[Afghanistan]

[P4]

Il semblerait que les "taliban" métastase dur dans les ex républiques Soviétiques frontalières de l'Afghanistan.

[g4lly]

Il semblerait que les "taliban" métastase dur dans les ex républiques Soviétiques frontalières de l'Afghanistan.

C'est pas nouveau, ca s'était un peu calmé avec la chute des taliban afghan en 2001, et la lutte djihadiste en Irak, visiblement les voisin du nord du Pakistan / Afghanistan redeviennent une cible privilégié. C'est un peu un jeu de chaise musicale, version foco guevariste.

[P4]

La quéstion est de savoir a quel point ces états sont déstabilisables et qui se mouillerait pour intervenir si besoin alors qu'a demi mot les US/Otan parle de quitter l'Afghanstan.

[Akhilleus]

qui se mouillerait pour intervenir si besoin

les russes

c'est leur pré carré (un peu comme si des djihadistes se pointaient au Mexique, à la Grenade ou au Canada pour les USA)

peut etre bien les chinois (pour damer le pion aux russes)

la Turquie pourrait jouer les arbitres avec la resurgence du panturquisme mais à bas bruit

[g4lly]

http://www.france24.com/en/20101012-cargo-plane-crashes-near-kabul-all-seven-crew-killed

A civilian cargo transport plane crashed into mountains near the Afghan capital Kabul on Tuesday evening, killing all seven people on board, a local civil aviation official said.

Afghan and international forces sent a search and rescue mission and helicopters out to the area of the crash, around 25-30 kilometres (15-20 miles) east of Kabul, after the aircraft went down en route from nearby Bagram military air base.

"It was a cargo plane coming from Bagram to Kabul when it hit the peak," Nangyalai Qalatwal, spokesman for the Ministry of Civil Aviation, told Reuters.

He said all seven people on board had died and all were foreigners, but he had no details of their nationalities.

The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) said early reports indicated the plane was an L-100 Hercules aircraft, the civilian equivalent of a military C-130. The plane was not an ISAF aircraft, a spokesman for the force said.

A police official had earlier reported a passenger plane had crashed near the Afghan capital.

Kabul's international airport is bustling with civilian and military air traffic involved in U.S., NATO and United Nations operations in the country's conflict and aid efforts, as well as commercial passenger and cargo flights.

In May, a plane from Afghanistan's Pamir Airways crashed into a remote Hindu Kush mountain region near Kabul, killing 43 passengers and crew. Before that the last major air crash was in 2005 when a Boeing 737 operated by Afghan carrier Kam Air crashed in a snow storm, killing 104 passengers and crew.

[Babou]

Parait que els italiens ont perdu 4 hommes en A-stan ce week end.. d'après JMT je sais pas si on avait parlé mais ca a accéllérer leur volonté de partir...

[RPD]

Regarde plus haut le post de Beleg  ;)

[Babou]

Regarde plus haut le post de Beleg  ;)

oui pardon O0

[Gibbs le Cajun]

http://lemamouth.blogspot.com/2010/10/litalie-songe-quitter-lafghanistan.html

je ne savais pas que les Danois avaient quitté l'Afghanistan .

[g4lly]

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/10/did-disdain-for-counterinsurgency-breed-the-kill-team/

Did Disdain for Counterinsurgency Breed the ‘Kill Team?’

Protecting the Afghan population around Kandahar was “pussyfooting,” according to the commander of the Army’s 5th Stryker Brigade. Better to “strike” and “destroy” the insurgents. Inside one of his platoons, a team of young soldiers went rogue, applying that guidance not to insurgents, but to unarmed civilians.

The looming question within Craig Whitlock’s excellent Washington Post piece on 5th Stryker’s commander, Colonel Harry D. Tunnell IV, is whether Tunnell’s distaste for counterinsurgency created an environment of callousness that led some of his soldiers to form a “Kill Team.” Tunnell himself had nothing to do with the murders of three Afghan civilians that the “Kill Team” is charged with committing. And there’s no evidence to date that he knew about the team’s alleged killings, corpse mutilations or hash smoking.

But Whitlock’s report — like Sean Naylor’s Army Times profile from January — shows that Tunnell quickly rejected the counterinsurgency strategy set by the U.S. military command. After the brigade arrived in Kandahar for a year-long tour in May 2009, civilian officials were surprised to hear Tunnell say, “Some of you might think I’m here to play this COIN game and just pussyfoot with the enemy. But that’s not what I’m doing,” a State Department official told Whitlock.

Instead, he was going after the insurgents — hard. Tunnell told Naylor, “if you degrade formations, supply chains and leadership near simultaneously, you’ll cause the enemy in the area to collapse, and that is what we’re trying to do here.” Some of his soldiers thought that approach would ultimately accomplish “absolutely nothing,” as a squad leader told Naylor. (See this Ink Spots post for more.)

But for the families of at least three Afghans, and possibly a fourth, the “Kill Team” had a lasting impact. “Kill Team” lawyers charge that Tunnell’s selective interpretation of his orders led Staff Sergeant Calvin Gibbs, the alleged ringleader of the team, to play by his own rules as well.

Lots of officers and soldiers think counterinsurgency’s focus on protecting civilians has gone too far. And their units haven’t produced “Kill Teams.” So it’s not as if skepticism of counterinsurgency reveals a zest for brutality. And chief counterinsurgent David Petraeus has consistently reminded people that counterinsurgency is a violent undertaking.

But Tunnell isn’t the first commander to set an aggressive tone and watch his soldiers misapply it in ugly ways. If the “Kill Team” is found guilty, it’ll likely spark a painful debate within the Army about the relationship between his anti-counterinsurgency approach and some of his men’s crimes. Striking the right balance between protecting civilians and fighting an enemy just got harder.

[French Kiss]

Oue, encore un qui a oublie qu'il est plus facile de lacher ses chiens que de les rappeler... :-[

[Manu]

http://lemamouth.blogspot.com/2010/10/litalie-songe-quitter-lafghanistan.html

je ne savais pas que les Danois avaient quitté l'Afghanistan .

Il s'est trompé, ce sont les néerlandais qui sont rentrés.

[debonneguerre]

http://www.ttu.fr/francais/Articles/Actualite%20des%20forces/afghanistanperte.html

Un commentaire détaillé sur la mort des 4 soldats italiens et notamment sur leur véhicule lince, un LMV iveco.

Quatre militaires italiens appartenant à la Brigade Alpine Julia ont perdu la vie le 9 octobre dans le détroit du Gulistan, a coté de Farah.

Un engin explosif improvisé (IED) a fait exploser le véhicule Lince, a l’intérieur duquel se trouvaient les quatre soldats, faisant partie d’un convoi logistique de plusieurs dizaines de personnes, ainsi qu’un cinquième soldat, grièvement blessé, mais dont les jours ne sont pas en danger.

Paradoxalement ce cinquième soldat était celui placé en haut de la tourelle du Lince, renforcée y a quelques mois. Cette attaque, qui porte le total des pertes italiennes en Afghanistan à 34, a provoqué un certain émoi dans les milieux politiques, mais aussi dans celui militaire.

En effet, le véhicule Lince était réputé, parmi la totalité des forces présentes en Afghanistan, comme un moyen de transport hautement sophistiqué, ayant sauvé la vie de nombreux soldats depuis sont emploi dans le théâtre, ce qui lui a valu un certain nombre de succès sur le théâtre export.

Suivant les indications de l’intelligence italienne, la Ministère de la défense de Rome était en train de renforcer les moyens sur place par l’envoi de véhicules Freccia, ayant les mêmes caractéristiques que le Lince (bloc moteur séparé de l’habitacle où se placent les soldats et tourelle renforcée) avec un blindage supérieur. Cependant, c’est bien la première fois que les talibans, qui ont depuis revendiqué l’attaque, montrent la capacité à monter des IED capables de faire sauter un engin si sophistiqué que le Lince, ce qui va considérablement augmenter le niveau d’alarme pour les troupes sur place, et plomber le moral des soldats.

Le gouvernement italien a réagi en ouvrant une discussion au parlement sur la nécessité d’autoriser les chasseurs présents sur place à emporter et larguer des bombes, l’Italie étant le seul pays à n’autoriser que l’utilisation du petit canon de bord. Une mésure qui suscite des débats « théologiques » entre partisan et opposants à la mission en Afghanistan, sans trancher sur la réelle question de la sortie de crise d’un théâtre qui devient de plus en plus impopulaire au sein de l’opinion publique nationale.

[g4lly]

Les sud africain avaient une regle pour la résistance aux mines a souffle et autre IED. Le vehicule doit etre 700 plus lourd que la masse d'explosif pour que le personnel supporte l'accélération causé par le souffle. Avec un LMV a moins de 5t ... y a pas de miracle. D'autant que des image de LMV touché en Irak avait montré les limite de l'architecture face au IED avec les portes déformé et ouvertes etc. Les autres engins de meme masse doivent pas faire mieux ... mais a cette masse je pense pas qu'on puisse sérieusement résister a des engin de 10kg placé dessous.

[collectionneur]

RIP, aucun véhicule n'est invulnérable, a t'on une idée de la charge utilisé contre les italiens ?

Sinon, probléme logistique pour les Canadiens. Suite à une dispute commerciale, les Emirats Arabes Unis ont expulsé l'armée canadienne qui disposait d'une base logistique pour les forces en Afghanistan dans ce pays :

http://www.cyberpresse.ca/international/201010/11/01-4331482-les-emirats-ferment-leur-espace-aerien-aux-ministres-canadiens.php?utm_categorieinterne=trafficdrivers&utm_contenuinterne=cyberpresse_lire_aussi_4332429_article_POS1

[jeanmi]

Un militaire français a été tué en Afghanistan lors d'une opération dans la vallée d'Uzbeen, a annoncé vendredi la présidence de la République.

Il s'agit du 50e militaire français tué en Afghanistan depuis 2001 et le début de l'intervention militaire

Grièvement blessé jeudi au cours d'un accrochage, ce sous-officier du 126e régiment d'infanterie de Brive, est décédé de ses blessures vendredi.

Un autre militaire français a été blessé au cours de l'opération, précise la présidence dans un communiqué.

[slider69]

une pensée pour sa famille.

sur les opérations rien à dire.ils font le maximum.

sur le fond stratégique de cet engagement...j'attends encore d'y voir le moindre des intérêts pour la France.

sur une vidéo en 5 parties de liveleak on voit une unitée de Marine obligé de pousser ( voir presque frapper les gus de L'ANA pour qu'ils avancent.

je pense qu'a partir d'indices aussi clair que çà , plus les manoeuvres de Karzai auprès des talibans. franchement faudrait que Morin et Sarkozy nous explique les buts de guerre.

de plus une infographie des 9 années de guerre montre bien la corrélation entre la politique "les esprits et les coeurs" et ne nombres de mort en augmentations depuis 2 ans. qu'attend Morin pour fixer d'autres moyens plus radicaux envers les "patchounes talibans"?  plutôt que de nous faire croire qu'ils sont de modestes paysans.soit on fait la guerre à la petite cuillère , soit à la louche en fixant des règles plus radicales et qui mettront nos soldats en meilleur position tactique.

[Gibbs le Cajun]

RIP pour le camarade tombé .

[Gibbs le Cajun]

le patron du battle group Richelieu ( le 2°RIMa constituant la base de se BG )  qui rejoindra l'afghanistan début décembre ,n'est autre que le lieutenant-colonel Heluin ( actuel CDC du 2°de Marine ),qui fut le chef de section de la 1° compagnie du  3°RIMa qui mena l'assaut lors de la reprise du pont de Verbanja à sarajevo en 1995 .

on ne cite pas le  nom du patron du attle Group Richelieu ,mais en général s'est le chef de corps du régiment "leader"  qui prend le commandement du battle group en partance pour l'afghanistan .

un lien (le site du 2°RIMa ,qui est pas mal fichu  =),vous direz que je ne suis pas objectif vu mes origines TDM  :lol:) ,on peu lire la biographie du colonel Heluin .

http://www.2rima.fr/index.html

[French Kiss]

Je me dis qu'une majorite d'afghans ne sont jamais sorti de leurs vallees, des lors, comment leur donner le sentiment d'un interet national pour leur pays, contre des "terroristes" qui trouvent grace a leurs yeux en tanant le cuir de l'occupant, alors que pour eux, l'interet commun trouve ses limites aux cercles familiaux et tribaux?

Vouloir constituer une grande armee afghane me semble plus relever du doux reve que d'un espoir realiste, si le gouvernement afghan parvient deja a former un corps d'armee capable de defendre Kaboul une fois l'ISAF partie, ce sera deja beau...

[g4lly]

http://lemamouth.blogspot.com/2010/10/de-veritables-soldats-des-gens.html

Alors qu'un infirmier du 126e RI a été tué hier en Afghanistan, le capitaine Eric, du 13e BCA, éclaire le courage de la filière médicale en Afghanistan en relatant au micro de Pierre Julien comment un médecin et une infirmière (1) ont sauvé sous le feu huit vies de soldats français, en Kapisa, le 9 mai dernier. "De grands professionnels de santé", "de véritables soldats"," des gens extraordinaires" lâche ce vétéran de l'Afghanistan (trois mandats). A entendre, ici.

(1) décorée de la croix de la valeur militaire ce mardi aux Invalides

http://www.rtl.fr/actualites/article/afghanistan-un-sous-officier-francais-tue-7630468070

[g4lly]

http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/10/15/afghanistan.report/index.html

(CNN) -- The insurgency in Afghanistan is gaining strength and new recruits in areas where the Taliban has not previously been prominent, according to a new report from the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) in Kabul.

In the third quarter of this year, it says, armed attacks by insurgents were 59 percent higher than in the same period of 2009.

The gloomy assessment of the security situation says some districts in northern provinces are in danger of slipping beyond control, and it describes efforts to form local militias in opposition to the Taliban as "clumsy."

It recommends that nongovernmental organizations engage with insurgent groups rather than avoid them.

There is evidence that insurgents are ready to accommodate nongovernmental organizations, according to the report.

The ANSO director, Nic Lee, writes that counterinsurgency efforts in Kandahar and Marjah in the south "have failed to degrade [insurgents'] ability to fight, reduce the number of civilian combat fatalities or deliver boxed government."

NATO said earlier this year that as part of its plan to secure Marjah, it planned to inject government services rapidly -- a plan dubbed by then commander U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal as "government in a box."

The new report says that insurgents are now operating advanced administrations in the south and east, and field reports suggest that insurgents are attracting non-Pashtun support in the north from elements within the Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik communities.

The Taliban is predominantly made up of Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan.

Within this environment, the report says, nongovernmental organizations are taking ever more precautions, and deliberate attacks on aid workers by insurgent groups have fallen this year.

Abductions of local nongovernmental organizations employees -- especially in the north -- have risen sharply, but all have been released. It says 25 workers have been killed in the first nine months of this year, compared with 17 in the same period last year.

However, this year's death toll includes the killing of 10 aid workers -- including eight foreigners -- in one attack in the far north-east of Afghanistan in August. The Taliban at first claimed responsibility for that attack but later denied being involved.

The most striking statistic produced by ANSO concerns the number of attacks by "armed opposition groups" this year.

After falling in the months following the presidential election in August 2009, it began climbing from 523 in February this year to a record high of 1,483 in September. ANSO says September's high was largely due to the parliamentary elections, but sees a consistent pattern over the past five years, with attacks rising 45 to 55 percent year on year.

It concludes that the growth in insurgent activity may be in part a response to the increase in NATO operations, especially in the south. But the report notes that many of the provinces showing the sharpest increases are in the east and north.

ANSO advises nongovernmental organizations on safety conditions in Afghanistan.

[slider69]

je pense aux trois enfants du soldat.

------

"Le chef de l'État réaffirme son soutien au peuple afghan et aux autorités afghanes. Il exprime la détermination de la France à continuer d'oeuvrer au sein de la Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité", conclut le texte."

le peuples Afghans ? ou les peuples Afghans plutôt!

franchement se battre pour karzai et le peuple Afghan ne veut plus rien dire quand justement tout le monde sait sauf Morin et Sarkozy qu'on se bat contre des villageois. faut arrêter de nous prendre pour des neuneus.

[g4lly]

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/10/4771231

While much of the public debate over the war in Afghanistan has focused on the “surge” of U.S. troops there and the effect of President Obama’s July withdrawal deadline, a quieter but equally significant increase in civilian resources has also taken place. An “uplift” of U.S. government interagency civilian personnel from the State Department, the Agency for International Development and the Agriculture Department, among other agencies, has also taken place. Announced by Obama in March 2009, the civilian uplift is “a substantial increase in our civilians on the ground ... to advance security, opportunity and justice — not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up in the provinces.” The plan was to increase the number of civilian personnel in Afghanistan from roughly 360 in January 2009 to approximately 1,000 by early 2010 and to around 1,200 to 1,300 by late 2010. Most personnel would be located in the provinces and districts of Afghanistan where coalition troops are located, while those in Kabul would concentrate on partnering with key central government ministries focused on delivering services to the Afghan people. The vast undertaking of recruiting, training, deploying and evaluating these personnel has significantly tested State, where the offices of the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the deputy secretary of state have been the coordinating organizations for the uplift. Since September marked the 1½-year anniversary of the president’s announcement of the uplift, it is useful to see how the increase has been implemented and to evaluate whether it has satisfied the president’s goals and met the needs of the Afghan people for good governance, positive administration, and robust reconstruction and development activities.

...

[P4]

French General Mixes Formula for a Bit of Afghan Calm

French General Mixes Formula for a Bit of Afghan Calm
By ALISSA J. RUBIN

FORWARD OPERATING BASE TORA, Afghanistan — Just east of Kabul lies a stark mountain moonscape that for centuries was home to gunmen who preyed on travelers and harassed invaders in the narrow mountain passes. As recently as last year, ambushes of NATO troops were not uncommon.

Now, the French soldiers responsible for the area say they believe that the situation has calmed so much that by next summer or even earlier, they would be comfortable handing primary responsibility for this district, Sarobi, in eastern Kabul Province, to Afghan troops.

“Of course this is a political decision, but the district of Sarobi could be transferred to Afghan control not later than the summer of 2011; I think even by February it could be ready,” said Brig. Gen. Pierre Chavancy, the commander of Task Force Lafayette, the French brigade in Afghanistan with 2,500 soldiers.

The handing over of districts to Afghan security forces is expected to begin next year in preparation for the gradual withdrawal of NATO troops. The French experience in Sarobi suggests that with a substantial number of Afghan troops, generous spending on civilian projects like schools and jobs programs and a local government that is not too corrupt, it is possible to create a measure of calm.

Less clear is whether that formula would work in other parts of a country where overall security has deteriorated. In some violent areas, corruption is so entrenched that it is all but impossible to root out, and the Taliban and other rebels are pervasive.

As he departs for France after his six-month tour, General Chavancy says he believes he is seeing the moment when the French Army’s work of the last two and a half years has begun to pay off, at least in Sarobi. The other troubled district in the French area of operations, Tagab, remains rife with Taliban fighters.

His analysis is that many of the local Taliban in Sarobi are not “very serious” and join the insurgency to make a living.

“These are peasants born to the mountains,” he said. “Their main problem is land. Each family has five and a half boys, but only one will inherit the land, what will the other 4.5 do? They need an income.”

General Chavancy’s certainty that Sarobi will be ready reflects the improvements his soldiers have seen in the Afghan Army’s professionalism but also a measure of realism about what can be achieved in this strategic crescent that was fought over by the British in the 19th century, the Russians in the 20th century and now the NATO coalition. Some violence is inevitable, but not necessarily worrisome, he said.

“O.K., on the road there are some hot spots, some small-arms fire against the A.N.A., the A.N.P., but nothing really significant,” he said, referring to the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. “And you have also some tensions and rivalries that have nothing to do with what we are doing here.”

The French battalion commander in charge of Sarobi, Col. Jerome Goisque, whose Forward Operating Base Tora looks out across the mountains and whose soldiers patrol its valleys, is more reserved. He said it would probably not be possible for a foreign civilian to travel on the roads. “It is quiet, but sometimes you have ambushes or exchanges of fire,” he said. “But if we were not there it would be worse.”

Still, compared with when the French took over from the Italians two and a half years ago, Sarobi now is far less lawless. Before, both Sarobi and Tagab were thick with Taliban fighters. Shortly after the French arrived, one of their patrols was ambushed in Sarobi; 10 French soldiers were killed, the largest loss of life for the French military since a bombing in Lebanon in 1983, which also killed 241 Americans. Last November, members of a French patrol were ambushed as they headed to a meeting.

Now the Taliban are passing through the area rather than living there, said General Chavancy, a quietly serious man, who has served in Bosnia, Djibouti and the Central African Republic, among other places. He credits the gradual professionalization of the Afghan Army and its growth. Afghans have begun to trust their soldiers, he said.

Many of the officers are old Northern Alliance commanders, who fought the local Taliban for years, and they know the area well. That would not be a recipe for peace since the local residents are Pashtuns, and the Pashtuns here are the officers’ old enemies, but the Afghan military is behaving “nationally not ethnically,” General Chavancy said.

Helping as well may be that the French Task Force Lafayette has a $50 million a year budget for civic projects, and while not all of it is being spent in Sarobi, enough is so that some poor areas are getting needed funds.

And, in Sarobi, the governor is not particularly corrupt and so there is less antagonism toward the government than in neighboring Kapisa Province, where corruption has been rife and the insurgency has used that to rally people against Afghan and NATO forces, the general said.

France is one of a handful of countries in the 40-member coalition in Afghanistan that is conducting combat operations; it has lost 49 soldiers since 2001. As is the case in most European countries, the government in France has only limited domestic support for the Afghanistan mission.

“The main thing French people feel is perplexity, they don’t understand what we do here,” General Chavancy said.

Hardest is to explain why the French have been unable to bring home two detained French journalists. The two struck off on their own in Tagab District, in Kapisa Province, and were kidnapped on Dec. 30, 2009. The French will not discuss the kidnapping or their efforts to win the journalists’ release.

Unlike Sarobi District, not much has changed in Tagab during the past two and a half years as the French have patrolled the area. General Chavancy estimates that there are 250 Taliban fighters operating there; girls are not permitted to go to school and travel can be dangerous.

General Chavancy estimates that it will be late 2012 before Tagab can be transferred to Afghan control.