieve decisive effects on land."

This debate goes to the heart of how the largest armed service sees itself. Since 1940, when the Depression-gutted military scrambled to rebuild itself to face the Nazi blitzkrieg, the core of the Army has been its armored forces: powerful, mobile, and expensive units of tanks, armored troop carriers, self-propelled artillery on tracked chassis, and a host of support vehicles to haul all the required fuel, ammunition, and spare parts.

The controversial Ground Combat Vehicle is meant to replace the armored forces' current infantry assault vehicle, the M2 Bradley, which is heavily armed but -- as Iraq revealed -- under-protected against roadside bombs. The weight of armor required to stop those threats means at least some designs for GCV are over 80 tons, according to a recent Congressional Budget Office study. That would be heavier than any ground vehicle ever mass-produced.

"CBO is just wrong," one Army source told AOL Defense. "Both contractors are below [the CBO figures].Their assertion for weight is not based on what the vendors have actually provided to date." Instead, Army sources said, CBO's figures appear to derive from early designs long since slimmed down. Even so, however, those confidential sources still talk about numbers north of 50 tons.

Scales himself says that's still too heavy, either for rapid deployment overseas or rapid maneuver on arrival. He would recommend at most a 45- to 50-ton vehicle -- still more heavily armored than the current Bradley -- which would rely not on sheer weight of metal but on tactics and technology. The best way to avoid roadside bombs is by going off road, he said, so the enemy does not have any obvious choke-points to mine. The best way to defeat anti-tank rockets, Scales went on, is to shoot them down with a kind of portable missile defense called an Active Protection System, a version of which the Israelis have mounted on their vehicles.

The CBO study, though, says active protection systems are not ready for prime time. Krepinevich, for his part, argues the Army needs to hold off major ground vehicle investments until the invention of much lighter forms of armor.

Congress is reserving judgment. Legislators have funded most of the Army's requests for GCV, except when they adjusted for a contract dispute that delayed spending on the program. But they've also expressed anxiety about GCV's cost and weight.

That said, the CBO study's figures for GCV don't shock Congress: "It kind of confirms what we suspected," one staffer told AOL Defense. For now, the Hill is waiting on the Army to complete its study of off-the-shelf US and foreign vehicles. That study, the staffer explained, is part of a "dynamic Analysis of Alternatives update" imposed on the Army by then-Under Secretary for Acquisition Ashton Carter after the service "totally screwed up its original AOA last year."

"There's a tremendous amount of support and acknowledgement that the Army needs something," the staffer went on, "but is that an upgraded existing vehicle or a new ground-up vehicle? That's still TBD [to be determined]. There are many that don't think they can afford a new ground-up vehicle."

Above and beyond the skepticism over the GCV itself, however, the very idea that the heavy brigades are central is coming under increasing attack, for reasons both strategic and fiscal.

Under the current 2013-2017 budget plan, the Army is already set to shrink from its 570,000-soldier peak to 490,000 -- a target still above its pre-9/11 strength of 480,000 and likely to fall further as part of any budget deal to head off sequestration. Budgetarily, though, not all soldiers are equal. Pay and benefits are increasingly expensive for military personnel across the board, but the most costly troops are the most heavily equipped.

So in the Army, you save the most by cutting units with lots of helicopters, followed by units with lots of armored ground vehicles. Helicopters have proven critical everywhere from Afghanistan to post-hurricane relief, so the Army's actually adding more aviation brigades. By contrast, when it announced it would disband eight brigades, the Army left six unspecified and named only two -- both armored units.

The Army Chief of Staff himself, Gen. Ray Odierno, told reporters after a recent speech that "we'll probably see a reduction in the number of heavy units... some small reduction." In his public remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Odierno went out of his way to emphasize what are traditionally seen as the service's secondary, supporting functions, like advisors, logistics, communications, and missile defense, instead of its combat brigades.

That jibes with Krepinevich's recommendations -- up to a point. For example, when reporters asked Odierno after a speech last week whether he could preserve some armored brigades by moving them from the active-duty Army to the National Guard, he cautioned against the idea, which has been bruited by Krepinevich among others. It takes extensive practice to maintain the technically and tactically complex skills of mechanized warfare, Odierno said, and unlike engineering or military police work, those skills are not ones Guard soldiers can practice in their civilian jobs.

"The most difficult formation to sustain over time is a heavy unit," Odierno said. "It takes more time to maintain it. It takes more time to train it and integrate it, so in my mind I'm not sure it quite fits in the National Guard, because of time constraints that they have."

Nor has the Chief of Staff meekly accepted AirSea Battle and a future dominated by the Air Force and Navy. In his speech last week, Odierno proposed an "Office of Strategic Landpower" to bring together strategists from the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command. This is clearly Odierno's baby, considering that Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Amos confessed not to having heard of the idea.

"It's actually NOT about competing with airsea battle or a counter to the AirSea Battle Office" led by the Air Force and Navy, an Army official insisted to AOL Defense.

"It's pretty transparently just a competition with AirSea Battle," one congressional source said, laughing out loud. "Why else would they have it?"

It'll be up to Odierno's new office to justify both the Army's overall strength and its traditional armored core in an era of ever-sharper cuts.

Pour ceux qui veulent les liens du texte:

http://defense.aol.com/2012/11/13/army-fights-to-keep-armored-brigades-force-structure-gcv-at-st/

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The Pentagon is considering cutting more than $100 million from the Army’s massive effort to replace its outdated Bradley fighting vehicle.

According to a report by InsideDefense​.com:

“A draft resource management decision from the Office of the Secretary of Defense would cut $150 million from the Army’s $1.4 billion budget request for the [Ground Combat Vehicle] in fiscal year 2014, but deeper cuts are also being considered by OSD’s cost assessment and program evaluation shop (CAPE) under a “ground forces program review” study. Sources said those cuts would slash between $600 million and $700 million annually from the GCV program between FY-14 and FY-18, according to a Defense Department official close to the matter.”

The news surfaced about one month after the Congressional Budget Office slammed the GCV program, arguing that the Bradley replacement will likely weigh more than the M1 Abrams tank. That means that the GCV could weigh as much as 84 tons, the CBO maintains. That’s twice as heavy as current Bradley vehicle.

The CBO latest working paper, “Technical Challenges of the U.S. Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle Program,” makes the GVC resemble overly ambitious Army programs that failed in the past such the Comanche attack helicopter, the Crusader self-propelled howitzer and the family of super vehicles under the failed Future Combat Systems program.

Matthew Bourke, an Army spokesman, acknowledged that the service was reviewing the GCV acquisition strategy but declined to discuss specifics. “The Army is currently reviewing the GCV [engineering and manufacturing development] phase acquisition strategy to ensure we maximize competition to the greatest extent possible, while maintaining affordability and requirements achievability,” InsideDefense​.com reported.

The Army intends to replace about 40 percent of the Bradleys in its heavy combat brigades with GVCs. The Army issued a revised RFP in November 2010 after the initial solicitation were deemed too ambitious and created a real possibility that high technical risks and immature technologies would lead to spiraling costs and schedule delays.

The revised RFP left some flexibility in how the contractor could address the requirements and designated a manufacturing cost of between $9 million and $10.5 million per vehicle, an average procurement unit cost of $13 million per vehicle, and a sustainment cost of $200 per mile of operation.

Three teams submitted proposals.5 In August 2011, the Army awarded contracts valued at about $450 million each to two of the contractor teams: one led by General Dynamics Land Systems and the other by BAE Systems.

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/12/07/army-gcv-faces-budget-axe/

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84 tonnes pour le CGV apparament  :O ils sont fou , ils sont champion pour créer des choses hors de prix

Meme un obus de  120mm à l'uranium appauvri le transperce pas , le remplacant du abrams fera 180 tonnes avec une double turbine de 3000 cv et 300L/km :lol:

Encore un projet à plusieurs milliards qui sera annulé ou limiter avant la fin... depuis les années 80 les américains ne savent plus faire de char...

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Il doit y avoir une erreur dans le texte, il explique qu'a 84 tonnes il fera le double d'un M-2, mais le bradley c'est quoi = 25/30 tonnes en charge pour les dernières variantes.

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84 tons US, c'est à dire 76 vraies tonnes (les tons light américaines font 908 kg et pas 1000 kg). ça ne retire rien à l'énormité du chiffre qui montre que les bureaux d'étude de BAE et de GDLS tournent en boucle ouverte. En clair on empile les specs et les performances et on constate les dégâts après. Alors que la bonne méthode consiste à fixer la masse (et le potentiel de croissance) et de faire en sorte qu'un bon équilibre de performances soit trouvé pour une masse donnée.

A une toute autre échelle, c'est ce piège qui menace le VBMR. Les démonstateurs sont déjà à 23 tonnes, ce qui signifie que les modèles de série feront plus de 25 t. Si on compte un potentiel de croisance de 15% minimum (20 serait mieux), ça amène l'engin à presque 29 tonnes ! Donc en clair c'est à refaire complètement. Encore trois ans perdus dans ce programme pourtant crucial pour notre AdT.

De manière générale Scorpion est confronté à un problème évident de segmentation des classes de masse des engins. On raisonne encore en silo et on va se planter. (mais c'est peut être un peu HS) ^-^

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Une logique de silo qui fera qu'on ne considérera ni la fonction ni les possibilités de substitution :

Dans le Vbmr où il y a peu d'alternative excepté le vab mk3, c'est moins illustrable.

Mais dans le domaine de l'EBRC , cela veut dire qu'on ne considère ni le Sphinx ni à fortiori le CRAB et encore moins l'option XL T40

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A une toute autre échelle, c'est ce piège qui menace le VBMR. Les démonstateurs sont déjà à 23 tonnes, ce qui signifie que les modèles de série feront plus de 25 t. Si on compte un potentiel de croisance de 15% minimum (20 serait mieux), ça amène l'engin à presque 29 tonnes ! Donc en clair c'est à refaire complètement. Encore trois ans perdus dans ce programme pourtant crucial pour notre AdT.

De manière générale Scorpion est confronté à un problème évident de segmentation des classes de masse des engins. On raisonne encore en silo et on va se planter. (mais c'est peut être un peu HS) ^-^

Aussi lourd qu'un VBCI ....

Cela va se finir par des VAB mk3 sur étagère ...

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Le VBMR a un demonstrateur ? il y a que Nexter il me semble

D'apres une interview d'un généraux se sera de conception simple donc à cabine ouverte(enfin pare brise) comme le VAB donc du coup je vois pas trop autre chose que le MK3 qui semble parfait pour la tache...

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il y a en fait cinq démonstateurs ! trois chez Nexter (en comptant le Xp2) et deux chez RTd (en comptant le VABmk3) ;)

Un seul, le VAB Mk3, est à peu près dans la masse objective soit vingt tonnes.

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Une logique de silo qui fera qu'on ne considérera ni la fonction ni les possibilités de substitution :

Dans le Vbmr où il y a peu d'alternative excepté le vab mk3, c'est moins illustrable.

Mais dans le domaine de l'EBRC , cela veut dire qu'on ne considère ni le Sphinx ni à fortiori le CRAB et encore moins l'option XL T40

Cette logique est malheureusement d'actualité. Ainsi, lors d'un débat où le sujet était l'innovation, le fait d'évaluer les systèmes au-delà de leurs exigences initiales pour quantifier les éventuelles passerelles et s'affranchir de cet effet silo (concrètement, considérer les fonctions pouvant être effectué par le système au-delà du simple effet attendu) fut abordé. 

Une réponse, est: "Il n’est pas question d’évaluer un produit au regard de performances qui n’ont pas été exigées initialement"...

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il y a en fait cinq démonstateurs ! trois chez Nexter (en comptant le Xp2) et deux chez RTd (en comptant le VABmk3) ;)

Un seul, le VAB Mk3, est à peu près dans la masse objective soit vingt tonnes.

Pourquoi serait-on les seuls a faire dans le léger :

Le VBMR remplacera principalement le « véhicule de l'avant blindé » (VAB) et sera décliné selon plusieurs variantes. Il devra transporter sous protection les groupes et diverses charges utiles des unités multirôles du contact (VTT, PC, Génie, mortier lourd, sanitaire, etc.) Les exigences de souplesse d'emploi et de maîtrise des coûts conduisent à une principale privilégiée de type 6X6 de 18 t à 20 t. Les premières livraisons devraient intervenir à l'horizon 2016.

[glow=red,2,300]En 2005, l'Agence Européenne de Défense a tenté de lancer une initiative sur un blindé mlutirôle autour de 20 t mais tous nos partenaires s'équipent de matériels de la taille du VBCI [/glow]sur la base de VCI chenillés. C'est de l'Allemagne et du Royaume-Uni avec leurs blindés multirôles (Boxer à 32 t, projet FRES UV 30 t).

La Suède n'a pas poursuivi le développement de démonstrateurs 6X6 pour son programme SEP et vient de choisir le finlandais PATRIA. L'Italie se dote d'une variante VCI du Centauro 8X8. Il n'y a donc pas de coopération possible ni voulue.

http://www.senat.fr/rap/a10-112-5/a10-112-519.html

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Defense analysts have predicted that the Army will be forced to either upgrade the Bradley or find a similar vehicle already in production because of the costs associated with developing the armored vehicle.

Read more: http://defensetech.org/2013/02/19/jltv-gcv-programs-face-uncertain-futures/#ixzz2LSUl3cWU

Defense.org

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Une image de la bête en question

Image IPB

La propulsion hybride permettrait de gagner de la place tout en servant de blindage supplémentaire

Image IPBImage IPB

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Une image de la bête en question

Image IPB

Y a pas un soucis de proportion sur cette image ? Ou alors les soldats rentrent allongé dans le tank ?  :lol:

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