[Afghanistan]

[slider69]

début d'analyse en profondeur des 8 ans de conflit

http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2009/10/07/apres-8-ans-de-guerre-obama-cherche-une-strategie-en-afghanistan_1250327_3216.html

@++

bye

[pascal]

article intéressant car aux USA on recommence à faire la distinstion entre "taliban" et Al Quaeda pour expliquer un éventuel recetrage de l'action sur les zones de déploiement privilégiés de "la Base" et notamment au Pakistan...

Nos politiques n'en doutons pas vont eux aussi réactualiser leur discours et suivre les américains dans ce domaine ... une fois de plus

Je serais curieux de voir ce que nous dirons nous français si les américains se recentrent ainsi sur les zones tribales ...

[collectionneur]

Voici un texte ''marxiste léniliste'' avec les chiffres de la guerre en Afghanistan, source non donné :

http://www.cpcml.ca/francais/Lmlq2009/Q39164.htm#1

Voici quelques faits et données concernant les dépenses massives pour la guerre en Afghanistan :

Nombre de civils afghans tués selon l'ONU de janvier à juillet 2009 : 1 013, soit 24 % de plus que pour la même période l'année précédente (Selon différentes sources le nombre réel de victimes est beaucoup plus élevé.)

Financement annuel des opérations de combat des États-Unis en Afghanistan en 2002 : 20,8 milliards $

Financement annuel des opérations de combat des États-Unis en Afghanistan en 2009 : 60,2 milliards $

Financement total des opérations de combat des États-Unis en Afghanistan de 2002 à 2009 : 228,2 milliards $

Financement total de la mission canadienne en Afghanistan de 2001 à 2011 : 18,5 milliards $

Budgets demandés par l'administration Obama pour la guerre en 2010 : 68 milliards $ (dépassant pour la première fois depuis 2003 les budgets pour la guerre en Irak)

Nombre de soldats américains en Afghanistan en 2002 : 5 200

Nombre de soldats canadiens en Afghanistan en 2002 : 850

Nombre prévu de soldats américains en Afghanistan en décembre 2009 : 68 000

Nombre de soldats canadiens en Afghanistan en 2009 : 2 700

Budgets récemment demandés par l'ambassadeur américain Karl Eikenberry pour les dépenses non militaires en Afghanistan pour 2010 : 2,5 milliards $

Budgets dépensés depuis 2001 pour la « reconstruction » en Afghanistan : 38 milliards $ (dont plus de la moitié est consacrée à la formation et à l'équipement des forces de sécurité afghanes)

Pourcentage du financement des États-Unis pour l'Afghanistan ayant servi à des fins militaires : presque 90 %

Coût de la récente modernisation de la base aérienne de Bagram (une ancienne base soviétique maintenant devenue la plus grande base américaine en Afghanistan) : 220 millions $

Nombre de centres de commandements régionaux américains en Afghanistan : 4 (Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif et Bagram)

Nombre de prisons et de centres de détention américains : environ 36 « sites surpeuplés et souvent violents » accueillant 15 000 détenus

Nombre de bases aériennes : au moins 74 dans le nord de l'Afghanistan et d'autres en voie de construction (Le nombre total de bases en Afghanistan ne semble pas disponible.) (Je pense qu'ils confondent avec les bases avec héliports)

Nombre de bases canadiennes en Afghanistan : 2

Pourcentage des avions d'espionnage et de véhicules aériens sans pilote maintenant consacrés à l'Afghanistan : 66 % (33 % en Irak)

Coût d'un seul contrat du Pentagone avec DynCorp International Inc et Fluor Corporation « pour la construction de bases militaires en Afghanistan » : au moins 15 milliards $

Coût par soldat du maintien des forces américaines en Afghanistan comparé à l'Irak : 30 % plus élevé

Nombre de litres d'essence utilisés chaque jour par les Marines en Afghanistan : 3 000 000

Coût d'un seul litre d'essence livré dans une zone de guerre en Afghanistan : environ 27 $

Nombre de litres d'essence utilisés pour la climatisation des tentes des soldats américains en Afghanistan : 1,7 million (par jour, par an ???)

[slider69]

salut

sait on le coût réel (1) du maintien des unités Françaises?

l'état tient il un décompte par année de l'aventure Afghane?

(1) coût opérationnel + frais de métropole pour acquisition de complément, location d'avion etc..

@++

bye

[g4lly]

Voici un texte ''marxiste léniliste'' avec les chiffres de la guerre en Afghanistan, source non donné :

L'important c'est "dans une zone de guerre"

Certaine FOB sont ravitaillé en carburant par helico ... imagine je cout. Les autres convoi essence par route occupent l'équivalent de deux sections rien que pour l'escorte ... y a autant de vehicule armée que de PL. Les anglais on meme imaginé des MRAP cargo sur base cougar pour transporter leur fret en zone chaude. Par contre a la pompe a Kaboul c'est 26 afhganis... mais a FOB Rhino ... 26$ :)

[fifou]

il parait qu'aux info ils ont montrés la vidéo de l'embuscade sur les 8 soldats américains tués, quelqu'un aurait la vidéo ?

[Saladin]

il parait qu'aux info ils ont montrés la vidéo de l'embuscade sur les 8 soldats américains tués, quelqu'un aurait la vidéo ?

Je pense que c'est celles là mais pas sûr : http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=99f_1254768950

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=68f_1254868284

[Chaps]

C'est une vidéo d'un combat de l'année passée (celle vue à la tv).

En tout cas; celle qui est passée ce jour avec des vues depuis hélicoptères pour illustrer la perte des 8 gi's

edit: correction

[debonneguerre]

Impessionantes les explosions des videos, qu'est ce selon vous? dépot qui explose, ou un missile laché prêt des compounds? ce qui n'aurait rien à voir avec un quelconque succés des assaillants comme le laissent croire les cris qui suivent dans la foulée.

[g4lly]

Impessionantes les explosions des videos, qu'est ce selon vous? dépot qui explose, ou un missile laché prêt des compounds? ce qui n'aurait rien à voir avec un quelconque succés des assaillants comme le laissent croire les cris qui suivent dans la foulée.

Une attaque au camion piégé ... plusieurs tonne d'explosif ca fait tout de suite sont petit effet.

[debonneguerre]

Une attaque au camion piégé ... plusieurs tonne d'explosif ca fait tout de suite sont petit effet.

Oui c'est surement ca.

Et sur les circonstances de la mort des 8 soldats us, personne n'a d'infos?

[Lord Aevy]

Le contingent français en Afghanistan perd son 36e soldat

PARIS - Un soldat blessé en Afghanistan le 4 septembre est décédé jeudi en France des suites de ses blessures, portant à 36 le nombre des pertes françaises, apprend-on auprès de l'état-major des armées.

Patrouille française dans la province afghane de Wardak, à la mi-juillet. Un soldat blessé en Afghanistan le 4 septembre est décédé jeudi en France des suites de ses blessures, portant à 36 le nombre des pertes françaises dans le pays. (Reuters/Shamil Zhumatov)

Dans un communiqué, Nicolas Sarkozy a déclaré que ce nouveau décès n'entamait pas "la volonté de la France de poursuivre son engagement en Afghanistan" et s'est associé à la douleur de la famille.

Le soldat Johann Hivin-Gérard avait été blessé le 4 septembre lors d'un accrochage entre un convoi du 3e régiment d'infanterie de marine de Vannes et des insurgés dans la province de Kapisa, entre Nijrab et Bagram.

Cette patrouille de sept véhicules avait été visée par un engin explosif, faisant deux morts et huit blessés dans les rangs français.

Les blessés avaient été rapatriés par avion.

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/2/le-contingent-francais-en-afghanistan-perd-son-36e-soldat_793114.html

[alexandreVBCI]

http://www.defensenews.com/osd_story.php?sh=VSDA&i=4314376&c=HOM&s=TOP

L'armée américaine veut envoyer des "mules" en afghanistan pour les tester.

Large Robot Vehicle Could See Trials In Afghanistan

BY karen walker, armed forces journal

Published: 7 Oct 15:30 EDT (19:30 GMT) 

Plans are under way to send two large autonomous robots to Afghanistan to see how well they operate as light infantry unit support vehicles.

The Lockheed Martin MULE/ARV-A(L) (Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle/Armed Robotic Vehicle-Assault(Light)) on display Oct. 7 at AUSA 2009. ( SHEILA VEMMER / STAFF) If the robots perform well, the U.S. Army is expected to issue a request for proposals (RFP) under its urgent-need acquisition program, which could fast-track a new generation of large robot vehicles into combat zones.

The Lockheed Martin Squad Mission Support System (SMSS) is on display at the Lockheed booth at the AUSA 2009 convention. It is a smaller, light infantry version of Lockheed's 3.5-ton Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment (MULE) robot vehicle for mounted/convoy operations. But while the SMSS may be the MULE's smaller cousin, it's not exactly petite, weighing 5,000 pounds and capable of lugging a 1,000-pound payload.

Don Nimblett, Lockheed Martin business development manager, combat maneuver systems, said the SMSS was aimed at the dismounted soldier, providing a squad-level support system that can carry the unit's supplies.

It also has potential use as a Special Operations support vehicle. Two SMSSs can be carried in a CH-47 helicopter and one can be loaded into a Merlin helicopter.

Two SMSS vehicles have been supplied on short-term trials to Fort Benning, Ga.; first to take part in the Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment, where new technologies are tested by soldiers, and again in August at the request of the Army's requirements division. Nimblett said they expect to see a report on how it fared in those tests by the end of October.

"We think it went well," he said. "One of the biggest comments we are getting now is 'why isn't this in Afghanistan?' "

That could soon change if the Army succeeds in getting funds to buy two SMSS vehicles for Afghanistan operations. Nimblett said there was an aggressive schedule to make that happen by March.

Ideally, the Army will buy two new vehicles that will be purpose-built. Given the short timeline, however, the Army might have to buy two of Lockheed's existing seven vehicles.

"We know that the Infantry Center has published a CPD [capabilities production document] and it's part of the acquisition process, and we are told that it's at the Army Department HQ. So if they sign it and approve it, that will establish it as an official requirement," Nimblett said.

Down the road, and after at least six months of in-theater testing, the Army could then issue an RFP for more such vehicles.

Lockheed says it expects a competitive bid to follow, but as things stand now, there is no other autonomous vehicle of this size that has been through as much soldier evaluation as the SMSS.

The SMSS can be controlled in a number of ways. It can be manned and driven in a conventional way; it can be remotely operated via a joystick; it can be tele-operated from beyond line-of-sight via its own sensors; or it can go into true autonomous operation.

In autonomous operation, it can even be told to follow a particular soldier. It takes a picture of that soldier and then follows him wherever he goes.

Nimblett said the company is also exploring the possibility of adding voice-recognition capability to the SMSS so it can obey voice commands.

[slider69]

"Dans un communiqué, Nicolas Sarkozy a déclaré que ce nouveau décès n'entamait pas "la volonté de la France de poursuivre son engagement en Afghanistan" et s'est associé à la douleur de la famille."

--------------

Le sergent Johann Hivin-Gérard, grièvement blessé dans l'explosion, appartenait au 3e régiment d'infanterie de marine (3e RIMa) de Vannes, dans le Morbihan. Il était marié, père d'un enfant, son épouse étant enceinte de six mois.

--------------

encore une fois , sincèrement çà m'attriste ces morts en Aghanistan.

le politique en question à t il bien mesurer la portée de son engagement?

croit il vraiment qu'avec nos 100 000 hommes (isaf) les choses vont évoluer positivement?

a quel prix humain et financier cette guerre sera remise en cause?et sous quel calendrier?

dire simplement que la mort de ce petit gars ne remet pas en cause notre mission est une ânerie de plus.la meilleur preuve reste la remise en cause récente de Mr Obama. un politique qui analyse sa géostratégie je trouve cela sain , par rapport à un autre qui parle pour parler sans vision stratégique.

@++

bye

[g4lly]

encore une fois , sincèrement çà m'attriste ces morts en Aghanistan.

le politique en question à t il bien mesurer la portée de son engagement?

Dire le contraire serait mettre nos soldats dans la ligne de mire. Il ne faut surtout pas avoir l'air faible ... du moins pas plus que les autres sinon tu deviens la cible et tu es condamné a ne rien faire ou a morfler.

Quant a notre présence la bas elle est avant tout lié a nos "alliés" ... on ne peut tout simplement pas partir, alors autant rester dans les moins mauvaises conditions.

[slider69]

la petite ou le petit ne verra jamais son papa !

çà doit être çà "la moins mauvaise des conditions" ?

évitons le traumatisme à la Dien bien phu.

un objectif difficile à atteindre avec des soldats loin de tout et fixé au sol dans une guerre d'occupation alors que le secret de la guerre , c'est le mouvement permanent. ( voir la biographie de Mc Arthur présent en 14-18 au coté des Francais et en 42-45 dans le pacifique)

@++

bye

[g4lly]

la petite ou le petit ne verra jamais son papa !

çà doit être çà "la moins mauvaise des conditions" ?

évitons le traumatisme à la Dien bien phu.

un objectif difficile à atteindre avec des soldats loin de tout et fixé au sol dans une guerre d'occupation alors que le secret de la guerre , c'est le mouvement permanent. ( voir la biographie de Mc Arthur présent en 14-18 au coté des Francais et en 42-45 dans le pacifique)

@++

bye

On est pas en guerre la bas ... tout le probleme est la ... la guerre on sait faire et on l'a bien faite. C'est la paix qu'on ne sait pas faire.

[FATac]

la petite ou le petit ne verra jamais son papa !

çà doit être çà "la moins mauvaise des conditions" ?

C'est justement le genre de considération qu'il ne faut pas avoir dans ce genre de cas.

Cela sape la résilience de notre population, et indirectement celle de nos forces armées.

Pour le dire crument (ce qui ne préjuge en rien de l'émotion que je peux ressentir vis à vis de ce soldat et de ses proches) : on ne fait pas d'omelette sans casser des oeufs ... et ces oeufs, ce sont nos soldats.

Leur engagement portait en lui le risque du sacrifice ultime. Cet engagement est initialement personnel, il devient familial à la fondation du foyer. Cela doit être admis et accepté par les proches - ou bien il faut rompre : soit le couple, soit l'engagement.

La guerre étant une continuité de l'action politique, elle doit être menée, de bout en bout, sans émotion parasite. L'état doit gérer les conséquence de ses choix (soutien familial, etc.), mais ne doit pas laisser l'émotion faire entrer de l'irrationnel dans la conduite des opération ou dans leur orientation à long terme.

C'est mon opinion, et je comprends qu'elle ne soit pas partagée.

[BTK]

http://www.defensenews.com/osd_story.php?sh=VSDA&i=4314376&c=HOM&s=TOP

L'armée américaine veut envoyer des "mules" en afghanistan pour les tester.

Large Robot Vehicle Could See Trials In Afghanistan

BY karen walker, armed forces journal

Published: 7 Oct 15:30 EDT (19:30 GMT) 

Plans are under way to send two large autonomous robots to Afghanistan to see how well they operate as light infantry unit support vehicles.

The Lockheed Martin MULE/ARV-A(L) (Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle/Armed Robotic Vehicle-Assault(Light)) on display Oct. 7 at AUSA 2009. ( SHEILA VEMMER / STAFF) If the robots perform well, the U.S. Army is expected to issue a request for proposals (RFP) under its urgent-need acquisition program, which could fast-track a new generation of large robot vehicles into combat zones.

The Lockheed Martin Squad Mission Support System (SMSS) is on display at the Lockheed booth at the AUSA 2009 convention. It is a smaller, light infantry version of Lockheed's 3.5-ton Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment (MULE) robot vehicle for mounted/convoy operations. But while the SMSS may be the MULE's smaller cousin, it's not exactly petite, weighing 5,000 pounds and capable of lugging a 1,000-pound payload.

Don Nimblett, Lockheed Martin business development manager, combat maneuver systems, said the SMSS was aimed at the dismounted soldier, providing a squad-level support system that can carry the unit's supplies.

It also has potential use as a Special Operations support vehicle. Two SMSSs can be carried in a CH-47 helicopter and one can be loaded into a Merlin helicopter.

Two SMSS vehicles have been supplied on short-term trials to Fort Benning, Ga.; first to take part in the Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment, where new technologies are tested by soldiers, and again in August at the request of the Army's requirements division. Nimblett said they expect to see a report on how it fared in those tests by the end of October.

"We think it went well," he said. "One of the biggest comments we are getting now is 'why isn't this in Afghanistan?' "

That could soon change if the Army succeeds in getting funds to buy two SMSS vehicles for Afghanistan operations. Nimblett said there was an aggressive schedule to make that happen by March.

Ideally, the Army will buy two new vehicles that will be purpose-built. Given the short timeline, however, the Army might have to buy two of Lockheed's existing seven vehicles.

"We know that the Infantry Center has published a CPD [capabilities production document] and it's part of the acquisition process, and we are told that it's at the Army Department HQ. So if they sign it and approve it, that will establish it as an official requirement," Nimblett said.

Down the road, and after at least six months of in-theater testing, the Army could then issue an RFP for more such vehicles.

Lockheed says it expects a competitive bid to follow, but as things stand now, there is no other autonomous vehicle of this size that has been through as much soldier evaluation as the SMSS.

The SMSS can be controlled in a number of ways. It can be manned and driven in a conventional way; it can be remotely operated via a joystick; it can be tele-operated from beyond line-of-sight via its own sensors; or it can go into true autonomous operation.

In autonomous operation, it can even be told to follow a particular soldier. It takes a picture of that soldier and then follows him wherever he goes.

Nimblett said the company is also exploring the possibility of adding voice-recognition capability to the SMSS so it can obey voice commands.

On fait moins cher et aussi, sinon plus, efficace depuis des millénaires :

http://www.olive-drab.com/od_army-horses-mules_afghanistan.php

On peut aussi se poser la question de l'utilité d'un truc aussi gros et aussi technologique dans un environnement dur comme l'A-stan.

Je vois plus l'utilité des mules robotiques dans les environnements urbains et périurbains, comme point de ravitaillement.

Pour moi le problème vient de la source : le poids de l'équipement transporté et son inflation dans les armées occidentales.

[g4lly]

On fait moins cher et aussi, sinon plus, efficace depuis des millénaires :

http://www.olive-drab.com/od_army-horses-mules_afghanistan.php

On peut aussi se poser la question de l'utilité d'un truc aussi gros et aussi technologique dans un environnement dur comme l'A-stan.

Je vois plus l'utilité des mules robotiques dans les environnements urbains et périurbains, comme point de ravitaillement.

Pour moi le problème vient de la source : le poids de l'équipement transporté et son inflation dans les armées occidentales.

Y a pas plus de techno dans une mule comme ca que dans un M-ATV ou je ne sais quoi qu'on utilise la bas.

L'interet de la mule c'est que c'est non habité et que si ca pete c'est po tres grave. Et comme ce qui compte c'est d'épargner les vies ... il suffit de limiter les hommes dans les convoi de ravito en faisant des ravito automatisé ... ils petent tant pis. Pendant ce temps les hommes continue la mission.

[BTK]

C'est justement le genre de considération qu'il ne faut pas avoir dans ce genre de cas.

Cela sape la résilience de notre population, et indirectement celle de nos forces armées.

Pour le dire crument (ce qui ne préjuge en rien de l'émotion que je peux ressentir vis à vis de ce soldat et de ses proches) : on ne fait pas d'omelette sans casser des oeufs ... et ces oeufs, ce sont nos soldats.

Leur engagement portait en lui le risque du sacrifice ultime. Cet engagement est initialement personnel, il devient familial à la fondation du foyer. Cela doit être admis et accepté par les proches - ou bien il faut rompre : soit le couple, soit l'engagement.

La guerre étant une continuité de l'action politique, elle doit être menée, de bout en bout, sans émotion parasite. L'état doit gérer les conséquence de ses choix (soutien familial, etc.), mais ne doit pas laisser l'émotion faire entrer de l'irrationnel dans la conduite des opération ou dans leur orientation à long terme.

C'est mon opinion, et je comprends qu'elle ne soit pas partagée.

+1

On notera aussi dans l'actualité :

"Les locaux du service de recrutement des armées, à Paris, aspergés de peinture rouge"

http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-monde/2009-10-08/afghanistan-les-locaux-du-service-de-recrutement-des-armees-a-paris-asperges/1648/0/383836

J'aime bien la partie "exprimant ainsi leur solidarité avec le peuple afghan de Kaboul". Ca leur fera chaud au coeur la solidarité quand les Talibans reprendront Kaboul et recommenceront les exécutions sommaires.

Comme dis plus haut, les français ne se sentent pas/moyennement concernés par le dossier pour plusieurs raisons :

-le dossier est tenu par l'Elysée, c'est le pré carré de Sarko

-la parole est déniée à l'Assemblée, donc au peuple

-le traitement par les médias français est archi-nul. Quand on voit le reportage M6 pour faire pleurer dans les chaumières, ça aide pas à montrer au français le sacrifice nécessaire. D'ailleurs sur ce forum la source n°1 est anglo-saxonne !

-la communication du MinDef et de l'Elysée n'est également pas au niveau pour parler à notre société où l'émotion gouverne l'opinion.

Arrêtons de mentir aux gens (ou de les désinformer), l'A-stan fait parti d'un axe de crise, se barrer de ce pays à court terme reviens à condamner sa population. Je ne dis pas qu'il n'y a pas des choses à changer sur la façon dont est menée la guerre et la politique. Discutons-en.

Que les gens s'expriment et débattent fait du bien à la démocratie, par contre partir d'A-stan lui ferait très très mal à moyen et long terme.

[P4]

Les soldats US dans le Wardak ont un petit moral,

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6865359.ece

[Gibbs le Cajun]

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/2/le-contingent-francais-en-afghanistan-perd-son-36e-soldat_793114.html

gibbs

RIP camarade .

[Coriace]

+1

On notera aussi dans l'actualité :

"Les locaux du service de recrutement des armées, à Paris, aspergés de peinture rouge"

http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-monde/2009-10-08/afghanistan-les-locaux-du-service-de-recrutement-des-armees-a-paris-asperges/1648/0/383836

J'aime bien la partie "exprimant ainsi leur solidarité avec le peuple afghan de Kaboul".

Pour leur soutien aux Talibans (et oui) je les enverrais bien là bas , voir comment c'est de pas avoir le droit de vote, ni la liberté de religion , ni la liberté d'expression , ni l'égalité (au moins théorique) des sexes, ni un systeme de soin efficace , ni SMIC ni RMI (ils doivent connaître pourtant) . Et après qu'ils recommencent à réclamer un Afghanistan "aux Afghans comme avant" et je les fais fusiller pour racisme .

Le raisonnement est extrêmement basique , mais c'est une extrapolation du leur , on réagit comme ça au ressenti, sans réfléchir et on crache sur des gens qui n'ont rien demandés . J'ai honte d'être Français ou Européen au sens large quand je vois comme les gens tournent quand ils ont toute leur liberté . Dire qu'il y a pas si longtemps y a des gens en Uniforme (et sans) qui se sont battus pour que nous puissions exprimer nos opinions et que des connards font ça aujourd'hui .

BREF .

Rip , et une pensée pour le soldat décédé , 36 , le compteur monte trop vite . Mais j'espère que son sacrifice ne sera pas vain , et que les proches seront bien accompagnés .

[g4lly]

http://www.battlefieldtourist.com/content/2009/10/09/battle-for-cop-keating/

Here’s an account of the fight last week in Kamdesh, Nuristan, Afghanistan where 8 men from 4th ID made the ultimate sacrifice. I cannot confirm this as authentic, however, I am convinced that this account is as real as they come. The below was NOT written by myself, I am only sharing this with you so you understand what transpired that day.

Battle for COP Keating

I don’t know ALL the facts, only what I overheard on the satellite radio. COP Keating was (past tense) located on low ground, near a river, surrounded by mountains – a poor place to have to defend to begin with. The village of Kamdesh was nearby, as was a mosque. About two platoons and a cavalry troop headquarters occupied the COP – Combat Outpost. If you Google COP Keating, you will find a Washington Times article describing the austere conditions there, written earlier this year. I was on duty from 0600-1800 (6 a.m. until 6 p.m.) on Saturday, 03 OCT 09, and heard, first-hand, the events I am about to recount transpire.

I took notes as the battle unfolded. Things were relatively quiet when I came on shift at 0600. Not too long afterward, I heard a call sign describing taking small arms fire at his position. (That in itself is not alarming – I hear that frequently because I hear satellite radio transmissions from all sorts of units who operate in Nangahar, Kunar, Laghman and in Nuristan Provinces, where this happened.) The situation, then began to deteriorate. The Troop Commander – urgently – requested rotary wing gunships to support him. He was told they were 45 minutes away, and that he should use his 120 mm mortars. He replied that the mortar pit was pinned down, and that the could not employ his 120 mm mortars. I did not know until I saw an aerial photo later that day, after I got off shift, that the COP was located in a “bowl,” surrounded on nearly all sides by high ground. The insurgents were shooting down into the mortar pit from above. The 120 mm mortars from OP Fritshe, a few kilometers away were able to help a little, but it was not enough.

Not too long after the fight started, the Troop Commander said that he had a KIA, and several wounded. Uh-Oh – now this is getting serious. Not too much longer after that, the Troop Commander, in a voice that was not panic’d, but which had a sense of urgency said, “We’ve got people inside our wire!!!” He said that he had lost communications with some of his elements at different places on the COP. He had had to abandon his Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and all the various means of redundant communications there (MIRC Chat, Blue Force Tracker, tactical FM radios, etc.) His only means of communication was the satellite radio he was using. He said he urgently needed air support. The number of KIA began to climb.

He kept asking about the helicopters – his higher headquarters said they were “30 minutes out…” He said that if he did not get help soon, they were going to be overrun. He had consolidated the Soldiers he had, to include dead and wounded, in a tight perimeter on part of his COP. He advised that the Afghan National Army (ANA) side of the COP was completely overrun and was on fire. The insurgents had gotten into his perimeter where the ANA latrine bordered his perimeter, after they had overrun the ANA camp. His Entry Control Point (ECP) where some Afghan Security Guards (ASG) had been had been overrun. The ANP Police Checkpoint had been overrun and he was taking a heavy volume of fire from that. He was taking a lot of RPG fire from the mosque. His Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) was under insurgent control. He kept asking about the helicopters. He was told, “Passing Checkpoint 12…” He said, “I’m telling you that if they don’t get here f***in’ soon, we’re all going to f***in’ die!!!” Shortly after that, his Squadron Commander came up on the radio and told him that he was going to be OK, that help was on the way. The SCO said that he needed to come up on FM and talk to the helicopters, who should be ariving very soon.

The Troop Commander said that the Harris was all he had at the moment, and asked that the Squadron relay. It was, obviously, a very anxious time. I was afraid that at any moment, the Troop commander would just stop transmitting, and that would mean that they were likely all dead and dying. Someone asked the Troop commander what his target priorities were, and he said that “anything outside the wire” was controlled by bad guys. He mentioned that he needed gun runs at a particular wall, and mentioned certain Target Reference Points (TRP’s) such as “the putting green” and “the diving board.” Finally, the helicopters arrived and began killing insurgents. It became clear, however, that it was such a target-rich environment that much more air support was needed. The helicopters gave the defenders enough breathing room to better position themselves, reload, etc.

Under the umbrella of the gunships, the Troop Commander said that he was going to try to re-take some of his camp. The SCO calmly encouraged him to “fire and maneuver.” As they regained some lost ground, the Troop Commander said that he was finding some of his unaccounted for Soldiers, and that they were KIA. He gave their battle roster numbers. Things were looking better, but it was still a fierce fight. I could hear a cacophony of machine gun fire when the Troop Commander keyed that microphone to talk. The mortars were still pinned won, with one KIA and wounded in the mortar pit. After only a short time, gunships had to leave to rearm and refuel, heading to FOB Bostic. (FOB Bostic was hit with indirect fire, also, throughout the day.)

The weather in the high passes interfered with the helicopters. Close Air Support in the form of jets were on the way, and the Troop Commander was asked to provide Target Numbers, which he did. He was still being pressed on all sides, still taking a heavy volume of small arms fire and RPG’s. He had regained some buildings, but had not been able to re-capture all his perimeter. He found at least one MBITR and was able to communicate with aircraft a little better.

Once the jets arrived overhead, they began to drop bombs on the masses, the swarms of insurgents. Usually, the insurgents conduct a raid at dawn, do their damage, and flee. Not this day. I looked at my watch, and it was after 1000 and the insurgents were still attacking, even though it should have become clear to them after the close air arrived that they could no longer hope to completely overrun the camp.  The Close Air was on station continuously after that, and as soon as one plane dropped its bombs and strafed, another came down to hit targets – some very close to camp. The mosque was hit by a Hellfire, and open source now reports that a high profile insurgent named Dost Mohammad was killed there.  A target described as a “switchback” was bombed repeatedly and the insurgents seemed to simply re-occupy it only to be bombed out of it again. (Several pieces of weapons and equipment has since been found there.) The “North Face” was also repeatedly bombed and strafed. A plan was developed to get reinforcements to COP Keating.

Because it was still “too hot” to land helicopters, they were flown to OP Fritshe and had to walk to COP Keating. Asked about his ammunition (Class 5) at about 1300, the Troop commander said that he was “red” on 7.62 link and MK19 ammunition. Not too long after that, he stated that he was “black” (supply exhausted) on 7.62, but still had a lot of .50 caliber. More KIA were found, and the Troop Commander said that they were missing their sensitive items (weapons, night vision, MBITR radios – things like that.) The KIA number rose to 5. There were constant updates on a particular wounded Soldier who had a broken leg and a crushed pelvis. They said that he had lost a lot of blood, but was on an IV, and was “hanging in there.” The Troop Commander said that he had two ANA KIA, and several wounded, still with him. He said that a lot of the ANA – about 12 – had broken and run when the COP began to be overrun. (Some of their bodies were found nearby the next day, along with some ASG who were wounded.) The Troop Commander said that the insurgents had made off with the ANA’s B-10 Rocket Launcher.

Throughout the day, the air support targeted a B-10 launch site, but it was unclear if it was the same system that the ANA had lost of not. The SCO got on the net and said that there was a plan to bring in a CH-47 Chinook as soon as it got dark, with attack helicopters overhead, and that they would bring in ammo and Soldiers and evacuate the wounded and dead. The SCO said that he would fly in, also. During the battle, the SCO always seemed calm and gave a lot of encouragement to the Troop Commander on the ground. He asked for updates (Situation Reports – “SITREPS”) but he did not nag the Troop Commander for it every 5 minutes. He let the Troop Commander fight the fight, frequently asking him what he needed and asking him how he and his Soldiers were doing, offering encouragement, but not micromanaging.

The fighting continued all day, even though it was not as intense as it had been in the early morning. As the relief column approached from OP Fritshe, it got into a brief fight, quickly killing two insurgents and capturing their ICOM radios and RPG’s. Then, they continued on toward COP Keating. The fire that had completely leveled the ANA side of the COP was spreading from building to building, and was setting the COP on fire. The Troop Commander and his Soldiers had to evacuate their TOC again, because it caught on fire. Many of the barracks buildings caught on fire and burned, taking the Soldiers’ possessions with them. Only one or two buildings were left by the time it was over.

As night approached, the Troop Commander told someone (S-3? FSO?) that if the air cover were lost, and if they were attacked again, they were “done.” The Troop Commander was assured that he would have adequate air support. The CSM came up on the net and asked the Troop Commander to try to expand his perimeter in order to try to get accountability of everyone. The Troop Commander said that he “just can’t do it, I just don’t have enough people. I have too many wounded.” The CSM said that he understood, but that he was looking at a cold body on the Predator feed near the maintenance building, and thought that that might be the final missing soldier. (It was later determined that that was not him.) The Troop Commander said that there were “a lot” of dead insurgents lying dead inside his perimeter, and he could be seeing one of those.

I went off shift at 1800. At that time, there were 6 US KIA, and one missing, later found and determined to be KIA. I do not know where the 8th KIA came from: either one of the wounded died, or earlier there was a mistake in regard to accountability.

The next day (Sunday, 4 OCT) when I came to work, I learned that they had found the unaccounted-for Soldier(s) and had made it through the night. During the late morning, the SCO came up on the net and briefed someone about the situation. He said that of five (5) HMMWV’s, only one was still running. They had counted eight (8) RPG impacts on one HMMWV alone. He said that the HMMWV’s were shot all to pieces. The camp Bobcat had a window shot out, but was still running, and they were still using it to move things.

There was a lot of UXO’s (unexploded ordnance) that made the area hazardous, such as unexploded US mortar rounds that had been scattered, as well as AT-4’s and Javelin’s. Most of the Soldiers on the COP had lost all their possessions except for what they were wearing. A plan was already being developed to get them new TA-50, uniforms, boots, toiletries, etc. once they were extracted. There were a lot of sensitive items that needed to be lifted out, because they are serial numbered items that needed to be accounted for, but most everything was ruined. They discussed whether to insert engineers with a lot of explosive to blow everything up, or whether to call in air strikes after everyone was evacuated and try to destroy what was left that way. Even at this point, they were still taking the occasional odd, angry shot or rocket fire.

As I type this, I am still listening to the folks who are left at COP Keating, figuring out what to destroy, how best to destroy it (demo vs. aerial bombs or rockets) what to fly out, and making a plan on how best to get that done so they can abandon and close the COP.